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The idea for this project grew out of the results of my Master's thesis, which examined to 
what extent David Foster Wallace's novel Infinite Jest (1996) could be considered 
postmodern, and whether it had truly gone beyond postmodernism into something new and 
different. As part of that work, I compared the novel to various definitions of postmodernism, 
including one developed by Brian McHale that posited that postmodern works manifested an 
ontological dominant as opposed to the epistemological dominant he believed was present in 
modern works. While I found sections in Infinite Jest that seemed to reflect both ontological 
and epistemological concerns, which would have made the novel a postmodern/modern 
hybrid and would have been consistent with a number of theories about contemporary fiction, 
what I discovered instead was that Infinite Jest was, to a large extent, much more concerned 
with ethical questions. This led me to tentatively propose that the period after postmodernism 
may be characterized by an ethical dominant. My dissertation started as an attempt to 
examine this possibility more fully, to see if an ethical dominant applies to works other than 
Infinite Jest, and to investigate what sort of ethics might be explored in such works.
The original title of this dissertation was The Ethical Turn in Contemporary American  
Fiction, which seemed to describe the phenomenon I was observing rather concisely. 
However, after more closely examining the “ethical turn” in philosophy and literary theory 
that was already being debated and had been detailed, for example, in Mapping the Ethical 
Turn: A Reader in Ethics, Culture, and Literary Theory (2001), I quickly realized that the 
content of the ethics described by this terminology was more consistent with the postmodern 
era, and probably represented the end phase of postmodernism rather than the beginning of 
some new period. The results of my research were turning up completely different ethical 
paradigms. To avoid confusion, I removed the phrase “ethical turn” from my title. Similarly, I 
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decided not to employ the phrase “ethical dominant,” both because I did not want to be 
shackled to McHale's theory and because I don't believe that an entire cultural and historical 
period can be summed up in one simple concept. McHale's theory is a useful tool, and I will 
explore the possibility of an ethical dominant in a later chapter in order to demonstrate that 
my theory is consistent with his, but I didn't want to impose unnecessary limits on the 
application of my research. Instead, my dissertation is designed to be compatible with most of 
the contemporary theories about what comes after postmodernism.
Such a design required that I first examine those theories in depth, and compare and 
contrast them to seek out areas of agreement and dispute. This examination makes up the 
content of my first chapter. Here, I evaluate the following theories that describe what comes 
after postmodernism: Nicholas Bourriaud's altermodernism, metamodernism – a theory 
proposed by Timotheus Vermeulen and Robin van den Akker, Jefferey Nealon's post-
postmodernism, Christian Moraru's cosmodernism, Gilles Lipovetsky's hypermodernism, 
Raoul Eshelman's performatism, and Alan Kirby's digimodernism. I summarize and assess 
each of them, and then explore what they have in common. These theories all try to go 
beyond postmodernism in some way, and all of them begin with the proposition that the 
postmodern era has ended. I've divided them into two categories: those that seem to try to 
extend postmodern theory into a new form, and those that try to make a clean break with 
postmodernism and propose something radically different. In either case, the results of my 
analysis clearly indicate that a renewed interest in ethics is of concern to most if not all of 
these theories. As the different theories vary widely in theoretical content, from the 
technological determinism of digimodernism to the high-speed capitalism of 
hypermodernism to the modern/postmodern hybrid of metamodernism, it may well be that 
the only constant is the need for a contemporary ethics. It is my hope that my thesis identifies 
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a connection among these theories.
In my second chapter, I present my argument that the renewed interest in ethics and 
ethical systems is directly related to ethical weaknesses in postmodernism. Some of the 
harshest critics have claimed that postmodernism is not ethical at all, that it represents a 
nihilistic relativism that negates any attempt to think ethics. This view is reflected in some of 
the novels I examine here.  However, a postmodern concept of ethics emerged and began to 
gain prominence during the aforementioned “ethical turn,” which generally explores a 
Lévinasian ethics of “being for the other.” Such an ethics is compatible with major figures of 
postmodern thought such as Derrida (who promoted it) and Foucault, as well as movements 
that represent the marginalized, such as feminism and queer theory. I will examine some 
criticisms of postmodernism and more specifically its ethics, to reveal the kind of discontent 
that has arisen. This short section will serve primarily as background for the chapters that 
follow and is not intended to be a complete and thorough examination of postmodernism and 
its innumerable critics. After this, I will present an argument that the concept of an ethical 
dominant would expand Brian McHale's proposal that postmodernism reflects an ontological 
dominant.
In my third chapter, I present a short periodization concept that draws on the ideas 
explored in my first two chapters, in order to offer an explanation for the renewed interest in 
ethical structures or systems. I propose that postmodernity ends with the end of the Cold War, 
and that worldwide political and economic changes, spurred by the rise of the Internet, bring 
about a new mood of hope and uncertainty, triggering a need for ethical guidance. In some 
ways this new period resembles modernity, with its reawakened belief in the power of 
technology to make the world a better place, but it is a modernity tempered by a postmodern 
awareness of what could go wrong. During this chapter, I will introduce the three ethical 
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paradigms that I intend to explore in my close readings of contemporary fiction, and explain 
why I think these specific paradigms have arisen as potential responses to the weaknesses of 
postmodernism. 
The first paradigm I will examine is a neoliberal ethics of selfishness, which I will 
draw from objectivism, the philosophy of Ayn Rand. Many of the theories I examine in 
Chapter One describe the impact of neoliberalism, but the ethics of neoliberalism are not 
explored even in those works that are most closely concerned with it. Rand's ethics is one of 
ethical egoism – being for the other is replaced by being for the self. I will draw in part from 
her work The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept of Egoism (1964) to explore how 
objectivism represents nearly an exact opposite of postmodern ethics, and thus represents a 
convenient antidote to its problems. I suggest that the rise of neoliberalism must be 
accompanied by a rise in neoliberal ethics, and the close readings I present in later chapters 
seem to bear this out. 
The next ethical paradigm I explore is a pragmatist concept of a “higher power.” Here, 
I draw primarily from William James' The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902), which 
introduces the idea of a non-denominational, self-imagined God-like spiritual force that 
provides ethical guidance. The sudden appearance of multiple high-profile novels exploring 
this terrain during a short period of time drew my attention to this paradigm. The idea of the 
higher power has been disseminated throughout American culture primarily by the self-help 
group Alcoholics Anonymous, which draws its intellectual content from James; yet, I've 
found numerous novels that directly reference James as well. The higher power concept 
accommodates a postmodern critique of power structures and dogma by being self-created, 
and is usually triggered by a religious experience of some kind. Inspired by this experience, 
one imagines a higher power, essentially an idealized supernatural other, and then asks it for 
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ethical guidance. Instead of being for the other, the goal is to be for something higher than 
mere humans. 
Finally, in my third paradigm, I explore what I call the ecological metanarrative. This 
paradigm imagines the world as an ecosystem, usually contained on the planet Earth, and 
conceives of each subject as being a part of the whole. What is good, then, is what is good for 
the planet, or the system as a whole, rather than an individual. In fact, in the most extreme 
cases, human beings are seen as the enemy. Here, I draw on ideas from the Transcendentalists 
up to Deep Ecology. The metanarrative component of my concept refers to the fact that the 
threat of climate change is being viewed as not only objectively real but also imminently 
dangerous. Like the metanarratives that postmodernism had grown skeptical of, according to 
Lyotard, the ecological metanarrative insists on its universality and absolute truth, and it 
demands immediate action. Thus, the ecological metanarrative is a return to the kind of 
totalizing thought that postmodernism typically eschews, while at the same time it resembles 
a postmodern critique of modernity.
Before describing the primary texts I intend to examine, I would like to explain my 
text selection process. Although my paradigms hold true in other fields of culture, I opted to 
stay with novels because I believe that novels, due to their length and their unique exploration 
of the psychological interior of a subject, provide the best platform for examining ethics. 
Although drama, film and television provide narratives as well, rarely can they provide the 
depth of examination of psychological experience that a novel provides. We see on the stage 
or the screen what the characters do and say, but we can only infer why. Novels delve right 
into interior motivations and feelings, giving the reader unparalleled insight into reasons for 
actions, and ultimately, this is where ethics occurs. After some deliberation, I also opted to 
stay with American fiction, although I found some evidence of these paradigms in Canadian 
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and British works as well. For this project, I read over 60 novels published after 1990 in the 
United States alone, and that represented only a fragment of the total number of works 
published. Getting a picture of the contemporary fiction of every country in the world would 
have required multiple lifetimes. Furthermore, the specific paradigms I observed draw 
directly from American philosophy, and may simply not be applicable to other cultures, or if 
so, only indirectly. Limiting my text corpus to one culture enabled me to focus in more 
deeply. As this dissertation is the first foray into this territory, there is still much work to be 
done.
Finally, I chose to eliminate a number of contemporary authors and specific works if 
they could be interpreted as being postmodern or concerned with an ethics of being for the 
other. Famous names such as Thomas Pynchon, Don DeLillo, and Toni Morrison were thus 
summarily removed from consideration even though they were still alive and still writing. I 
was more interested in going after the generation raised on these writers, those who might try 
to differentiate themselves by seeking some new direction or those whose works had been 
ignored until after the postmodern era. So, while some of the authors whose novels I chose to 
examine are well-known literary figures (Jonathan Franzen, Jeffrey Eugenides, TC Boyle), 
others are less famous. I aggressively sought out and read works by authors who had only 
published one or two novels, in the hopes of finding patterns across new authors. In no way 
does my text selection imply that postmodern ethics has disappeared from the market – in 
fact, it might even be more accurate to say that an ethics of being for the other is the most 
common ethics being explored in contemporary fiction. For each one of my paradigms, I 
opted to read two different novels, one of which directly engages with postmodern ethics or 
theory while the other does not. With this design, I want to demonstrate how those works that 
do not openly refer to postmodernism are nevertheless engaged in the same project as those 
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that do. The similarities in design and approach between the novels reveal their common 
focus, and demonstrate how this focus is related to the contemporary era.
After reading a wide array of contemporary novels focused on the ethical paradigms I 
was researching, a general pattern began to emerge. There was usually at least one character, 
often the protagonist, who was living an unhappy, dysfunctional life, who had no fixed belief 
systems, no clear focus or goals, and had enormous problems making decisions. The level of 
dysfunction varies from work to work, but often these characters have substance abuse 
problems, broken relationships, have attempted suicide, and have unsatisfying dead-end jobs. 
Then, after discovering or encountering the ethical paradigm and applying it to their lives, 
these characters begin to have success and to feel happier and more fulfilled. Sometimes, two 
or more characters are contrasted instead, pursuing different ethical paradigms, with one 
producing better results than the other. At times, the characters' suffering is directly linked to 
postmodern theory, even to the point of naming specific theorists, but this is not always the 
case. The second half of my dissertation contains my close readings of these selected texts. 
In my fourth chapter, I examine the neoliberal ethics of being for the self with close 
readings of two novels. Two Girls, Fat and Thin (1991) by Mary Gaitskill provides us with a 
stellar example of the pattern I identified above. As the title suggests, there are two main 
protagonists, Justine Shade and Dorothy Never, who represent the contrast between 
postmodernism and Ayn Rand's objectivism. Justine is a jaded, unhappy, masochistic 
underachiever who decides to write an article about philosopher Anna Granite and her 
philosophy “Definitism,” which are thinly veiled caricatures of Ayn Rand and objectivism. 
She finds Dorothy Never, who not only is a follower of Anna Granite, but also her former 
secretary. Although Justine is cool, attractive and thin, while Dorothy is fat and unattractive, 
the novel suggests that Dorothy's adherence to Definitism makes her stronger than Justine, 
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and Justine begins to reluctantly admire her. In the novel's climax, it is Dorothy who plays the 
hero, saving Justine from an abusive lover. The second novel I examine in this chapter is 
Mark Costello's Big If (2002). Again, we have two protagonists, only instead of 
postmodernism versus objectivism we have Vi, a government employee, and Jens, who works 
at a startup. Vi is a Secret Service agent, and thus her life is dedicated to protecting someone 
else. She and the other agents are described as being unhappy and having highly 
dysfunctional private lives as a result of living at the whim of the government. Jens, on the 
other hand, has a happy family and is engaged in work that makes him feel satisfied. His 
startup is about to go public, and as a result of his talent and hard work, he is about to become 
rich. There is little hint of postmodernism here, but the difference between the two characters 
is ethical. Jens has chosen to live his life for himself, while Vi has sacrificed her life to 
protect others. The result is that Vi and the other agents are miserable, while Jens and his wife 
are prosperous and fulfilled. When Jens is called on to make a life-changing decision, he 
chooses himself and his family over the general public, demonstrating an ethics of the self.
My fifth chapter examines the concept of religious experience and the belief in a 
higher power. The first novel I read is Jeffrey Eugenides' The Marriage Plot (2011). Here, 
there are three characters, each of them unhappy and each of them presenting a direct and 
specific critique of postmodern theory. All are university students during the heyday of 
postmodernism in the United States, and all of them reject postmodernism in their own 
fashion. However, one of the characters, Mitchell Grammaticus, chooses to study religion 
after reading The Varieties of Religious Experience by William James. He subsequently goes 
on a journey in search of ethical truth that leads him to attempt being for the other, only to 
find that he is unable to do so. Only after he has a religious experience in a Quaker church 
can he still his unhappiness and find the right path in his life. A second character also has a 
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religious experience while suffering from bipolar disorder and subsequently chooses a similar 
path. The novel directly opposes religious experience and the belief in a higher power to 
postmodern theory. The second novel I read in this chapter is Jamesland (2004) by Michelle 
Huneven. The protagonist is Alice Black, a direct descendant of William James, who is 
referred to in the novel's title. Alice is the typical character for these novels: unhappy, having 
an affair with a married man who treats her badly, working a low-level job that doesn't fulfill 
her, and neglecting her health by drinking too much and not eating enough. After having a 
religious experience that she can't understand, she contacts the minister at her local Unitarian 
Universalist church, Helen Harlan, who is an admirer of William James and offers spiritual 
guidance to Alice. Through Helen, she becomes friends with Pete Ross, who has just gotten 
out of a mental hospital after attempting suicide. By applying the pragmatist religious ideas 
of William James, all three characters improve their lives, return to happiness, and enter more 
fulfilling careers.
My final chapter investigates the ecological metanarrative. In Jonathan Franzen's 
Freedom (2010), one of three main characters has adopted ecological ethics, while the other 
two flounder in unhappiness and substance abuse. Walter Berglund, an ardent 
environmentalist, is relentlessly described as “good” throughout the novel and is widely 
admired for it, while his best friend Richard Katz represents the nihilistic and relativist 
version of postmodernism. Katz is portrayed as cool and attractive, but without a viable belief 
system, and dedicated to hedonism. Walter's wife Patty recognizes that her husband is 
ethically in the right, but finds Richard Katz more attractive. However, her affair with Katz 
does not result in happiness, but rather in pain and loneliness. In the end, she returns to 
Walter, who has become a hero to the younger generation because of his ecological beliefs. 
The second novel in this chapter is A Friend of the Earth (2000) by T. Coraghessan Boyle. 
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This novel, like many dedicated to the ecological metanarrative, presents the reader with a 
dystopian future in which the environment has been destroyed by climate change. The 
protagonist, Ty Tierwater, has dedicated his life to fighting for the environment to such an 
extreme that he has spent years in prison. He has failed, and the consequences are spelled out 
to the reader in a vivid depiction of a ruined planet and a dangerous climate. Boyle takes the 
reader through Ty's slow indoctrination into ecological ethics and thus presents a didactic 
narrative that also attempts to indoctrinate the reader. The tragic death of Ty's daughter while 
trying to save a tree from being cut down makes her a martyr and a hero to the characters in 
the novel, and by extension, to the reader.
I believe these readings will clearly illustrate not only my specific paradigms, but also 
the centrality of the need for ethical guidance in the era after postmodernism. Since there is 
no clear consensus about what happens after postmodernity, my thesis is designed to solidify 
at least one piece of the puzzle. As my first chapter will show, my thesis is consistent with all 
of the different models, and thus, I believe that this dissertation is an important contribution 
to a new field of research. The paradigms I explore can be used to explain much of what has 
happened since the end of the Cold War, and can also serve as models for the interpretation of 
contemporary fiction. 
In addition, I believe that an exploration of ethics is a valuable pursuit on its own. As 
our society grows ever more skeptical about the value of the humanities, with much of the 
skepticism tied specifically to postmodern approaches, ethical criticism can be pointed to as 
increasingly necessary. If science, math, and technology can provide us with ever new 
products and conveniences, they have no mechanism to tell us the right thing to do with all of 
these new wonders, some of which pose a threat to the entire planet. In order to survive as a 
species, to prevent us from destroying ourselves, ethics will be needed, and ethics lies firmly 
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in the realm of the humanities. Literary theory could seize this opportunity in time to re-
establish itself as paramount. In the preface to Mapping the Ethical Turn (2001), Todd F. 
Davis and Kenneth Womack write, “[T]o pretend that the ethical or moral dimensions of the 
human condition were abandoned or obliterated in the shift to postmodernity certainly seems 
naive. Part of being human involves the daily struggle with the meanings and consequences 
of our actions, a struggle most often understood in narrative structures” (ix). Analyzing these 





In this chapter, I will analyze seven different attempts to describe what comes after 
postmodernism and then I will compare and contrast them to draw out common threads. 
There are multiple reasons why I want to start by doing this. First, I want to demonstrate that 
there is a widespread agreement among a range of theorists that postmodernism has ended. 
Next, I want to show that there is no substantial agreement about what comes after 
postmodernism. Third, my comparison will demonstrate the importance of ethics to all these 
models, meaning that the need for ethical structures or systems is one of the few areas of 
agreement among these periodization concepts. Finally, the examination of these concepts 
will serve as background for my own periodization model, which I will present in my third 
chapter, and for the close readings that follow.
1.2 Theories Extending Postmodernism
1.2.1 Altermodernism
Nicholas Bourriaud's concept of what follows postmodernism is outlined in an essay prepared 
for the art exhibition Triennial 2009 at the Tate Gallery. Both the concept and the exhibition 
are named “Altermodern,” a term “which serves both as the title of the present exhibition and 
to delimit the void beyond the postmodern” (2).  Drawing the name from the Latin word for 
“other” (alter), the term “has its roots in the idea of 'otherness'” and thus “suggests a 
multitude of possibilities, of alternatives to a single route” (2). He has formed his concept, in 
part, by conceiving of “the death of postmodernism as the starting point for reading the 
present” (2). Bourriaud proposes that the postmodern era began in 1973 with the oil crisis, 
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which “could well represent the 'primitive scene' of postmodernism in the same way as, 
according to Sloterdijk, oil gushing from a well symbolizes twentieth-century modernism” 
(7). Postmodernism, he believes, “is the philosophy of mourning, a long melancholic episode 
in our cultural life” (9), and citing Lyotard, he attributes this to the death of metanarratives: 
“[A] traumatic loss: that of the ideologies of carefree superabundance and progress, technical, 
political or cultural” (7). He insists that the postmodern era had two periods, the first of which 
was characterized by a “purely depressive attitude” (9) triggered by “[h]istory having lost its 
direction and ability to be read,” leaving nothing but “an immobilized space-time, in which, 
like reminiscences, arose mutilated fragments of the past” (9). The second period of 
postmodernism reflects “the relativisation of history itself through the medium of post-
colonial thinking” (9), and is “less melancholy – but multiculturalist” (9). The second period 
“has its beginnings in the end of the Cold War” (9), and thus, the “grand modernist narrative 
was succeeded by that of globalisation, which does not designate a cultural period properly 
speaking, but a geopolitical standardisation and the synchronisation of the historical clock” 
(10). According to Bourriaud, “The meaning of a work of art, for this second-stage 
postmodernism, depends essentially on the social background to its production” (10), and 
thus, “multiculturalism, now a critical methodology, has virtually become a system of 
allotting meanings and assigning individuals their position in the hierarchy of social 
demands” (10). This has the effect of “reducing their whole being to their identity and 
stripping all their significance back to their origins” (10). This “neurotic preoccupation with 
origins” (10), he insists, “must be called into question” (10). We are “on the verge of a leap, 
out of the postmodern period and the (essentialist) multicultural model from which it is 
indivisible” (2) into the new epoch, which would manifest “a synthesis between modernism 
and post-colonialism” (2). This urge is propelled by a “threat from fundamentalism and 
Allen 16
consumer-driven uniformisation, menaced by massification and the enforced re-abandonment 
of individual identity” (2). The “definite turning point in history” triggering this movement 
appears to be “the collapse of the globalised financial system in 2008” (6), according to 
Bourriaud.
There is a difference between the new modernism and the old, for “altermodernism 
has no desire to substitute for postmodern relativism a new universalism, rather a networked 
'archipelago' form of modernity” (13). Drawing from the writings of Winfried Georg Sebald, 
Bourriaud thus proposes the archipelago as a metaphor for the new era: “The archipelago 
(and its kindred forms, the constellation and the cluster) functions here as a model 
representing the multiplicity of global cultures” (1-2). The archipelago is “an example of the 
relationship between the one and the many” (2), whose “unity proceeds from a decision 
without which nothing would be signified save a scattering of islands united by no common 
name” (2). Contemporary culture then, due to “a multicultural explosion and the proliferation 
of cultural strata, resembles a structureless constellation awaiting transformation into an 
archipelago” (2). Creating the “abstract entity” (2) that links the parts to the whole is the role 
of altermodernism, which “sees itself as a constellation of ideas linked by the emerging and 
ultimately irresistible will to create a form of modernism for the twenty-first century” (2). 
Defining a network as a “connected chain of distinct elements in time or space” (12), he 
claims that “[v]arious materials can serve as a 'glue' to hold the component elements together, 
yet one of them today assumes a particular importance: storytelling” (12). This new network 
form of modernism “is only possible starting from the issues of the present, and assuredly not 
by an obsessive return to the past” (3). 
In fact, essential to the idea of altermodernism is the idea of heterochrony, which is “a 
vision of human history as constituted of multiple temporalities,” (3) and “is neither a 
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petrified kind of time advancing in loops (postmodernism) nor a linear vision of history 
(modernism)” (3), but instead, “a positive experience of disorientation through an art-form 
exploring all dimensions of the present, tracing lines in all directions of time and space” (3). 
Thus, “historical memory, like the topography of the contemporary world, exists only in the 
form of a network” (12). This heterochrony is possible because postmodernism “has allowed 
the historical counters to be reset to zero” (2), which has occurred “thanks to the post-colonial 
criticism of Western pretensions to determine the world's direction and the speed of its 
development” (2). This means that “today, temporalities intersect and weave a complex 
network stripped of a centre” (2). Bourriaud insists that altermodern heterochrony “is not the 
summoning up of the past to explain the present” (4), but rather, “history, the last continent to 
be explored, can be traversed like a territory” (5), creating “journeys in time” that “result in a 
modification of the way in which signs are indexed with their period” (6).
The journey as metaphor is another crucial component of altermodernism. Bourriaud 
writes: “[T]he vital thing today, starting from the standpoint of the extreme globalisation of 
world culture, is to grasp afresh the emblematic gesture of modernity – the exodus” (12). The 
altermodern, then, “brings together three sorts of nomadism: in space, in time and among the 
'signs'” (3). Bourriaud envisions the artist as a “cultural nomad” (3), who “can simultaneously 
explore geographical, historical and socio-cultural realities” (3). This approach “goes hand in 
hand with the generalisation of hypertext as a thought process: one sign directs us to a 
second, then a third, creating a chain of mutually interconnected forms, mimicking mouse-
clicks on a computer screen” (5). In fact, this exploration is one way that the contemporary 
era resembles modernism: “[W]hat remains of the Baudelairean model of modernism is no 
doubt this flânerie, transformed into a technique for generating creativeness and deriving 
knowledge” (3). This nomadism is “a way of learning about the world” (3), and “enshrines 
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specific forms, processes of visualisation peculiar to our own epoch” (3). This means that 
“trajectories have become forms: contemporary art gives the impression of being uplifted by 
an immense wave of displacements, voyages, translations, migrations of objects and beings” 
(3). In fact, Bourriaud believes that “in this era of the altermodern, displacement has become 
a method of depiction” (4), and thus, “artistic styles and formats must henceforth be regarded 
from the viewpoint of diaspora, migration and exodus” (4). This displacement means that 
“[n]o longer can a work be reduced to the presence of an object in the here and now: rather, it 
consists of a significant network whose interrelationships the artist elaborates, and whose 
progression in time and space he or she controls” (4). Bourriaud coins the word “viatorise,” 
which he takes “from Latin viator, 'traveller'” (12), to designate this approach, and believes 
that its emergence is due to the fact that “[t]here are no longer cultural roots to sustain forms, 
no exact cultural base to serve as a benchmark for variations, no nucleus, no boundaries for 
artistic language” (4). Thus, “[t]oday's artist, in order to arrive at precise points, takes as their 
starting point global culture and no longer the reverse” (4). Bourriaud insists that “we must 
rexamine the very notion of territory – cultural or otherwise – from the viewpoint of  
'viatorisation'” (13), because, due to the effects of globalisation, “there no longer is any 
territory” (13).
Finally, Bourriauad proposes that altermodernism “is also taking shape under the 
urgent pressure to answer very basic questions” (13), for example, “[H]ow do we live in this 
world that we are told is becoming 'global,' but which seems to be buttressed on particular 
interests or tensed behind the barricades of fundamentalism – when not upholding icons of 
mass culture as role models?” (13). Here, the altermodern subject seems to be struggling with 
an ethical dilemma. This is followed by an aesthetic one: “How to represent a power that is 
becoming ever more furtive as it slips into bed with economics?” (13). Finally, he poses that 
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altermodern art struggles to unite ethics and aesthetics while still remaining art: “How, 
finally, to make art anything but a secondary type of merchandise in a system of values 
entirely oriented towards this 'general and abstract equivalent' that is money, and how can it 
bear witness against 'economic horror' without reducing itself to sheer militancy” (13). These 
questions echo Bourriaud's comments at the beginning of the essay, while writing about the 
responsibility of the critic or curator: “We have an ethical duty not to let signs and images 
vanish into the abyss of indifference or commerical obilivion” (1).
I believe Bourriaud's concept has its strengths and weaknesses. Like metamodernism, 
it is presented in a short essay that doesn't give him much space to develop his ideas, and 
consequently, it is rather vague and skeletal. If altermodernism is a combination of 
modernism and post-colonialism, then it would be illuminating to have a more thorough 
description of how these two factors play a role in the archipelago and journey metaphors. I 
also question his periodization, especially his placing the beginning of postmodernism in 
1973. While this may be somewhat more plausible when dealing exclusively with French 
philosophy, we can't ignore the appearance of major works of postmodern literature and art as 
early as William Burrough's Naked Lunch in 1959. Andy Warhol's career was in full flower 
well before 1973, and key works of postmodern thought, such as “The Death of the Author” 
and “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” both published in 
1967, had already appeared. In fact, many theorists propose that the negativity of 
postmodernism comes not from concern about the exhaustion of energy sources, as 
symbolized by the oil crisis, but rather, the critique of reason and progress triggered by 
symbols of modern destruction such as Auschwitz and Hiroshima. This said, I think there is 
some merit to his proposal that there is a second phase of postmodernism that manifests an 
obsession with identity and origins, and that the era of post-colonial critique plays a role in 
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this stage. Again, though, he misses out on the roots of this phase in the civil rights struggles 
of the 1950s and '60s. These oversights could very well be explained by the brevity of his 
argument, however.
The archipelago metaphor aligns well with other similar concepts arising recently, 
such as networks, fractals, the bubbles and spheres of Sloterdijk, or the use of set theory by 
Badiou. These approaches attempt to reconcile the one and the many, creating a model that 
allows simultaneous separation and unity. I think his description of heterochrony is quite 
interesting, although less developed than Lipovetsky's ruminations about the contemporary 
perception of time, which we'll encounter later. However, his description of contemporary 
culture as a journey across time, space, and signs resembles several descriptions of 
postmodern pastiche or historiographic metafiction, so that one struggles to see the 
difference. He clearly is differentiating altermodernism from the postcolonial or late-stage 
postmodernism that concerns itself with questions of identity rather than the earlier 
transgressive, boundary-smashing version that arose well before 1973. Finally, the 
unfortunate selection of alter as his prefix makes it even harder to differentiate his concept 
from postmodernism and postcolonialism, both of which are frequently preoccupied with the 
“other.” Ultimately, the altermodern journey doesn't take us very far from postmodernism.
1.2.2 Metamodernism
Timotheus Vermeulen and Robin van den Akker put forth their concept, “metamodernism,” in 
a short essay published in the Journal of Aesthetics and Culture in 2010. Announcing that 
“[t]he postmodern years of plenty, pastiche and parataxis are over” (2), they describe a 
culture wherein “new generations of artists increasingly abandon the aesthetic precepts of 
deconstruction, parataxis, and pastiche in favor of aesth-ethical notions of reconstruction, 
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myth, and metaxis” (2). These new artists “express a (often guarded) hopefulness and (at 
times feigned) sincerity that hint at another structure of feeling, intimating another discourse” 
(2). A new model is needed, because “[t]hese trends can no longer be explained in terms of 
postmodernism” (2). The two scholars have developed the concept of metamodernism to 
describe “a structure of feeling” (2) but they “do not seek to impose a predetermined system 
of thought on a rather particular range of cultural practices” (2), insisting instead that their 
concept is “an invitation for debate rather than an extending of a dogma” (2).
This new epoch is characterized by “the apparent rise of another modernism” (2). 
Vermeulen and van der Akker “argue that this modernism is characterized by the oscillation 
between a typically modern commitment and a markedly postmodern detachment” (2). 
Drawing the “meta” of metamodernism from the Platonic concept of metaxis, they write, “If 
the modern thus expresses itself by way of a utopic syntaxis, and the postmodern expresses 
itself by means of a dystopic parataxis, the metamodern, it appears, exposes itself through a-
topic metaxis” (12). Thus, “metamodernism oscillates between the modern and the 
postmodern. It oscillates between a modern enthusiasm and a postmodern irony, between 
hope and melancholy, between naivete and knowingness, empathy and apathy, unity and 
plurality, totality and fragmentation, purity and ambiguity” (5-6). However, we “should be 
careful not to think of this oscillation as a balance…rather, it is a pendulum swinging 
between 2, 3, 5, 10, innumerable poles” (6). The oscillation guards against excesses: “Each 
time the metamodern enthusiasm swings toward fanaticism, gravity pulls it back toward 
irony; the moment its irony sways toward apathy, gravity pulls it back toward enthusiasm” 
(6).
Rejecting the modern “notion of history dialectically progressing toward some 
predetermined Telos” (5), metamodernism also rejects a postmodern conception of the end of 
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history, whether it posits that history's end has been “achieved,” or whether “people realized 
its purpose could never be fulfilled – indeed, because it does not exist” (5). Instead, it stakes 
out a more tenuous position: “[M]etamodern discourse also acknowledges that history’s 
purpose will never be fulfilled because it does not exist. Critically, however, it nevertheless 
takes toward it as if it does exist” (5). This “as if” approach draws from different 
philosophical sources than modernism or postmodernism, as “the modern and the postmodern 
are linked to Hegel’s 'positive' idealism, the metamodern aligns itself with Kant’s 'negative' 
idealism” (5). This “as if” approach is designed to lead to moral and political improvement: 
“[H]umankind, a people, are not really going toward a natural but unknown goal, but they 
pretend they do so that they progress morally as well as politically” (5). The result is a kind 
of “pragmatic idealism” (5) that avoids modern fanaticism and naivete as well as postmodern 
skepticism and apathy. Thus, the metamodern approach has a touch of tragic romanticism to 
it, as it “moves for the sake of moving, attempts in spite of its inevitable failure; it seeks 
forever for a truth that it never expects to find” (5).
It comes as no surprise, then, that Vermeulen and van der Akker believe that 
“metamodernism appears to find its clearest expression in an emergent neoromantic 
sensibility” (8). Citing “movements as diverse as Remodernism, Reconstructivism, 
Renewalism, the New Sincerity, The New Weird Generation, Stuckism, Freak Folk” (7), as 
well as “Romantic Conceptualism” (8), they insist that this new romantic sensibility “has 
been expressed in a wide variety of art forms and a broad diversity of styles, across media 
and surfaces” (8). Noting that “Romanticism is about the attempt to turn the finite into the 
infinite, while recognizing that it can never be realized” (8), they believe that “aesthetic 
categories lingering between projection and perception, form and the unformable, coherence 
and chaos, corruption and innocence” such as “the tragic, the sublime, and the uncanny,” 
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strongly resemble the metamodern oscillation between “modern enthusiasm and a 
postmodern irony” (8). 
We must be careful, we are warned, “not to confuse this oscillating tension (a both--
neither) with some “kind of postmodern in-between (a neither--nor)” (9-10). Although “both 
metamodernism and the postmodern turn to pluralism, irony, and deconstruction in order to 
counter a modernist fanaticism…in metamodernism this pluralism and irony are utilized to 
counter the modern aspiration, while in postmodernism they are employed to cancel it out” 
(10). This subtle distinction is due to the fact that “metamodern irony is intrinsically bound to 
desire, whereas postmodern irony is inherently tied to apathy” (10). By focusing on “what is 
often called the sublime, the uncanny, the ethereal, the mysterious, and so forth” (10), the 
metamodern art work counters the modern “by drawing attention to what it cannot present in 
its language, what it cannot signify in its own terms” (10), while the “postmodern work 
deconstructs it by pointing exactly to what it presents, by exposing precisely what it 
signifies” (10). This move toward the romantic is not nostalgic or parodic, and thus “should 
not merely be understood as re-appropriation; it should be interpreted as re-signification” 
(12), turning “everyday life, the commonplace, and the mundane” (10) into “site[s] of 
ambiguity, of mystery, and unfamiliarity” (10).
 Vermeulen and van der Akker propose a number of potential causes of the transition 
from postmodernism to metamodernism. One such trigger is the fact that “financial crises, 
geopolitical instabilities, and climatological uncertainties have necessitated a reform of the 
economic system” (4), including “the transition from a white collar to a green collar 
economy” (4). Another factor is “the disintegration of the political center” due to “the rise to 
prominence of the Eastern economies” and “the failure of the 'third way,' the polarization of 
localities, ethnicities, classes, and the influence of the Internet blogosphere” (4-5), which “has 
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required a restructuration of the political discourse” (5). Finally, “a transformation of our 
material landscape” has been driven by “the need for a decentralized production of alternative 
energy; a solution to the waste of time, space, and energy caused by (sub)urban sprawls; and 
a sustainable urban future” (5). Using Barack Obama's slogans “yes, we can,” and “change 
we can believe in” as examples, Vermeulen and van der Akker propose that a new “narrative 
of longing structured by and conditioned on a belief ... that was long repressed, for a 
possibility (a 'better' future) that was long forgotten” (5) has appeared. Although they have 
stated that “the 2000s are the defining period for the shift from postmodernism to 
metamodernism to occur” (Misunderstandings), they insist that “this new shape, meaning, 
and direction do not directly stem from some kind of post-9/11 sentiment” (Notes, 5), as they 
believe that the “conservative reflex of the 'war on terror' might even be taken to symbolize a 
reaffirmation of postmodern values” (5).
In my opinion, Vermeulen and van der Akker have accomplished what they set out to 
do, which is to start a debate. Due mostly to the brevity of their sketch, however, their 
concept remains vague. It seems a bit convenient and overly simplistic to define the new 
epoch as being merely a combination of the previous two. Their suggestions about the 
possible causes of this new era are generic: indeed, financial and political crises are nothing 
new and certainly existed during both the modern and postmodern eras. Although they do 
remark on environmental concerns, they could have built a better bridge between their model 
and these social changes they describe. I believe they have accurately grasped the quality of 
hope and optimism of the contemporary era, but have not gone back far enough to link it to 
the end of the Cold War and the rise of the Internet. In fact, the Cold War is not mentioned in 
their model, and they seem to relegate the '90s to the postmodern era. Their description of the 
metamodern as “pragmatic idealism” (5) seems to demand a consideration of pragmatism, 
Allen 25
and in fact, the expression “practical idealism,” which originates with John Dewey, was used 
by both Al Gore and Condoleeza Rice during the era in question. It seems to me that this was 
a missed opportunity.
The two theorists give an interesting overview of trends in architecture and the visual 
arts, but their consideration of literary texts is non-existent. Here, examples of neo-
romanticism would have been interesting to those working on contemporary literary theory, 
and would have strengthened their argument. However, as they were writing for a journal 
primarily focused on the visual, this can be understood. Although they attempted to group a 
wide range of movements under the metamodern umbrella, some more careful analysis would 
have better demonstrated the accuracy of this assessment. In fact, the concept of 
metamodernism is so cursory and vague that I probably wouldn't have considered it at all if it 
hadn't achieved such popularity. The idea obtained notoriety when artist Luke Turner turned it 
into an aesthetic manifesto, which was then adopted by Hollywood actor Shia LeBoeuf, who 
began to describe himself as metamodern. Furthermore, in 2014, country music singer 
Sturgill Simpson released an album entitled Metamodern Sounds in Country Music. None of 
the other models examined here have attained this level of media prominence, and I suspect 
that alternate versions of “metamodernism” will eventually appear, with completely different 
descriptions.
1.2.3 Post-postmodernism
Jeffery T. Nealon has adopted the default epochal name for his analysis, Post-Postmodernism 
or, The Cultural Logic of Just-in-Time Capitalism, published in 2012. He believes a new 
paradigm is required because “it's pretty clear that whatever happened culturally and 
economically in the 1980s and '90s, we're living in a different period” (26). Nealon argues 
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that “post-postmodernism marks an intensification and mutation within postmodernism” (9), 
and thus, “the initial 'post' in the word is less a marker of postmodernism's having finally 
used up its shelf life at the theory store than it is a marker of postmodernism's having 
mutated, passed beyond a certain tipping point to become something recognizably different” 
(9). This difference is “not a difference in kind as much as it is a difference in intensity” (10, 
italics in the original). As the subtitle to Nealon's book suggests, he draws his approach from 
Frederic Jameson, showing that economic and cultural forces are intertwined, and he remarks 
that “over the past thirty years in the US, the major shift in economic and cultural terrain is 
within 'capitalism' itself – which is no longer the same thing it was in the 1980s” (26). The 
intensity he frequently refers to is drawn from Hardt and Negri's assertion that “[c]apitalism 
today seeks primarily to saturate and deepen – intensify – its hold over existing markets, 
insofar as global capitalism of the twenty-first century has run out of new territories to 
conquer” (41), and so, rather than focusing solely on cultural forces, we need “to think 
economically as well as culturally about the difference between the two periods” (28). An 
economic focus is required because “capitalism itself is the thing that's intensified most 
radically since Jameson began doing his work on postmodernism” (11), and thus, “[t]he 'late' 
capitalism of that era (the tail end of the cold war) has since intensified into the 'just-in-time' 
(which is to say, all-the-time) capitalism of our neoliberal era” (11). Nealon believes that the 
economic realities of the postmodern period “overcoded” its cultural production, and so “the 
dominant logic of economics in the neoliberal revolution years has in many ways been 
isomorphic...with the cultural logic of the humanities and the rise of theory” (186). Nealon 
insists that the postmodern era be reassessed because “when one overcodes the liberated 
cultural effects of postmodernism with the substantially more dire economic realities that rely 
on the same concepts, one can no longer assess the cultural effects in quite the same way” 
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(38). Recognizing this means “you can't quite so easily or naively cherry-pick and affirm the 
stuff you like (say, the Yale School of literary criticism), while you simply denounce the stuff 
you don't like (say, the Chicago School of economics)” (38). In fact, Nealon proclaims 
somewhat provocatively, “we literary and cultural theorists are, and have been, neoliberal 
postmoderns” (187).
Nealon argues that critical theory needs to change: “[T]he narratives by which we 
characterize that period called the '60s – narratives of unprecedented rebellion, resistance, and 
liberation – don't necessarily do much useful work in explaining or intervening within a very 
different historical situation” (28). The fact that “a repressive notion of 'normalization' is not 
the primary danger lurking within contemporary capitalism” (36) means that “the cultural 
rebellion narratives of the '60s, which often revolved around the liberation of an individual's 
or group's desire in the face of various social repressions, can now officially be pronounced 
dead” (36). Indeed, “the ethos of liberation that surrounds cultural postmodernism (the 
transgressions of hybridity, the individual ethics of self-fashioning, Dionysiac celebrations of 
multiplicity, endlessly making it new)” (37) are, in fact, “the watchwords of neoliberal 
capitalism” (38). Nealon uses classic rock music as an example of the intermingled changes 
in economics and culture: “The rock 'n' roll style of rebellious, existential individuality, 
largely unassimilable under the mass-production dictates of midcentury Fordism, has become 
the engine of post-Fordist, niche-market consumption capitalism” (73). This shift underlines 
a movement away from the disruptive transgression of cultural novelty: “Consumption in the 
present cultural market for music has largely become unmoored from newness as the ultimate 
test of authenticity and value” (81). Instead, consumers are seeking self-affirmation in the 
form of liberation: “[C]lassic rock at this juncture functions in popular culture as little more 
than an endless incitement to become who you want to be, being your own person, not 
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following everyone else” (72). This cultural transition is due to changes in capitalism, 
according to Nealon: “[C]apitalism today promises the same subjective authenticity as the 
once outlaw commodity called classic rock” (73). Classic rock has become another 
commodity, rather than a disruptive cultural force, because “capitalism has morphed into the 
kind of thing that, at its center rather than at its margins, now has a use for classic rock” (73). 
Critical theory has not kept pace with these changes, as Nealon believes that “much of North 
American humanities 'theory' of the present moment is stuck in and around 'the '80s'” (28), 
and thus, “we need a new theoretical and methodological toolbox for responding to post-
postmodern culture” (12).
Nealon questions whether “the end of the cold war, globalization, post-Fordianism, 
the rise of so-called immaterial labor, or the intensifications of postmodern 'finance capital'” 
(130) may have made “the tools and procedures of deconstruction problematic, in need of 
supplementation, or even maybe obsolete” (130). Nealon proposes some provocative 
questions, such as, “What happens to the critical discourse 'deconstruction' when capitalism 
in practice assumes the role of 'deconstructor' par excellence?” (137). Since neoliberal 
capitalism, through privatization and globalization, has performed a socioeconomically 
deconstructive role, Nealon asks us, “Has deconstruction's triumph as a kind of capitalist 
epistemology ironically cost it the store in terms of its status as a critical discourse?” (137, 
italics in the original). Mocking Derrida's suggestion that Perestroika was another name for 
deconstruction, Nealon rejoins, “Perhaps we should add 'global capitalism' to the list of 
alternate names for deconstruction” (137). For Nealon, “the hermeneutics of suspicion has 
waned as an effective post-postmodern research agenda” (147) because “[c]ontemporary 
capitalism...is not the sort of thing that hides – it's everywhere, all the time – so a 
hermeneutics of suspicion may not offer the most effective tools to diagnose it” (111). Citing 
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Christopher Nealon (no relation), he calls instead for a “hermeneutics of situation” (103) that 
is “aimed at offering tools for thinking differently about the present, rather than primarily 
either exposing or undermining the supposed 'truth' of this or that cultural position” (103). 
This approach moves “[f]rom a focus on understanding something to a concern with 
manipulating it – from (postmodern) meaning to (post-postmodern) usage” (161, italics in the 
original). This change has already started occurring: “[O]ver the past fifteen years or so, 
there's been a slow but decisive turn away from the linguistic turn in the North American 
academic world” (160). Literary studies, Nealon believes, “has swerved away from 
interpreting texts – from pivoting on questions about textual meaning and its discontents – to 
examining the historical, archival, scientific, biological, and political contexts of literary 
production” (160). He insists that “this post-postmodern (anti-language or anti-hermeneutic) 
set of stances” (163) is not a return to old methods, “but rather a recognition that not all 
deployment of force (social, biological, historical, unconscious, etc.) can easily or 
satisfactorily be modeled on a Sausurrean understanding of linguistics” (163).
Nealon offers readings of Nietzsche and Adorno as examples of how to focus on a 
hermeneutics of situation rather than the postmodern hermeneutics of suspicion. According to 
Nealon, “Nietzsche has much to teach us about the situation of transnational capitalism” 
(106). He believes that Nietzsche has given us an alternative way to understand economics, 
and thus a useful approach to post-postmodernism: “Nietzsche's intervention concerning truth 
and/as a coin teaches us that the value of truth or money is the product of a dynamic action, 
not the mere referencing of a static state” (110). The focus is on action and its effects rather 
than on meaning or truth: “Both God and money...have a common face or enact a common 
truism: it's all about the practices of force and power, not about the states of truth or 
representation (108, italics in the original).” In other words, a deconstruction of meaning or a 
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revelation of undecideability is less useful in the neoliberal era: “Like God, an Internet or 
tech startup doesn't really represent anything at all – there's nothing tangible or authentic 
'behind' it; but both certainly do comprise and enable certain kinds of command” (108, italics 
in the original). Nealon draws a similar lesson from Adorno, proclaiming, “Adorno's 'minor 
ethics' is a kind of 'musical ethics' of speed and slowness – an ethics that does something, 
produces effects, over against the transcendental ethics of resentment, judgment, and 
condemnation” (120). Adorno's cultural readings, according to Nealon, are not mere 
excursions into the question of meaning, but rather, “the Adornian dialectic is a performative, 
rather than a constative discourse. In other words, the dialectic 'is' something only insofar as 
it produces effects” (123). Asserting that “[a]ctive, engaged praxis within existing conditions 
is the first and last principle of Adornian ethics” (125), Nealon believes that in Adorno “the 
philosophical question 'What does it mean?' will always be subordinated to the ethical 
question 'What does it do?'” (123). This approach offers us “an ethics that doesn't dictate, but 
rather works through and modulates extremes in a dialectical way” (123).
Nealon recommends that we not “moralistically denounce or judge capital, but rather 
experiment with its speeds and slowness – see what (else) it can do” (113). As a case study, 
he offers the situation of the so-called 'corporate university' much lamented among 
academics. The problem, Nealon insists, is that “corporatization and the economy at large has 
shrunk the middle-management ranks and made business command structures more flexible, 
while the 'corporate' academy has positively bloated itself on rigid layers of paper-shuffling 
administration” (87). Thus, “'80s-style economic theory offers some provocative tools and 
arguments to folks who would want to strengthen the position of those ousted by corporate 
managerialism in the university” (92). Nealon proposes using the techniques of neoliberalism 
rather than merely critiquing them: “[I]f higher education has to cut somehow to stay alive in 
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the near term, maybe it has something to learn from the people who brought you downsizing, 
'80s-style corporate practitioners” (85). He recommends taking the neoliberal argument 
directly to the funders of the university, the state and private donors, as if they were investors: 
“From a business perspective, it's hard not to conclude that the administration is the cash-
wasting 'entrenched bureaucracy' that needs to be savagely downsized in the corporate 
university” (92). He argues that “an alliance with the enemy may still be in order, but that the 
provisional ally is not the cultural conservative” (100, italics in the original), but rather the 
fiscal conservative. In other words, Nealon says, “I'm suggesting that in many ways the 
corporate university isn't corporate enough” (94, italics in the original). University 
researchers and professors would not be endangered by such a move, as “faculty and students 
are not the 'fat' in higher education” (93).
Nealon wants to return to viewing literature as having a use function, rather than 
focusing solely on interpretive questions: “[F]or thousands of years before (in fact, for 
virtually all of its existence), literature was equipment for living in myriad ways, not just as a 
provider and/or frustrator of 'meaning'” (183). The problem today is, “[i]f literature has any 
'use-value' or offers us equipment for living after postmodernism, that value remains 
primarily thematized as a kind of spoiling move, an antiquarian slowing down of all the 
superfast flows that characterize the post-postmodern world” (164). Rather than focusing on 
questions of truth or meaning, he insists, “one might directly focus on literature's powers of 
the false, its abilities to create other, virtual worlds” (173). He refers to this as “a 'strong' 
power of the false that lies in its direct ability to create the new, understood specifically as the 
abnormal or the error – rather than (or at least in addition to) the false's traditional 
philosophical, 'weak' job of subverting the true” (174). Here, literature and its analysis take 
on roles that can be constructive rather than deconstructing already existing belief systems. 
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Nealon believes this is a restoration of a more traditional role for literature, and so it is “less a 
call to innovate 'new' roles or jobs for literature, new modes of equipment, than to recall that 
literature was equipment for a lot of becomings before it somewhat myopically became 
equipment tailor-made to interrupt the totalizing claims of philosophy” (183).
Nealon offers us a biting and insightful critique of deconstruction and the postmodern 
approach to literary theory, pointing out the hidden similarities between the postmodern drive 
for emancipation and the neoliberal critique of government regulation of business. This 
inherent contradiction has been lurking at the heart of leftist politics, which call for ever more 
government control while at the same time advancing a paranoid and desperate critique of 
totalizing authority and power. It was inevitable that something had to give. I think he also 
correctly points out that the world has changed, that capitalism isn't hiding in the shadows 
embedding secret agendas into its products any more, but rather brashly trumpeting them in 
the public arena, meaning that a deconstruction of hidden meanings may not be as useful as a 
tool of resistance as it was once considered to be. He has correctly assessed the rather 
obvious change of direction that literary theory has made in recent years into areas that also 
include facts and details that exist outside the text. I agree, too, that, given the failure of 
Marxism to produce a viable alternative to capitalism despite numerous opportunities, it may 
be time for critics to seize the reins of capitalism and see where they can steer it, rather than 
standing on the sidelines emitting doleful lamentations. Nealon's suggestions about the 
corporate university offer an interesting path forward and an opportunity for academics to 
ride the waves of change rather than drown in them. What I find most appealing about 
Nealon's work is his call to regard literature as having other roles than merely providing 
fodder for exercises in deconstruction. Indeed, one could argue that one of the original 
purposes of storytelling was the communication of ethical beliefs and structures, which 
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resonates strongly with the thesis of my dissertation.
Where Nealon's attempt at periodization falls short is in its nebulous analysis of 
contemporary culture. Other than a vague suggestion about “intensification,” we really do not 
get much of a description about what is happening now. He offers a minimal number of 
readings; for example, a cursory glance at Ridley Scott's Gladiator (2000) that serves only to 
illustrate his comments about an empire running out of new territory to conquer, and a brief 
discussion of Bruce Andrews, a Language poet (and what's more postmodern than Language 
poetry, anyway?) to illustrate the swerve away from using literature to communicate 
meaning. It almost seems as if Nealon is neither aware of nor interested in contemporary 
culture or even literature, and has set out primarily to engage opponents within the narrow 
field of literary theory, and within the university administration. Extensive readings of 
Nietzsche and Adorno reinforce the impression that he is not really focused on the 
contemporary. Adopting the default name for this period, post-postmodernism, indicates a 
certain lack of vision – yes, post-postmodernism is after postmodernism, but the name tells us 
nothing else. This lack of originality is exacerbated by using Frederic Jameson as his 
intellectual template, rather than developing something new.
1.2.4 Cosmodernism
Christian Moraru's Cosmodernism: American Narrative, Late Globalization, and the New 
Cultural Imaginary, published in 2011, proposes a new periodization structure, in which the 
contemporary era would begin with the end of the Cold War, and the post World War II era, 
essentially what could be referred to as the postmodern era, would be absorbed into the 
previous period, “with more recent events of incontestably global impact like September 11, 
2001, as symptoms of the Cold War's aftermath rather than as harbingers of another, 
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genuinely new epoch” (2). He would call this era “cosmodern,” drawing from the concept of 
cosmos, and emphasizing a one-world or universal ontology, which he labels an “ecology” 
that “sets out to critique late-global egology” (8). Cosmodern ecology, then, is set up in 
opposition to egology, “not because it features nature, although it often does, but because it 
challenges the egotistic penchant of late-globalization” (50). To counter this egology, we need 
“an 'ecological' balance understood as co-presence, co-implication, and co-responsibility of 
self and his or her 'cultural other,' in short, as ethical relatedness” (50).
In fact, according to Moraru, “the cosmodern lynchpin is relation itself – the concept 
and practices of 'relationality' in narrative, theory, and other areas of post-1989 American 
culture” (3). Thus, “relationality” is the important factor distinguishing the cosmodern era 
from its predecessors. This relationality “speaks to and upholds unabashedly an ethics of 
difference” (8), based on a “self-other relation” (21). Following Lévinas, he insists that this 
ethics precedes ontology, in other words, “it is premised on ethics” (31), and so, 
“cosmodernism is best understood as an ethical rather than 'technical' project” (316). This 
would differentiate cosmodernism from postmodernism, which “continues to do the bidding 
of an older worldview that conceptualizes and thus further 'others' and externalizes alterity 
qua 'theme' and 'form'” (313). Although Moraru acknowledges that “[c]osmodernism does 
follow in postmodernism's footsteps thematically and formally” (313), he believes that we 
should “give the postmoderns credit for laying the groundwork, setting the basic agenda, and 
developing...the terminologies and methodologies for a project whose completion by and 
large lies beyond the postmodern's [sic] purview” (310).
This uncompleted project has four aspects. First, it is “an imaginary modality of 
mapping out today's world as a cultural geography of relationality” (5, italics in the original). 
In this imaginary, on a cultural level, relations with others (here, meaning other cultures) are 
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perceived as shaping cultural development in a “mutually fashioning process” (50), in 
contrast to the modern and, Moraru argues, postmodern imposition of a dominant culture. 
Second, the cosmodern project is a “protocol of subjectivity formation” (5, italics in the 
original), by which Moraru, drawing loosely on Lacan and Derrida, means that the individual 
subject, the self, is formed by interaction with the other (here, meaning a person, but still 
from a different culture), and through encountering the other's difference. Third, 
cosmodernism is “an ethical imperative pointing to the present as much as to the future” (5, 
italics in the original). Thus, it is “not a strict assessment of where American culture stands 
now but a suggestion that this is where it may and should go” (305, italics in the original). 
Moraru argues that we are ethically compelled to implement the vision presented in the 
cosmodern imaginary. Finally, cosmodernism is “a critical algorithm for decrypting and 
assembling a range of post-1989 narrative and theoretical imaginings into a reasonably 
coherent and, again, ahead-looking model” (5, italics in the original). Here, Moraru is 
proposing that his model be adopted for critical purposes, as an organizing tool to make sense 
of the contemporary era. As one can see, Moraru's project is a bold and ambitious 
undertaking, and the pages of his book are inundated in a cascade of references encompassing 
much of critical and literary theory from the last half century, as well as a bibliography of 
more than 630 sources.
To illustrate his model, Moraru chooses five topics that exemplify the concepts he has 
laid out. The first is called “idiomatics.” Moraru traces how interactions between cultures 
create changes to the dominant language, and thus “idiom springs from a condition of 
relatedness and sets up, against prescriptive statutes of correctness, accuracy, and legitimate 
enunciation, new ways of relating the speakers to others” (84). This demonstrates the 
ecological nature of encounters between cultures, and draws from postcolonial theory to 
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show how the subaltern affects the dominant culture. His next example is “onomastics,” 
which refers to the history and use of proper names. Here, Moraru shows how proper names 
can be appropriated by the cultural other to create new cross-cultural meanings, 
disconnecting the name from its cultural and national source, and yet “can also inscribe us 
into the wider world. In the cultural other's name, in the name of somebody from a different 
topology, we overflow our initial toponomy” (125). This overflow of cultural or national 
boundaries brings us into relation with the other, as “culturally 'transferable' proper names are 
anthropological vehicles of compassion through which the self empathizes with others” 
(155). His third focus is “translation,” drawing from theory about globalization, and this 
section presents Moraru's ideas about subject formation. The act of translation is presented as 
a method of self-discovery: “[T]ranslation as interpretation and deciphering – as reading text 
– prompts self-reading” (202). Moraru sees translation as an ecological act opposing the 
egological projection of the self onto the other: “[S]elf-knowledge does not come about 
egologically, as I self-center and shut others out, but translationally – ecologically” (169). 
According to cosmodernism, “my being takes shape, and so I become what I am, in 
translation of an other” (174), and thus, translation plays an important role in subject 
formation. His fourth example is called “readings,” and makes use of reader-response theory. 
Here, analyzing novels that feature characters reading texts, Moraru builds a metaphor about 
reading others (meaning actual people) as texts; a process that leads to self-development. 
“Other-reading reaches beyond the informative; it is formative” (205), he insists. Moraru 
believes this process is something new, connected to the cosmodern era, “this double 
movement where the relation to an other serves as a prologue to self-relation is growing 
quickly into a subjectivity procedure in the United States and elsewhere” (205). The last 
section is called “metabolics,” and deviates from the other four by moving away from 
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linguistic concerns and focusing on physical bodies. According to Moraru, “bodies are in the 
cosmodern imaginary worldly connectors. They embody culture, or cultures rather” (277). 
Bodies are “symbolic sites of cultural action, re-action, and interaction” (256), and “[c]ultural 
amalgams and venues of further amalgamations, tropisms, permutations, and combinations 
that allegorize emerging cross-cultural alliances and mèlanges” (285). In the cosmodern 
imaginary, the mutual fashioning of cultures and subjects is symbolically portrayed through 
fantastic physical transformations and hybridizations.
Moraru has compiled a fascinating and thorough assessment of the legacy of 
postmodernism, and has no doubt identified much of what that movement has bequeathed to 
the next generation. However, I find the name and even the whole concept of cosmodernism 
somewhat superfluous. If he had simply intended his book to be a mere summary of 
postmodernism, few, if any, changes would have been required. Building his concept on a 
foundation formed by thinkers traditionally considered postmodern, including citing sixteen 
different works by Derrida, ten by Baudrillard, and nine by Lévinas, while basing his ethics 
directly on Lévinas, makes it nearly impossible for Moraru to go beyond the postmodern. 
This is reflected in his selection of readings, as well. He puts great emphasis on Don DeLillo, 
citing eleven different works and giving several close readings, although DeLillo is widely 
regarded as a quintessential postmodernist. Other readings include John Updike, who 
published his first novel in 1960, Raymond Federman, who first published a book of poetry 
in 1967 and a novel in 1971, and Vladimir Nabokov, who died in 1977, twelve years before 
the cosmodern era supposedly begins, and who was actually born in the 19th century. 
Although he does include some more recent writers such as Chang-Rae Lee, Jhumpa Lahiri, 
and Suki Kim, it sometimes seems like he was trying hard to find some “others” to use as 
examples.
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Although he insists on starting his period with 1989, the end of the Cold War, there is 
no analysis of how this political transformation has shaped subsequent cultural developments. 
The Internet is referred to in passing, but its radical impact on the way we live today is not 
addressed. Furthermore, he is hindered by his own ambition. The cultural features he 
describes may exist, but even he acknowledges that “cosmodernism is not necessarily the 
cultural model late globalization is fostering in the United States and elsewhere, or not the 
reigning one by a long shot” (305). He provides examples primarily from fiction, but insists 
that this model extends to contemporary culture as a whole, with no vision of how this might 
be reflected in fields such as architecture, art, film or music, although these cultural avenues 
might have been even more fruitful than readings of fiction. Had he merely claimed to have 
identified a movement in critical theory, he would have been on much firmer ground.
Finally, Moraru's advocacy of engagement and translation and reading of the other fall 
flat as he himself fails to engage with his own stated other, that of late-globalization's 
egology. If he were to follow the prescription laid out by cosmodernism, allowing his contact 
with an other to shape him through translation, reading, and even (metaphorically) physical 
transformation, then he must engage with the egologists whom he opposes. He makes no 
attempt to do so. This is one of the fundamental critiques of Badiou, a thinker Moraru 
dismisses in a hurry, but who has exposed the Achilles heel of the postmodern ethics of being 
for the other.
1.3 Theories Deviating from Postmodernism
1.3.1 Hypermodernism
In the book Hypermodern Times (2005), Gilles Lipovetsky, with the assistance of Sebastian 
Charles, puts forth his concept of the contemporary, which he calls “hypermodernity.” This 
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new concept is necessary, according to Lipovetsky, because “[n]ow that genetic technologies, 
liberal globalization and human rights are triumphing, the label 'postmodern' is starting to 
look old; it has exhausted its capacities to express the world now coming into being” (30). 
These developments have triggered a “second modernity,” which is “deregulated and 
globalized, has shot into orbit: it has no opposite, and is absolutely modern, resting on three 
axiomatic elements constitutive of modernity itself: the market, technocratic efficiency and 
the individual” (31-2). Rather than witnessing the end of modernity, we have entered the era 
of “consummate modernity” (32), “which takes the concrete form of a globalized liberalism, 
the quasi-general commercialization of lifestyles, the exploitation 'to death' of instrumental 
reason, and rampant individualism” (31). This consummated modernity means that “[i]t is no 
longer a matter of emerging from the world of tradition to reach the stage of modern 
rationality, but of modernizing modernity itself and rationalizing rationalization” (33).
At the heart of Lipovetsky's concept is an examination of our relationship with time. 
He proposes that changes in capitalism have altered our experience of time: “[W]e are 
witnessing a formidable expansion in the size and number of financial and stock market 
activities, an acceleration in the speed of economic operations that now function in real time, 
and a phenomenal explosion in the volume of capital circulating across the planet” (32). This 
acceleration of the market is pervasive, and thus, “[t]he frenzied escalation of 'more, always 
more' has now infiltrated every sphere of collective life” (32). Lipovetsky proposes that “the 
reordering of the way social time is organized” is due to “the move from a capitalism of 
production to an economy of consumption” (36), leading to “the replacement of an unbending 
and disciplinary society by a 'society of fashion' restructured from top to bottom by the 
technologies of ephemerality, novelty and permanent seduction” (36). Thus, the postmodern 
conception of a society controlled by disciplinary structures is replaced by a culture of 
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marketing seduction and novelty, meaning that “fashion, now ubiquitous, has established the 
mode of temporality now socially prevalent” (37). According to Lipovetsky, “the logic and 
the very temporality of fashion” create enormous changes in societies; “they are dominated 
by the present, which replaces collective action by private happiness, tradition by movement, 
hopes for the future by permanent novelty” (37). This reorganization of time is not a recent 
phenomenon, rather, this “consecration of the present” began “decades before the fall of the 
Berlin Wall or the accelerated universe of cyberspace and globalized liberalism” (37). In 
other words, it was characteristic of the postmodern era, as well. However, “[f]rom the 1980s 
and, especially, 1990s, onwards, a second-generation presentism has come into being, based 
on neo-liberal globalization and the revolution in information technologies” (38). These 
political and technological developments have amplified our focus on the present: “While 
neoliberal, computerized society did not create the fever of the present, there can be no doubt 
that it brought it to its apogee by shuffling different time frames and intensifying our desire to 
be freed from the constraints of space-time” (39). 
The second-generation presentism is different from the first; it brings with it a certain 
anxiety: “The spirit of the time dominated by frivolity has been replaced by a time of risk and 
uncertainty. A certain carefree attitude has gone for good: the present is increasingly lived out 
in a sense of insecurity” (39). This change is a clear signal that the postmodern era has ended, 
since “[t]he increasing insecurity of people's lives has supplanted the carefree 'postmodern' 
attitude” (40). Rather than an exuberant sense of postmodern play, “[a] sense of insecurity has 
invaded all minds; health has imposed itself as a mass obsession; terrorism, catastrophes and 
epidemics are regularly front-page news” (39). Even the political focus has changed: “Social 
struggles and critical discourses no longer carry any utopian perspectives that aim at 
overcoming domination. The only real question now is that of protection, security and the 
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defense of social benefits, of urgent humanitarian aid and safeguarding the planet. In short, 
'damage limitation'” (39). The viewpoint has become so dark that “[t]here is no longer any 
faith in a future that will necessarily be better than the present” (41), and thus, “the time of 
disenchantment with postmodernity itself has arrived – the time of the demythification of life 
lived in the present, now that it is forced to face the rising tide of insecurity” (40).
The source of this anxiety is precisely the intense and forced nature of this focus on 
the present, and how it puts us continually in conflict with the future and the past. Lipovetsky 
argues, “It is no longer class against class, but time against time, future against present, 
present against future, present against past” (49). The disintegration of dominating cultural 
structures and the emergence of a present-oriented logic of fashion has brought forth a new 
condition: “Hypercapitalism is accompanied by its double: a detached hyperindividualism, 
legislating for itself but sometimes prudent and calculating, sometimes unrestrained, 
unbalanced and chaotic” (33). This hyperindiviualism brings with it both freedom and 
insecurity, and in fact, Lipovetsky contends, “The less collective norms can command our 
behavior in detail, the more the individual shows a growing tendency to be weak and 
unstable” (56). This instability is a by-product of freedom itself, as “the more freely and 
intensely people wish to live, the more we hear them saying how difficult life can be” (56). 
This new “hyperindividualism is less a cult of the present moment than a projection into the 
future, less festive than hygienic, less a matter of the intense enjoyment of life than of the 
prevention of problems” (47). And so, the constant focus on the present has paradoxically led 
to constant concern about the future: “In reality it is less a carpe diem which characterizes the 
spirit of the time than anxiety about a future fraught with risk and insecurity” (45). Thus, 
Lipovetsky suggests that the future, although momentarily displaced by the logic of fashion, 
is still a driving force in contemporary culture, and “[e]ven if short-termishness reigns in the 
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economy and media, our societies nevertheless continue to be turned to the future; they still 
wish to tear themselves away from the way things are” (43).
Therefore, he argues, “the hypermodern individual is still an individual-for-the-future, 
a future based around 'me'” (48). However, the changes brought about by the postmodern era 
have made this future a source of psychological instability: “Widespread institutional 
deregulation is accompanied by mood swings, an increasing lack of organization in people's 
personalities, a growth in the number of psychological disturbances and cries for help” (56). 
The constant anticipation of future risk means that “health is becoming a ubiquitous 
preoccupation for a growing number of individuals of every age” (47). This has led to 
profound change in ethics, as “hedonistic ideals have been supplanted by the ideology of 
health and longevity. In the name of these, individuals are to a massive degree renouncing 
immediate satisfactions, improving and reorienting their daily behavior” (47). This ethical 
change, manifesting itself within a culture formed by the logic of fashion, a logic of novelty 
and the present, is actually driven by preoccupation with the future: “While the axis of the 
present is still dominant, it is not absolute: the culture of prevention and the 'ethics of the 
future' have led to a renewed importance being given to the imperatives of a more or less 
distant future” (44). This 'ethics of the future' extends beyond individual choice to more 
universal concerns, as “anxieties about the future of the planet and environmental risks are 
assuming a fundamental importance in the collective debate” (43). However, the renewed 
concern with the future should not be confused with modernity's utopian fantasies; rather, 
“[t]he heroic will to create a 'radiant future' has been replaced by a managerial activism: a 
vast enthusiasm for change, reform and adaptation that is deprived of any confident horizon 
or grand historical vision” (34). Yet, we seem to have emerged from postmodernity's dark 
pessimism: “Hypermodernity has not replaced faith in progress by despair and nihilism, but 
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by an unstable, fluctuating confidence that varies with events and circumstances” (45). 
Lipovetsky's ruminations on our changing relationship with time do not stop with 
considerations of the present and future; he also examines the contemporary relationship with 
the past. Although we are in an age of presentism, Lipovetsky insists that “hypermodernity is 
not structured by an absolute present, it is structured by a paradoxical present, a present that 
ceaselessly exhumes and 'rediscovers' the past” (57, italics in the original). In fact, he argues 
that “our age is the scene of a frenzy of commemorative activities based on our heritage and a 
growth in national and regional, ethnic and religious identities” (57). This recovery of the 
past marks a break with postmodernity because “[t]he value attributed to the past is a 
symptom of the advance of cultural capitalism and the commercialization of culture: as such, 
it is less a postmodern than a hypermodern phenomenon” (59). Neoliberal capitalism has 
seized on our fascination for the past in order to commodify it: “In hypermodern society, 
everything old, and our nostalgia for it, have become sales techniques and marketing tools” 
(60). As a result, a new dimension in material value has appeared: “There was use-value and 
exchange-value: in addition, we now have emotional-memorial value associated with feelings 
of nostalgia” (60). In some ways, this new value represents a reversal of modernity, since 
“[t]he moderns wanted to make a tabula rasa of the past, but we are rehabilitating it; their 
ideal was to break away from the grip of traditions, but those traditions have acquired a new 
social dignity” (57). This is because our relationship with the past is fundamentally different 
from the one the moderns struggled against, for “[t]he past no longer provides a social 
foundation or structure: it is revamped, recycled, updated, exploited for commercial ends” 
(60), and this forms a fundamental “characteristic of hypermodern society: we celebrate what 
we no longer wish to take as an example” (61). Lipovetsky believes that this celebration is 
individualist rather than institutional: “If doting on the past has a nostalgic dimension, it also 
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bears witness to the rising power of individualistic desires for quality of life, and to a 
hypermodern culture of well-being” (61). Since the individual in a culture driven by 
consumer choice and “deprived of any framework” (56) is left to self-definition, “[t]he 
second age of modernity is self-reflective, individualist-emotional and concerned with 
identity” (62). The past supplies ready-made identities that can be constructed, configured, 
and consumed.
Lipovetsky sees this revival of the past as potentially dangerous, noting that, “in 
several cases, the reactivation of historical memory functions in frontal opposition to the 
principles of liberal modernity” (63) and citing an “upsurge in religious trends which reject 
secular modernity, the neo-nationalist and ethnic and religious movements that lead to 
dictatorships, wars of identity, and genocidal massacres” (63). These dangerous trends are 
connected to the end of the Cold War: “The end of the division of the world into blocs, the 
ideological vacuum, the globalization of the economy, and the weakening of state power have 
led to the rise of a multitude of local conflicts based on ethnic, religious, or national factors, 
together with separatist movements and wars between communities” (63). Lipovetsky argues 
that the resurgence of religion is a by-product of hypermodernity rather than a sign of 
resistance to it: “In the uncertain, chaotic, atomized universe of modernity, new needs for 
unity and meaning, for security and a sense of belonging, arise: this is a new opportunity for 
religions” (64). Religions offer what our contemporary culture lacks: the traditions 
dismantled by modern reason, and the disciplinary structure dismantled by postmodern 
emancipation, and so, “it is from within the hypermodern cosmos that the religious domains 
reproduced, in so far as the hypermodern generates insecurity, the loss of fixed guide-lines, 
the disappearance of secular utopias, and an individualist disintegration of the social bond” 
(64, italics in the original). Although “[i]nstrumental rationality is extending its domain,” 
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paradoxically, “this eliminates neither religious belief nor the need to refer to the authority of 
a tradition” (64). “Secularization is not irreligion,” insists Lipovetsky, “it is also a process 
which creates a new form of the religious domain in the sphere of worldly autonomy” (64). 
This hyperindividualist form of religion remains consistent with a consumer-focused 
modernity: “[T]here is no antinomy with individualist modernity, since the tradition is handed 
over to the initiative of individuals, 'cobbled together' in a DIY manner, mobilized for self-
realization and integration into a community” (63). Religious tradition is now “used without 
any institutional backing, being perpetually reworked in accordance with the principle of 
individual sovereignty” (67).
As we can see, Lipovetsky presents a dynamic, paradoxical model that features 
clashing concepts of time and covers a wide range of topics. I believe he has definitely 
captured some of the psychological effects, not just of neoliberal capitalism and the 
instantaneous gratification delivered by the Internet, but also of the deconstruction of 
tradition and externally-imposed value systems that occurred during the postmodern era. I 
agree with his reading of the focus on the present as being more anxious and insecure than 
the postmodern era, leading to a renewed focus on ethics as a mechanism to deter future 
calamity. That this anxiety is connected to the sense of individual freedom obtained by 
postmodern emancipation seems plausible to me, as well. His explanation for the re-
emergence of religious tradition is somewhat abrupt and ignores the role that postmodernism 
has played in undermining modernity's emphasis on empirical, scientific rationality. 
Nevertheless, I believe he has observed and partially described an important cultural force. 
Where Lipovetsky's analysis falls short, it seems to me, is in the lack of support for his 
assertions. He makes almost no cultural or historical readings beyond generalities like "the 
headlines are full of stories about disasters" (when were they not?), and "we are worried 
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about our health" (just as they were in the early twentieth century) and he seems content to 
sketch out his ideas in broad brush strokes, leaving the details to others. If this is the way our 
culture is truly developing, then it ought to be possible to illustrate it with more concrete 
examples. There could also be more attention paid to the philosophical underpinnings of 
these movements, rather than just giving us a surface description. In part, this comes from 
Lipovetsky assuming his audience shares his philosophical background, but the fact that the 
environmental movement is based on almost two centuries of philosophy should at least be 
mentioned before asserting that it arises from an "ethics of the future" (even if this is indeed 
the case). The philosophy of neoliberal globalism, which shapes Lipovetsky's entire concept, 
is given almost no consideration beyond "there is a demand for more and more." Despite 
these weaknesses, Lipovetsky's model is the one that most closely aligns with my own.
1.3.2 Performatism
In Performatism: Or the End of Postmodernism (2008), Raoul Eshelman presents his vision 
of what comes after postmodernism, which he chooses to call performatism. Performatism is 
primarily an aesthetic model that posits a return to semiotic monism. According to Eshelman, 
performatism “may be defined most simply as an epoch in which a unified concept of sign 
and strategies of closure have begun to compete directly with – and displace – the split 
concept of sign and the strategies of boundary transgression typical of postmodernism” (1). 
Theorists working from a postmodern theoretical perspective will misinterpret the works of 
this new epoch because “the new epoch works first and foremost on an aesthetic, 
identificatory level, to create an attitude of beautiful belief, and not on a cognitive, critical 
one” (12). He finds that there has been little willingness to make the theoretical adjustments 
necessary to understand the new era: “As it turned out, the mechanisms that made 
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postmodernism into one of the most theory-saturated literary epochs ever also prevented its 
norms from being exposed to any sort of historical self-critique” (161). To blame, according 
to Eshelman, is “the split, belated concept of sign running through all of postmodern thought” 
(161). Critics are reluctant to embrace the idea of an epochal shift “because of their obligation 
to postmodern norms” (31). To fully appreciate the new epoch, two major misconceptions 
must be clarified, the first is that “the notion of sign as something belated, uncontrollable, and 
split apart from its referent” provides the “only viable kind of theory” (193), and the second 
is, “that the new monist, unified concepts of sign are simply repeating old, well-known 
metaphysical errors” (193). 
Although Eshelman believes that the cultural change is epochal in nature, he does not 
tie the changes to any particular historical events: “In my view, the main reason for the switch 
to monism is that creative artists have become tired of recycling increasingly predictable 
postmodernist devices and have turned to its monist Other to construct alternatives – a move 
that ultimately knows no ideological boundaries” (32). Still, he doesn't believe that there has 
been a complete break with postmodernism, but rather that “performatist works feed in some 
way on postmodernism; some break with it markedly, while others retain typical devices but 
use them with an entirely different aim. Still other works develop seemingly ironclad monist 
positions only to fall back into postmodern irony” (xiv). Eshelman presents four basic 
components of this new model. The first is “ostensivity (a specific type of monist semiotics)” 
(xii), the second is “double framing (a specific way of creating aesthetic closure)” (xii), the 
third is “opaque or dense subjectivity” (xii), and finally there is “a theist or authorial mode of 
organizing temporal and spatial relations” (xii-xiii). 
According to Eshelman, “the new epoch may best be defined as the becoming-
conscious of the ostensive, which up to now existed as a latent, but unrecognized force in all 
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culture” (199). Drawing from the concept of an “originary scene” developed by literary 
theorist and anthropologist Eric Gans, in which the birth of culture is envisioned as stemming 
from a monist, ostensive sign, Eshelman insists that “the ostensive is quite simply the most 
elegant and parsimonious monist answer that we have to the notion of dual origin marked by 
différance and its many terminological cousins” (6). This originary monist sign created at the 
birth of culture means that “a synthetic, unified, object-focused projection – and not an 
epistemological aporia – stands at the beginning of all culture and continues to condition each 
individual act of language” (6). The originary sign “can be experienced in three ways: as 
sacred, as political, and as aesthetic” (199), but the aesthetic is not itself a separate function, 
but rather the sign is “perceived as beautiful because it allows us to oscillate between 
contemplating the sign standing for the thing and the thing as it is represented by the sign” 
(5). Eshelman insists that when “you step back to regard the sign as it oscillates between 
being a sign and being a thing, you automatically lose interest in instrumentalizing it for 
material or sacral ends” (199). Although this aesthetic concept may seem to be nothing more 
than a return to Kantian metaphysics, in actuality, “[p]erformatist aesthetics are 'Kant with a 
club': they bring back beauty, good, wholeness, and a whole slew of other metaphysical 
propositions, but only under very special, singular conditions that a text forces us to accept on 
its own terms” (57). This new aesthetic differs from the traditional Kantian one, because “this 
one works by coercion” (57), creating a “a paradoxical, oxymoronic, or saturated return to 
metaphysics using postmetaphysical means” (194, italics in the original).
The mechanism of this coercive aesthetics is what Eshelman terms the “double 
frame,” which “is based on a lock or fit between an outer frame (the work construct itself) 
and an inner one (an ostensive scene or scenes of some kind)” (36-7). The ostensive sign is 
found within the inner frame: “[T]he inner frame or scene is grounded in an originary scene: 
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it reduces human behavior to what seems to be a very basic or elementary circle of unity with 
nature and/or with other people” (4, italics in the original). Thus, the aesthetic property of the 
inner frame is a sense of unity or closure that “arises in a reflexive, intuitive distance to the 
ostensive sign” (199). However, “the constructed ur-scene must be confirmed somewhere 
else on the higher, authorial level of the outer frame” (81), which “ has an arbitrary or 
dogmatic quality and seems to be imposed from above” (4). This outer frame “creates a 
discrete inner space within a context and – in direct opposition to postmodern practice – 
forcibly cuts that space off from the surrounding context and from what may variously be 
described as conceptuality or discourse” (200). If the inner, originary (or imaginary) scene is 
forcibly locked into the outer frame, “it enables the protagonists and ourselves to experience 
such scenes as part of a greater, transcendent frame, and thus as ethical, beautiful, or 
sublime” (81, italics in the original). This outer frame, Eshelman proposes, “is not 
impermeable or inviolable,” and “cannot and should not be exempted from ideological and 
metaphysical critiques” (86). He points out the cause of confusion on the part of 
postmodernist critics: “When postmodernists misinterpret performatist works it is almost 
always because they think that there is only one kind of legitimate frame: the intermediate 
one,” which “corresponds, in effect, to the Derridean notion of the parergon: it is that which 
mediates between inside and out while being reducible to neither” (84). In fact, Eshelman 
believes, the existence of the outer frame allows the possibility of transcendence from the 
inner scene, and thus performatism “seeks to restore a space where transcendence, goodness 
and beauty can be experienced vicariously, by identifying with fictional ostensive scenes” 
(90).
The coerced unity resulting from the ostensive sign and its role in the double frame 
“allows for a new, positively conceived – but not unproblematic – type of subjectivity” (8). 
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The performatist subject “is constructed in such a way that it is dense or opaque relative to its 
milieu,” which is “a reaction to the plight of the postmodern subject, who is constantly being 
pulled apart and misled by signs in the surrounding context” (8). Opacity to this surrounding 
context enables the return of subjectivity, “[b]ecause the simplest formal requirement of once 
more becoming a whole subject is tautological – to be a subject the subject must somehow set 
itself off from its context” (37). Of course, this new form of subjectivity is “ambivalent, since 
it achieves a closed unity at the expense of participation in a viable social environment of 
some kind” (8). Eshelman emphasizes the constructed nature of this subject: “[T]he subject's 
newly won opacity or denseness is constructed and doesn't represent a natural, pre-existing 
essence,” and “doesn't ascribe it any particular idealized or essential features before the fact” 
(9). In fact, the opaque or dense subject can appear quite limited due to its lack of social 
interaction. Comparing the performatist subject to Erving Goffman's concept, which also 
operates inside frames, Eshelman describes the limitations of the opaque subject: “Unlike 
Goffman's facile and highly adaptive social actor, however, performatist heroes and heroines 
are, at least at the beginning of their development, locked into a tight 'fit' with a single, set 
frame” (92). Yet it is through its constructed opacity that the performatist subject can attain 
transcendence from this frame; a transcendence that is “not some sort of mystical escapism, 
but a logical reaction to the legacies of both modernism and postmodernism” (119).
Eshelman believes that this transcendence involves a turn to a “theist” aesthetics: 
“Because of its emphasis on transcending coercive frames rather than continually 
transgressing porous, constantly shifting boundaries (as is the case in postmodernism), 
performatism acquires a distinctly theist cast” (13, italics in the original). This theism 
manifests itself “in such a way that the reader or viewer at first has no choice but to opt for a 
single, compulsory solution to the problems raised within the work at hand” (2). An “all-
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powerful, omniscient” creator “forces his or her own authoritative point of view upon us in 
what is usually a circular or tautological way” (19), “using dogmatic, ritual, or some other 
coercive means” (2). This “radically theist” approach contrasts sharply with the “radically 
deist” postmodern approach, in which “the notion of a personal God is replaced by a 
dynamic, constantly shifting relation between parts and a whole” (89). In postmodern art, 
“the authorial position recedes in an endless mise-en-abyme of undecidable, catch-me-if-you-
can irony” (200). In contrast, in performatism, the theist author manifests itself in the outer 
frame: “Inasmuch as the outer frame is forcibly imposed from without, it may be experienced 
as the sublime, intimidating product of a higher, powerful will” (200). In narrative works, 
“closed, monistically organized narrative frames” (90) are imposed, which “means that time 
and space are framed in such a way that subjects have a real chance to orient themselves 
within them and transcend them in some way” (38), while visual artists “use strategies that 
dampen or defuse suspicion and create positive visual projections within the artificially 
imposed, but internally free space of intuition” (219). Accessing the intuition rather than 
reason is part of an “attempt to make viewers believe rather than convince them with 
cognitive arguments” (37, italics in the original). The theist intervention of an author or 
creator in the work forces this belief. 
Eshelman demonstrates his theory in five areas: fiction, film, architecture, critical 
theory, and art, citing an extensive array of international works, all of which appear during 
the timeframe of his proposed epoch. In each of the five sections, he presents and examines a 
set of typical manifestations of his model, including five plot types and nine architectural 
components, attempting to maintain his semiotic model while addressing such radically 
different forms as photography and philosophy. Although his identifications and descriptions 
of potentially new aesthetic elements are quite convincing, it takes an extraordinary labor to 
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connect the vast array of cultural elements to his simple monist semiotic model. Attempting 
to boil down an entire cultural epoch to a single change in semiotics, one that he believes 
occurs cyclically and has occurred now because artists have simply grown tired of the old 
shtick, is a Herculean task. The theory would have been much stronger if he had not insisted 
on this one structure: ostensivity, double frame, opaque subject and theism. Each of these 
may indeed be components of a new epoch along with the numerous other ideas (such as 
transcendence, a return to beauty, etc.) he presents, but relying on them all being present 
either excludes a huge amount of contemporary culture, or forces the critic to do some 
uncomfortable contortions to make the theory fit.
I believe he also missed out on several opportunities to tie his new epoch to historical 
and political changes that would easily apply and strengthen his argument. Especially 
frustrating, for example, is his discussion of new architecture in Berlin. He acknowledges that 
the new Federal Chancellory “is most certainly one case where the fall of communism has 
had a direct aesthetic expression” (152), but he does not go for the obvious comparison 
between German reunification and his proposed return to semiotic monism. Again, at the end 
of the book he cites “the rapid, revolutionary switch to a market economy in Eastern 
European countries and the globalization process in general” (207) as a contributing factor, 
but later hedges his bets by asserting that “the motor of this progress is located in a basic, 
insoluble conflict between semiotic monism and semiotic dualism and not in the zeitgeist” 
(216-7). There is also virtually no mention of the Internet, whose widespread impact on 
global culture has barely been registered by most theorists. Eshelman does acknowledge the 
post-Cold War triumph of capitalism as “a universal, inescapable economic and cultural 
reality” (207), but doesn't address how this might have helped create the new epoch. He does, 
however, open the door to such a discussion by asking, “If global capitalism really is as 
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spiritually empty, ugly, arbitrary, and claustrophobic as the postmodern critique maintains, 
then it is fair to ask how it managed to unfold such a world-encompassing, universal dynamic 
in the first place” (212), but unfortunately, he doesn't follow up on this line of thought. 
Eshelman has shown boldness by relinquishing the postmodern crutch of most of his rivals 
and venturing out into the raw, naked contemporary culture to analyze what is really out 
there, but remains reticent when it comes to answering the key question: why now?
1.3.3 Digimodernism
Alan Kirby has put forth a paradigm about what follows postmodernism in his book, 
Digimodernism: How New Technologies Dismantle the Postmodern and Reconfigure our 
Culture (2009). According to Kirby, the rise of digital technology, including the Internet, have 
put the era of postmodernity to rest and created a new epoch: “Postmodernist culture was 
rooted in all kinds of historical, social, economic, and political developments; it was the 
aesthetic expression of epochal shifts engulfing millions of people. It would take something 
wrenchingly huge to sweep this away; I believe digital technology, essentially, is that 
something” (35). Kirby identifies specific traits that characterize the “digimodernist” texts he 
proposes are the successors to postmodernism: “onwardness, haphazardness, evanescence, 
and anonymous, social and multiple authorship,” in addition to “infantilism, earnestness...and 
apparent reality” (4-5). This is a wide range of characteristics, but I want to go through them 
quickly, as I believe they are interesting and useful observations about contemporary culture 
that at times resonate with my concept.
Starting with onwardness, Kirby writes, “The traditional text appears to almost 
everyone in its entirety, ended, materially, made. The digimodernist text, by contrast, is up for 
grabs,: it is rolling, and the reader is plunged in among it as something that is ongoing” (63). 
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His primary example is the blog, which is continually updated and added to; never finished. 
Although he identifies the diary, journal, or log as the predecessors of the blog, Kirby insists 
that the “primacy given by blogs to the latest entry marks a first break with their textual 
inheritance” (131). Rather than following the beginning to end narrative flow of a printed 
diary, “as the eye descends the screen of the blog it goes back in textual time” (131, italics in 
the original). This reversed temporality, to Kirby, is due to the text's unfinished nature. The 
blog is “a text under development, one currently being constructed, being built up, a text 
emerging, growing” (131), and the ability of readers to add comments means that the text is 
never complete. Social networking sites such as Facebook follow the same pattern. In 
addition, the open-ended nature of some video games, which provide huge worlds to explore 
and are continually updated with new content, provides another example of this 
digimodernist onwardness.
This unfinished, contingent onwardness leads to another of Kirby's characteristics: 
haphazardness. Since the text is not finished, “the future development of the text is 
undecided. What it will consist of down the line is as yet unknown” (63). Unlike a traditional 
text, whose form is determined and permanently fixed, the digimodernist text retains “the 
permanent possibility that it might go off in multiple directions: the infinite parallel potential 
of its future textual contents” (63). As an example, Kirby cites YouTube, which, in contrast to 
cinema or television, allows the user an unprecedented range of seemingly random 
experiences: “YouTube places cheek by jowl highly sophisticated work by career specialists 
and stuff by people who barely know how to switch on a camcorder” (141). This has led to an 
aesthetic that recreates the appearance of the haphazard: “YouTube's haphazardness means 
that it encompasses amateur and professional material,...students and other unpaid wannabes 
seek to make their videos look 'professional' in order to gain employment, the trained and 
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salaried rough up their work to make it look real, authentic, and sincere” (142, italics in the 
original). Films such as The Blair Witch Project (1999) or Cloverfield (2008) exemplify this 
aesthetic.
According to Kirby, “The digimodernist text does not endure. It is technically very 
hard to capture and archive; it has no interest as a reproducible item” (63). In other words, it 
is evanescent. Kirby's key example is the text message, “several billion of which are digitally 
created and sent every day, [and] is by some criteria the most important 'textual' mode or 
recorded communication medium of our time” (82). Kirby believes that the text message, 
which he describes as “the lowest form of recorded communication ever known” (81) and “a 
virtually illiterate jumble of garbled characters” (81), is “ephemeral and evanescent, even 
harder to hold on to than the e-mail” (81). As it is not permanently stored and often has no 
features identifying its author, “biographers who depend professionally on stable, enduring 
private messages written and received by their subject look on the SMS and despair” (83). 
This evanescence extends itself into other fields, including the reality TV show contest, such 
as Big Brother or American Idol, as such shows are made to be seen once only: the drama 
disappears once the result of the audience voting is known, and thus, the shows have little if 
any replay value. Similarly, although a video game can be played again and again, once 
finished, each session is forever lost. It is impossible to go back and repeat the same 
experience.
Anonymous and/or group authorship is yet another characteristic of these 
digimodernist texts. According to Kirby, “the figure of the disreputably lonely or mocked or 
dethroned author of postmodernism and post-structuralism is obsolete” (72) because 
digimodernism “abolishes the assumed singularity of authorship” (71), and thus “silently 
restores the authorial, and revalorizes it” (71). From Wikipedia to message boards, the 
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Internet is filled with texts that are composed by the same people who use them, who remain 
mostly anonymous. The course of a reality TV show may be determined by the audience, 
who call in and choose the winners, but these viewers remain unknown; unseen. This 
authorship is hierarchical, with various functions performed by different levels of the 
hierarchy, “from an originative level that sets parameters, invents terms, places markers, and 
proffers structural content, to later, lower levels that produce the text they are also 
consuming” (71).
Kirby remarks on the prevalence of children's entertainment in contemporary culture: 
“American popular cinema and, by extension, world popular cinema have become a 
subdomain of children's stories. Of the ninety movies appearing on the lists of the top ten 
grossing films worldwide every year from 1999 to 2007, forty-five, or exactly half, are 
children's fictions” (148). In addition to dominating world cinema, there has been a “new 
redefinition of popular music as songs for children” (151). In part, he blames economics; “it 
can be argued that society has been infantilized, particularly through consumerism that 
fetishizes spending and sees work as an irrelevant burden” (157). This infantilization has 
widespread results on the culture: “Infantilized adults produce children and teenagers mired 
forever in preschool behavior patterns: unable to listen or concentrate, seeking constant 
entertainment, unwilling to do chores, verbally incontinent and incoherent, acting and 
dressing in public as at home” (285-6). This vicious circle drives the market, leading to more 
infantilized culture: “[C]onsumerism privileges too the response of the targeted market; and 
so an infantilized 'popular' culture at best elides, at worst scorns all cultural knowledge and 
training (which presuppose maturity)” (283). However, he suggests that there may be 
“another way of seeing all these traits not in terms of regression from sophistication (not as 
'credulity,' or 'infantilism,' etc.), but in terms of breakup and re-formation. It can be argued 
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that a new, though in many ways old, form of narrative is percolating through our culture” 
(182). This new form of narrative represents “an evolution in narrative after postmodernism, 
away from the realist/antirealist impasse toward a mythopoeic form more reminiscent of 
medieval storytelling” (180).
Kirby also claims that digimodernism is partly characterized by a new kind of realism 
that he calls the “apparently real.” He describes three components of the apparently real: 
“There are three concomitant observations that can be made about the textual functions of the 
apparently real: its deployment of a (pseudo)scientific discourse; its engulfing of the self 
('addictiveness'); and its immersion in the present” (172). Unlike realism, the apparently real 
must only present itself as real to be accepted, although the audience remains aware of its 
actual unreality: “The apparently real is, then, a negotiation between viewer and screen: we 
know its not totally genuine, but if it utterly seems to be, then we will take it as such” (165, 
italics in the original). Kirby believes that “[p]ostmodernist culture was rooted in all kinds of 
historical, social, economic, and political developments” (35), but the “apparently real and 
digimodernism are by contrast lost in the here and now, swamped in the textual present; they 
know nothing of the cultural past and have no historical sense” (175). Here, the primary 
example would be the reality TV show, which is partly scripted, staged, and edited, yet 
presented as real. Being rooted, as it is, in the non-historical present, the apparently real lacks 
self-reflectivity: “The apparently real comes without self-consciousness, without irony or 
self-interrogation, and without signalling itself to the reader or viewer. Consequently, for 
anyone used to the refinement of postmodernism, the apparently real may seem intolerably 
'stupid'” (164). The MTV show Jackass and its subsequent film version would be prime 
examples
Finally, Kirby also remarks on the prevalence of autism in contemporary culture, 
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insisting that “[w]e live in the age of autism.” (264). The ubiquity of autism is actually a 
component of digimodernism, as Kirby believes that “autism is integral to digimodernism, 
and plays much the same role within it as the neurosis did for modernism and schizophrenia 
for postmodernism” (268). The autistic subject as portrayed in films such as Rain Man (1988) 
and in books such as Mark Haddon's The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night Time 
(2003), could, in theory, be attributed to “the emergence of new technologies, especially 
computers, the Internet, and videogames, which enable individuals to engage with 'worlds' or 
reality-systems without socially interacting” and leads to “a diminished capacity to relate to 
or to 'read' other people” (268). This, in addition to “the growing and widespread tendency to 
portray the sociopathic as normative in popular TV drama, cinema, and music,” a trend that 
“valorize[s] acting according to personal impulses with no reference to other people, the 
collectivity, social rules or conventions” (268), would be the easy explanation, according to 
Kirby. However, Kirby wants a more complex theory, and he invents one that has nine 
different cultural components. I'll list them briefly here. First, he cites a “demographic shift 
toward overpopulation” and “over-urbanization” that leads to “the disappearance of 
wilderness and the near-impossibility of solitude,” and causes a “need for solitude, silence, 
freedom from interference” (269). Second, he lists “the economic tendency toward ever-
greater flexibility, multitasking, ad hoc arrangements, job insecurity, rapid staff turnover” 
leading to an “insistence on sameness, on repetition of past actions, on rigidity” (269). Third, 
there is “a social shift toward an ever-greater valorization of social skills, of the ability to chat 
and come across, to accrue popularity and self-represent” which brings a backlash of desire 
for “the authentic, the concrete, depth-knowledge versus superficiality” (269). Fourth, “an 
increased suspicion of the characteristic traits of masculinity,” so that the “culture sets more 
store by the 'feminine' quality of empathy than by the 'masculine' value of 'systemization'” 
Allen 59
(270), meaning that “'maleness,' at root, is identical with mental impairment” (270). Fifth, 
there has appeared “a cultural modishness of a 'Latin' emotional tone (forever hugging, 
kissing, frequent touching, emoting, loud voices)” and this means that autism is associated 
with “an unfashionable 'English' (or Victorian) remoteness” (270). Sixth, there is a perception 
of an “emerging generational crisis by which young people are felt by adults to be 
unreachable” (270), with an illogical “media emphasis on autism as a child's disease” (270). 
Seventh, the collapse of Marxism has caused difficulty “conceptualizing alienation from a 
pervasively consumerist society,” so that “autism can be broadly identified as behavioral 
alienation in a consumer-capitalist hegemony” (270). Eighth, “the emerging moral consensus, 
deriving from a degraded postmodernism or multiculturalism, by which everyone is right 
from their side and all views must be respected” is opposed by autism's focus on “truth, 
objectivity, and reason, postmodernism's devils” (271). Finally, the need for autism is driven 
by a “psuedophilosophical or antiscientific drift toward the denigration of knowledge and 
cleverness” that calls for “autism's contrasting embrace of exhaustive knowledge, its love and 
recall of facts, its rich and grammatically correct use of language, its insistence on rationality, 
truth, and rigor” (271).
As we see, Kirby gives us an extensive overview of new cultural characteristics that 
he believes are driven by digital technology. And yet, toward the end of his book, he suddenly 
and briefly shifts focus from technology to the “most popular and destructive Western grand 
narrative” (278): consumerism. For Kirby, consumerism is “a conception of life, a system of 
values, a worldview, a framework for the understanding, meaning, and purpose of existence 
stretching far beyond mere buying”(278), which has become “the sole or overriding model 
for all human life” and “a fanaticism,” meaning that “[p]ostmodernism's commitment to 
many valid viewpoints is obsolete, overpowered by an all-swamping single creed” (278). 
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Consumerism is “megalomaniacal” (278), transforming everything from education to 
families, it “reinvents religion (as New Age bricolage) and sport (as club fanaticism)” (279), 
it “destroys political action” (280), and “eats up the planet and excretes back into it” (280). 
For Kirby, the goal is “to isolate consumerism primarily as a mode of thought, a moral code, 
an ethos, a buried framework of understanding; to challenge it in its grand-narrative 
imperialism, its demented ambitions to direct all; to roll it back, to push it back. We need a 
new mental master” (280).
The question for us is, are the forces shaping this new era connected simply to new 
technologies, as Kirby insists at the beginning of his book, or is there another force driving 
these changes that rises above the technologies? I believe Kirby has correctly identified a 
number of new forms of culture or communication, only to rely too heavily on technological 
determinism as the impetus. He himself can't decide whether it is technology leading the 
charge or consumerism. His nine-point analysis of the autistic subject is a great example of 
this lack of clarity as he swerves from the obvious factors, such as new technology, to 
everything from disapproval of masculinity to Marxist alienation to too much hugging and 
touching. To paraphrase football legend John Madden, when you have a whole lot of 
something, you usually have a whole lot of nothing. In other words, Kirby can see the 
cultural changes, but he is unclear about what is driving them. I think he glimpsed the horizon 
during his short detour into consumerism, but it was too late to go back and rename the book 
Consumodernism. He also finds no way to connect the end of the Cold War to the rise and 
spread of new technology, leaving a major worldwide historical shift unaccounted for. 
However, Kirby does at least separate himself from postmodern orthodoxy and venture forth 
into contemporary culture to bring back new ideas. He has clearly accomplished something 
valuable here.
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Another flaw in his analysis has to do with the scarcity of culturally important texts. 
Kirby writes: “It is almost possible to argue that digimodernist literature does not exist. 
Where are the digimodernist novels, poems, and plays? One way of answering this would be 
to say that literature does not have the relationship to digimodernism which it had to 
postmodernism or modernism” (254), and then goes so far as to ask, “Is digimodernism 
finally another name for the death of the text?” (260). Of course, the fact that he asks this 
question in a book demonstrates that, indeed, the text may still be relevant. Simply writing “it 
would be true to argue that digimodern literature is yet to come” (254), and then ignoring 
contemporary fiction means his theory is primarily applicable only to the new cultural forms 
he has identified. One has to pose the question, is the text message a culturally important 
medium? Or is it comparable to the telegram, the post card, the fax, the e-mail – in other 
words, is it merely a quotidian mode of communication and not a new form of “culture”? I do 
believe that video games are the cutting edge art form of the contemporary era, and I would 
have loved to have seen an in-depth analysis of a game. Unfortunately, Kirby offers us few 
readings of any games, and only addresses the use of CGI animation in film.
1.4 The Importance of Ethics
When comparing and contrasting the different concepts outlined in these theories, we see a 
huge disparity in vision, from an extension of postmodern relationality with an other to 
technological determinism to a neo-romantic dedication to an unattainable future to a (re)turn 
to semiotic monism. There is no widespread agreement on exactly what follows 
postmodernism. However, certain commonalities do appear. For one, the acknowledgment of 
a global, consumer-oriented neoliberal capitalism is prevalent. Some are fearful of it, while 
others are more sanguine. Subject-formation and/or construction seems to be a component of 
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many of these models, whether the subject is formed by contact with an other or perhaps an 
autistic or dense subject. Another commonality seems to be the re-conception of the world as 
one: a cosmology or ecology, a monism, a network or archipelago, a global market – the 
fashioning of the many into one seems to be a common feature of these concepts. However, 
the most consistent point of agreement is ethics.
For example, Moraru's model is primarily focused on ethical concerns: 
“cosmodernism is best understood as an ethical rather than 'technical' project” (Moraru 316). 
His model is not just a description, it is also “an ethical imperative pointing to the present as 
much as to the future” (5, italics in the original) that calls for “an 'ecological' balance 
understood as co-presence, co-implication, and co-responsibility of self and his or her 
'cultural other,' in short, as ethical relatedness” (50). Vermeulen and Van de Akker's model, 
metamodernism, proposes that “new generations of artists increasingly abandon the aesthetic 
precepts of deconstruction, parataxis, and pastiche in favor of aesth-ethical notions of 
reconstruction, myth, and metaxis” (Notes 2). Here, ethics is combined with an aesthetics 
premised on the belief that “humankind, a people, are not really going toward a natural but 
unknown goal, but they pretend they do so that they progress morally as well as politically” 
(5). Like Vermeulen and Van de Akker, Eshelman is concerned with the interaction of 
aesthetics and ethics: “Performatism, you could say, seeks to restore a space where 
transcendence, goodness and beauty can be experienced vicariously” (Eshelman 90). His 
double-frame model “enables the protagonists and ourselves to experience such scenes as part 
of a greater, transcendent frame, and thus as ethical, beautiful, or sublime” (81, italics in the 
original), and so, he believes, “[w]orlds constructed in this way become ethical by definition” 
(90). Nealon's model draws extensively from Adorno's ethics, which he describes as “a kind 
of 'musical ethics' of speed and slowness – an ethics that does something, produces effects, 
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over against the transcendental ethics of resentment, judgment, and condemnation” (Nealon 
120). This ethics is different from postmodernism, offering instead “an ethics that doesn't 
dictate, but rather works through and modulates extremes in a dialectical way” (123). In this 
approach, the postmodern obsession with meaning and its failure is replaced with an ethical 
question: “[T]he philosophical question 'What does it mean?' will always be subordinated to 
the ethical question 'What does it do?'” (123). Lipovetsky believes that in hypermodernity the 
postmodern focus on the present is being altered by a new ethics: “While the axis of the 
present is still dominant, it is not absolute: the culture of prevention and the 'ethics of the 
future' have led to a renewed importance being given to the imperatives of a more or less 
distant future” (Lipovetsky 44). This ethics of the future has led to a change in behavior 
patterns: “[H]edonistic ideals have been supplanted by the ideology of health and longevity. 
In the name of these, individuals are to a massive degree renouncing immediate satisfactions, 
improving and reorienting their daily behavior” (47). Even Bourriaud, who doesn't discuss 
ethics specifically, believes that altermodernism “is also taking shape under the urgent 
pressure to answer very basic questions” (Bourriaud 13). One of the main questions is “how 
do we live in this world that we are told is becoming 'global', but which seems to be 
buttressed on particular interests or tensed behind the barricades of fundamentalism – when 
not upholding icons of mass culture as role models?” (13). The question “how do we live” is 
the central concern of ethics, and thus, altermodernism, too, seeks to examine ethical 
concerns.
In fact, the only one of the models we examined that doesn't address the importance 
and prevalence of ethics in contemporary culture is Alan Kirby's digimodernism. I would like 
to suggest that the incorporation of such a discussion would actually improve on his work. 
For example, the development of new technology hardly explains the popularity of children's 
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stories and what he describes as “an evolution in narrative after postmodernism, away from 
the realist/antirealist impasse toward a mythopoeic form more reminiscent of medieval 
storytelling” (Kirby 180). Why would digital technology cause this? Couldn't digital 
technology be used to create postmodern stories just as well as this “new” form of narrative? 
The fact is, what children's stories and medieval storytelling have in common is a clear, 
pedagogical approach to morals. Their very purpose is to impart ethical values. The 
popularity of such forms in contemporary culture would be better explained by the desire for 
ethical instruction than by new technology. A closer look at these fairy-tale like epic 
narratives would reveal clear, incredibly simplistic differentiations between good and evil, 
such as the light and dark sides of “the force” in the Star Wars universe, or the hobbits and 
orcs of the Lord of the Rings films. The contemporary era is longing for ethical clarity, and 
these youth-oriented, mythical narratives provide it.
The question is, why are ethics such an important part of these periodization models, 
and why is the need for ethical structures so prevalent in contemporary culture? In the 
following chapters I will address this question and I hope to provide a more satisfying 
answer.
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2 Postmodern Ethics and the Ethical Dominant
2.1 Introduction
The main thesis of my dissertation is that the lack of ethical clarity and structure during 
postmodernity has led to a renewed interest in building and exploring ethical systems in the 
era after postmodernity. In my first chapter, I explored seven different models of what comes 
after postmodernism and demonstrated that despite an incredibly diverse array of possible 
features, nearly all of them contained a focus on ethics, and even the one model that didn't 
explicitly propose such a focus was made stronger by adding it. None of the models was 
inconsistent with my thesis. In this chapter, I will examine postmodern ethics, drawing from 
its critics to explore why it has ethical weaknesses. I will profile the “ethical turn” that occurs 
in response to such criticisms, leading to an ethics of being for the other. Then I will present 
some criticism of this reconfigured version of postmodern ethics to show that something 
different is needed. After this, I will consider the possibility of extending Brian McHale's 
theory that postmodernism manifests an ontological dominant by presenting a logical 
argument for an ethical dominant.
2.2 Postmodern Ethics and its Discontents
There are two visions of postmodern ethics that I will focus on here in order to provide a 
useful backdrop for presenting my three contemporary ethical paradigms, and performing my 
critical readings of contemporary fiction. The first vision is that postmodernism doesn't have 
an ethics, because ethics is not compatible with the postmodern approach. Zygmunt Bauman 
summarizes the views of critics offering this perspective: “The postmodern mind seems to 
condemn everything, propose nothing. Demolition is the only job the postmodern mind seems 
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to be good at. Destruction is the only construction it recognizes. Demolition of coercive 
restraints and mental blocks is for it the ultimate purpose and the end of emancipatory effort” 
(Intimations ix). As the author of Postmodern Ethics (1993), Bauman doesn't share this view, 
as we will see shortly, but he describes it very succinctly:
What has come to be associated with the notion of the postmodern approach to 
morality is all too often the celebration of the 'demise of the ethical,' of the 
substitution of aesthetics for ethics, and of the 'ultimate emancipation' that follows. 
Ethics is denigrated or derided as one of the typically modern restraints now broken 
and destined for the dustbin of history; fetters once deemed necessary, now clearly 
superfluous, another illusion that postmodern men and women can well do without. 
(Ethics 2)
According to this vision, postmodernity has left us without any ethical codes, floating in a sea 
of relativity, while real world ethical concerns go unmet. We are thus forced to fashion our 
own codes, without any hope of external affirmation: "In a cacophony of moral voices, none 
of which is likely to silence the others, the individuals are thrown back on their own 
subjectivity as the ultimate ethical authority. At the same time, however, they are repeatedly 
told about the irreparable relativism of any moral code" (Intimations xxii). This has led us to 
a position of hopeless stasis, paralyzing the postmodern subject in indecision and constant 
anxiety. How do we live? What is the right thing to do? “The ethical paradox of the 
postmodern condition is that it restores to agents the fullness of moral choice and 
responsibility while simultaneously depriving them of the universal guidance that modern 
self-confidence once promised” (xxii), Bauman writes. In the midst of this ethical crisis, 
postmodern theory offers only rhetorical solutions that do not help us with any real-world 
problems. As Christopher Norris puts it, “[W]e have reached a point where theory has 
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effectively turned against itself, generating a form of extreme epistemological skepticism 
which reduces everything – philosophy, politics, criticism, and 'theory' alike – to a dead level 
of suasive or rhetorical effect where consensus-values are the last (indeed the only) court of 
appeal” (Norris 4). This criticism of the focus on the rhetorical was echoed by 
postcolonialists such as Edward Said, who argued that postmodernism had abdicated any 
responsibility for events in the real world:
In having given up the world entirely for the aporias and unthinkable paradoxes of a 
text, contemporary criticism has retreated from its constituency, the citizens of 
modern society, who have been left to the hands of 'free' market forces, multinational 
corporations, the manipulations of consumer appetites. A precious jargon has grown 
up, and its formidable complexities obscure the social realities....(Said 4)
Although supposedly on a mission of emancipation, by focusing on linguistics and textual 
questions almost exclusively, postmodern theory was ignoring real world oppression and the 
opportunity for real attempts to deliver emancipation to the marginalized, according to such 
critics. The idea that postmodernism was avoiding ethical engagement was further 
exacerbated by the revelation that the celebrated deconstructionist, Paul de Man, had 
collaborated with the Nazis during World War II, and then lied extensively about his past, 
including his academic qualifications: “De Man's Wartime Journalism indeed unleashed a 
flood of controversy within and outside the academy over whether deconstruction was 
morally evasive or iniquitous. It intensified criticism of the Derridean postulate of 'nothing 
outside the text' (or textuality) as ethically myopic” (Buell 9). 
Around the same time, some voices began to question the entire postmodern project. 
Jürgen Habermas, for example, suggested that there was nothing 'post' about postmodernism, 
that it was actually just a form of conservatism whose criticisms of modernity were echoes of 
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the conservative complaints that arose back when modernity first arrived: “Is modernity as 
passé as the postmodernists argue? Or is the widely trumpeted arrival of postmodernity itself 
'phony'? Is 'postmodern' a slogan which unobtrusively inherits the affective attitudes which 
cultural modernity has provoked in reaction to itself since the middle of the nineteenth 
century?” (Habermas 39). Notice the use of the word “phony.” Together with the complaint 
about “jargon” we read earlier, the accusation began to arise that all of this postmodern theory 
was just a bunch of obscurantist nonsense. In fact, this was the suspicion of physicist Alan 
Sokal, who famously sent a fake article to academic journal Social Text that was filled with 
jargon and scientific inside jokes making fun of postmodern theory:
So, to test the prevailing intellectual standards, I decided to try a modest (though 
admittedly uncontrolled) experiment: Would a leading North American journal of 
cultural studies – whose editorial collective includes such luminaries as Fredric 
Jameson and Andrew Ross – publish an article liberally salted with nonsense if (a) it 
sounded good and (b) it flattered the editors' ideological preconceptions? (Sokal)
The article was indeed published, and Sokal revealed his hoax afterwards. He followed this 
stunt up with a book he named Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals' Abuse of 
Science (1998) that accused a number of prominent theorists of attempting to appropriate the 
authority of science by using phony mathematical and scientific language and symbols. 
Needless to say, the attacks provoked considerable controversy. 
It may very well have been the sustained and increasing criticism that led many 
prominent postmodern figures such as Derrida and Foucault to swerve in the direction of 
ethics toward the end of their careers. Or perhaps they simply saw the same flaws that others 
were remarking on. Either way, a concept of ethics began to emerge that was compatible with 
postmodern theory. Drawn from the work of Emmanuel Lévinas, its takes the Heideggerian 
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mitsein one step further, replacing the ethical concept of being with the other with the idea of 
being for the other. According to Bauman, “In a most dramatic reversal of the principles of 
modern ethics, Lévinas accords the Other that priority which was once unquestionably 
assigned to the self” (85). That priority exists because, for Lévinas, ethics must be the first 
philosophy, the foundation on which even metaphysics or ontology must be founded: 
“Preexisting the disclosure of being in general taken as basis of knowledge and as meaning of 
being is the relation with the existent that expresses himself; preexisting the plane of ontology 
is the ethical plane” (Lévinas 201). The self is only fully realized when it comes face to face 
with an other: “Awakening to being for the Other is the awakening of the self, which is the 
birth of the self” (Ethics 77, italics in the original). The other's need demands a response, and 
our obligation is to help, without expecting any reward: “I am for the Other whether the 
Other is for me or not; his being for me is, so to speak, his problem” (50). Only then can we 
begin to establish a philosophy. Ethics does not come from outside, but from inside, from an 
internal response to the need of the other: “Given the ambiguous impact of the societal efforts 
at ethical legislation, one must assume that moral responsibility – being for the Other before 
one can be with the Other – is the first reality of the self, a starting point rather than a product 
of society” (13, italics in the original). Because it precedes all philosophy, it cannot be 
codified, transmitted or learned. Bauman acknowledges the problematic nature of this 
approach:
To be frank, this is not the kind of foundation ethical philosophers dreamt of and go 
on dreaming about. It leaves quite a lot to be desired, and this is perhaps why the 
seekers for the building site of Law look the other way. No harmonious ethics can be 
erected on this site – only the straggly shoots of the never ending, never resolved 
moral anxiety will on this soil grow profusely. (80)
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Being for the other does have the advantage that it dovetails with postmodernism's supposed 
interest in the marginalized, in emancipation from oppressive power structures, and 
transgression of restrictive boundaries. Postmodernists can do these things to help the other. 
These concepts began to gain prominence just as postmodernism was staggering under the 
weight of ethical criticism, and gave the movement new life in what has been called “the 
ethical turn.” If this all sounds familiar, it's because these ideas are the same ideas explored in 
Christian Moraru's cosmodernism, which we examined in Chapter One.
Being for the other might resolve some theoretical problems for postmodern theorists 
wanting to preserve their status and accomplishments, but it is quite difficult to actually do. 
Lawrence Buell summarizes two major arguments against such an ethics, one from the left 
and one from the right. From the left: “How can moral precepts (e.g., honor the claim of the 
other) form the basis of social collectives and ensure a reformed society or polity? And even 
if they can, is there not even something oppressively homogenizing, if not totalizing, about 
Lévinas's 'other'?” (16). The other is always presumed to be inferior, in need of our help, his 
or her individual characteristics erased by our desire to be ethical – we rush in to help, even if 
no help is truly needed. The argument from the right centers around reciprocity: “How ethical 
is the ethos of allowing oneself to be held hostage, without mutuality of personal obligation 
or a social contract at the foundation of it?” (16). Indeed, in this ethics of being for the other, 
what's in it for me?
Jacques Rancière goes even further with his skepticism in his essay, “The Ethical Turn 
of Aesthetics and Politics” (2015), to suggest that this ethics of being for the other is nothing 
more than a facade behind which hides good old-fashioned imperialism. In criticizing the 
U.S. invasion of Iraq, he blames the ethical turn for providing justification for the military 
action: “Ethics has established its reign here, too, initially in the form of the humanitarian, 
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and then in the form of infinite justice against the axis of evil” (7). The extension of human 
rights to the oppressed in Afghanistan and Iraq was cited as justification to support the 
military intervention:
However, this absolute right of those without rights could be exercised only by an 
other. It is this transfer that was first called humanitarian right and humanitarian war. 
In a second step, the humanitarian war against the oppressor of human rights became 
the infinite justice exercised against that invisible and omnipresent enemy who came 
to threaten the defender of the absolute right of victims on its own territory. (8)
The need of the other compels us to take action, to intervene and impose those rights that we 
consider absolute, but this has metastasized into something far worse: “The humanitarian war 
becomes an endless war against terror: a war that is not one, but a mechanism of infinite 
protection” (8).
Perhaps the harshest critic of the ethical turn is Alain Badiou, whose book Ethics: An 
Essay on the Understanding of Evil (2001) launches a full frontal assault against it. First of 
all, he objects to the idea that the other needs our intervention: “We have seen that ethics 
subordinates the identification of this subject to the universal recognition of the evil that is 
done to him. Ethics thus defines man as a victim” (11, italics in the original). In fact, he 
objects to the very idea that the other is, in some way, other in the first place: “[T]he other 
always resembles me too much for the hypothesis of an originary exposure to his alterity to 
be necessarily true” (22, italics in the original). He, too, sees colonialism lurking behind this 
concept of the other:
The objective (or historical) foundation of contemporary ethics is culturalism, in truth 
a tourist's fascination for the diversity of morals, customs and beliefs. And in 
particular, for the irreducible medley of imaginary formations (religions, sexual 
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representations, incarnations of authority...). Yes, the essential 'objective' basis of 
ethics rests on a vulgar sociology directly inherited from the astonishment of the 
colonial encounter with savages. (26)
Being for the other requires an other who is subordinate, who is beneath us, whom we can 
help through intervention, but awarding this status to the other implies a lack of respect: 
“Every intervention in the name of civilization requires an initial contempt for the situation as 
a whole, including its victims” (13, italics in the original), and this serves only to maintain 
“the insistent argument according to which the misery of the Third World is the result of its 
own incompetence, its own inanity – in short, of its subhumanity” (13, italics in the original). 
In fact, instead of being a postmodern recognition of the marginalized, the ethics of being for 
the other is merely racism disguised by a veneer of goodness:
Who can fail to see that in our humanitarian expeditions, interventions, embarkations 
of charitable legionnaires, the Subject presumed to be universal is split? On the side 
of the victims, the haggard animal exposed on television screens. On the side of the 
benefactors, conscience and the imperative to intervene. Who cannot see that this 
ethics which rests on the misery of the world hides, behind its victim-Man, the good-
Man, the white-Man? (13)
Badiou also points out one of the greatest weaknesses of the contemporary attempt to 
politically realize being for the other, which is that the other might very well not be someone 
we like or agree with, indeed, the other might very well be someone fighting for exactly that 
which we oppose:
Our suspicions are first aroused when we see that the self-declared apostles of ethics 
and of the 'right to difference' are clearly horrified by any vigorously sustained 
difference. For them, African customs are barbaric, Muslims are dreadful, the Chinese 
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are totalitarian, and so on. As a matter of fact, this celebrated 'other' is acceptable only 
if he is a good other – which is to say what, exactly, if not the same as us? Respect for 
differences, of course! But on condition that the different be parliamentary-
democratic, pro free-market economics, in favor of freedom of opinion, feminism, the 
environment.... (24, italics in the original)
Tolerance for cultural differences can only go so far or otherwise we would have to tolerate 
the intolerant as well: “[T]here can be no respect for those whose difference consists 
precisely in not respecting differences” (24). Must women dedicate themselves to 
misogynists, or homosexuals to the homophobic? Badiou insists that a postmodern ethics of 
being for the other proceeds in the wrong direction, by starting not with the good and how to 
attain it, but by focusing on the evil – the oppression or problematic conditions we wish to 
free the other from. Without this evil, there can be no good: “[I]f the ethical 'consensus' is 
founded on the recognition of Evil, it follows that every effort to unite people around a 
positive idea of the Good, let alone to identify Man with projects of this kind, becomes in fact 
the real source of evil itself” (14).
It is clear from this litany of criticisms that postmodern ethics, whether we want to 
start with our first model, the relativist, non-ethical approach, or whether we want to follow 
the ethical turn and embrace being for the other, are problematic, fraught with contradictions 
and absurdities that make them difficult to live by. The ethical turn acknowledges the need for 
ethics, but postmodern theory is unable to provide it. Being for the other is a concept that 
crumbles apart as soon as it is examined closely. It is my contention that the attempt to find 
other approaches to ethics has risen to prominence in the era after postmodernity as a direct 
result of these weaknesses.
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2.3 An Ethical Dominant?
One of the most popular and controversial definitions of postmodernism comes from Brian 
McHale, who argues that postmodern writing exhibits an ontological dominant. He contrasts 
this with modernism's epistemological dominant. According to McHale, modernist writing 
focuses on “such epistemological themes as the accessibility and circulation of knowledge, 
the different structuring imposed on the 'same' knowledge by different minds, and the 
problem of 'unknowability' or the limits of knowledge” (McHale 59). We see this reflected in 
the use of certain modernist techniques, such as “the multiplication and juxtaposition of 
perspectives, the focalization of all the evidence through a single 'center of 
consciousness'...virtuoso variants on interior monologue,” and a structure of “impeded form” 
that employs “dislocated chronology, withheld or indirectly-presented information,” and 
“difficult mindstyles” (59). These techniques are meant to bring into question the 
“accessibility, reliability, and limitation of knowledge” (59), McHale argues. In modernist 
writing, we often see a focus on subjectivity, consciousness, and individual constructions of 
truth.
In contrast, postmodernist writing exhibits a concern with ontological questions. For 
McHale, this is a logical progression, as “[i]ntractable epistemological uncertainty...becomes 
at a certain point ontological plurality or instability” (60). If truth is indeterminate or a 
product of subjectivity, then there can be no certain reality, but rather many different realities, 
many different worlds. McHale writes, “Postmodernist writing is designed to raise such 
questions as: what is a world? What kinds of worlds are there, and how are they constituted, 
and how do they differ? What happens when different kinds of worlds are placed in 
confrontation, or when the boundaries between worlds are violated?” (60). Thus, postmodern 
writing often exhibits stories with multiple possible endings, characters who cross ontological 
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boundaries, such as ghosts or characters taken from other fictional or mythological worlds; or 
even interactions between the characters and the “author.” We also see mixtures of history 
and fiction, magic or hallucinatory worlds, and fictions that attempt to tell “the other side of 
the story,” whether from a postcolonial perspective or as a representation of a marginalized 
identity group.
Although McHale acknowledges that the definition is “strategic” (55), designed to 
produce “new insights, new connections, coherence of a different degree or kind” (55), I find 
it to be a quite useful tool in distinguishing between the two eras as long as one keeps in mind 
that it is not a dogmatic truth. In fact, there probably can be no authoritative definition of a 
phenomenon as complex and diverse as postmodernism. In addition, McHale is narrowly 
focused on written fiction, and it remains to be seen how this could be applied to postmodern 
architecture, for example, where “difficult mindstyles” and “the limitation of knowledge” 
play perhaps less of a role. Nevertheless, as the idea follows a logical progression from 
modern to postmodern, it makes the explanation convenient and productive. At this point, I 
would like to pose the question of what would logically follow this progression from 
epistemological to ontological. If postmodernism has truly ended, we would need a new 
“dominant” to replace the ontological. If we followed the lead of those proposing a simple 
return to modernism, the logical choice would be a return to an epistemological dominant, but 
we would be lacking a logical description of why this has occurred. How does a questioning 
of ontology resulting from a questioning of epistemology lead back to questioning 
epistemology again?
I would instead like to propose instead an ethical dominant as the ideal candidate to 
succeed the ontological. During modernity, subjects questioned the veracity of received truths 
and began developing methods for creating more reliable and verifiable truths, such as the 
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scientific method. Eventually, they began to encounter the extreme limitations of the human 
mind, and the fact that much of our so-called reality is purely constructed from unconfirmed 
and unverifiable ideas. The realization that our tiny minds never know the full truth and 
cannot contain nor process even small doses of the infinite scope of the material world led to 
doubts about what had been previously perceived as reality. Other potential realities were 
identified or constructed that offered alternatives to the existing ones. This is confusing, 
leading to uncertainty, anxiety, and instability. 
Decisions are difficult to make if we know that the constructed reality that the 
decision is embedded in may, in fact, be false. Yet, decisions must constantly be made, often 
with limited knowledge and experience of the circumstances surrounding the decision. The 
solution to this problem would be to develop a method to determine which of the potential 
realities to choose. In other words, which one is better? In order to even begin answering this 
question, we would need to have some kind of method of evaluating the different potential 
realities and sorting through their benefits and drawbacks. In other words, we would need a 
system of ethics. By implementing a system of ethics that exists independently of the 
situation being evaluated, a decision can be arrived at quickly, and if it later turns out to be a 
bad choice, the subject can at least have the solace of knowing that he or she acted in 
consistency with the principles of the ethical system. An ethical system provides an answer as 
to which reality construct to apply, and eases the anxiety and uncertainty of the postmodern 
approach. For these reasons, I believe the ontological dominant of postmodernity would 
logically be followed by an ethical one, if we follow McHale's model.
I offer this possibility, like McHale, not as some kind of absolute truth, but rather as a 
way of preserving and extending a useful tool. If we choose to see the development of 
cultures in terms of a cultural dominant, we will need to identify one for the contemporary 
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era as well. As far as I know, no one else has attempted to do this yet. My proposal is 
preliminary, but it offers a coherent and practical explanation for some cultural developments 
that have occurred over the last few decades. It can serve as a quick litmus test to help us sort 
out which works are still postmodern, and which ones are not. However, I am not willing to 
go so far as to say with certainty that the era after postmodernism is characterized by an 
ethical dominant. The concept could be useful, but ultimately I cannot accept an explanation 
that sums up an entire historical period with one simple idea.
2.4 Conclusion
If, ultimately, I am not willing to pronounce that the contemporary era is one characterized by 
an ethical dominant, I am at least willing to insist that the increased need for ethical certainty, 
structures, or systems is one component of this era. The analysis of the different periodization 
attempts in my first chapter has demonstrated this to us. Furthermore, the exploration of 
postmodern ethics and its critics above has made it clear that there is something lacking in the 
postmodern approach to ethics. Putting these two pieces together, it is reasonable to conclude 
that the lack of ethical certainty in postmodernism is the reason for the resurgence in ethical 
concerns. In the following chapter, I will present a periodization model that attempts to 
demonstrate this more conclusively by examining political, economic, and cultural changes in 
the era after postmodernity, and examining three specific ethical paradigms that I have 
discovered in contemporary American fiction.
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3 The Period After Postmodernism
3.1 A New World Order
3.1.1 The End of Postmodernity
I propose that the end of the Cold War brought about the end of the postmodern era, and that 
we have been living in a different political, socioeconomic, and cultural era since then. The 
exact nature of this era is still open to debate, as we saw in Chapter One, but I believe that the 
enormous political and cultural changes brought about by the end of the Cold War make a 
logical and almost obvious turning point for anyone concerned with periodization. The world 
was no longer torn between two competing economic models, as neoliberal capitalism 
became global, flooding across central and eastern Europe, and even transforming China. 
New markets, new resources, new labor pools became available, and capitalists eagerly 
charged forth to exploit them, triggering an unprecedented economic expansion and 
subsequent prosperity. The Marxist model was dead, and the end of history was famously 
declared. Consumerism flourished.
Politically, the reunification of Germany became the celebrated symbol for the 
international integration processes set in motion. The Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992, 
created the European Union and the common currency, opening an avenue for the integration 
of former Eastern bloc states into the European community. Peace processes blossomed, 
bringing a political solution to the ongoing troubles in Northern Ireland and a short-lived 
agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. Apartheid fell in South Africa, and even 
entrenched adversaries such as North and South Korea and India and Pakistan engaged in 
talks. After the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia removed its troops from eastern Europe, while 
NATO began expanding. The world-wide impetus toward reunion and reconciliation brought 
international attention to civil war in the former Yugoslavia, which was eventually resolved 
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through one of an increasing number of military interventions. An African Union was 
established in 2001. The polarized model of the Cold War was dissolved by images of Bill 
Clinton and Boris Yeltsin laughing together in front of the world press, and embodied by 
Russian troops serving alongside NATO forces as peacekeepers in the Balkans.
A similar process unfolded in the economic sphere. Free trade agreements flourished, 
despite the opposition of labor and environmental advocates. South Pacific nations created 
the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992, the same year the Central European Free Trade 
Agreement (CEFTA) was created. The Central American Integration System (SICA) arrived 
in 1993, and was followed by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was expanded, creating the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. These supra-national agreements and regulatory 
structures emphasized integration and cooperation, even at the cost of national interests, as 
US presidential candidate Ross Perot's quip about a “giant sucking sound” famously accused. 
These agreements ushered in and fostered neoliberal thinking – restrictive regulatory barriers 
fell, dragging social protections with them, and the primary concern was economic growth 
and expansion. “It's the economy, stupid,” Bill Clinton's campaign mantra, typified this focus, 
and his administration's “triangulation” strategy best symbolized the Third Way thinking that 
came into vogue. Government efficiency became a major concern, and the welfare state, as a 
product of the now discredited Marxism, fell into disrepute.
These colossal world-wide changes make the best starting point for a new epoch, in 
my opinion. The postmodern mentality was rooted in the man-made disasters of World War 
II, and the subsequent enduring stasis of a world teetering on the brink of an apocalyptic third 
world war, a never-ending threat of mutually assured destruction that inevitably triggered 
feelings of hopelessness, insecurity, and absurdity. The postmodern paranoia about power 
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structures was clearly ignited by these precursors. Concern for the “other” was rooted in 
horror at the atrocities of the Holocaust, and the similarities between the oppressed Jews and 
other oppressed and marginalized groups. Postmodern play was the flip side of existentialism 
– if life was meaningless and death inevitable, we did not have to take it all so seriously. 
What difference did it make? The structures of civilization built up over thousands of years 
could be dismantled and reconfigured and mocked, the rules could be transgressed, the 
powerful dethroned and replaced by the powerless. In the end, it didn't matter, as we were 
headed toward apocalypse anyway.
The end of the Cold War changed these foundational conditions. The world was 
transforming, and it appeared to many to be for the better. Hope, long dormant and ridiculed, 
reignited and burgeoned, as new utopian schemes were conjured forth. There arose, as Alan 
Greenspan famously warned, an “irrational exuberance.” The world was suddenly in flux, and 
that meant that decisions once again had meaning and consequences. The postmodern 
philosophical approach, entrenched in a hopeless stasis and focused on dismantling the 
existing order, was ill-equipped to deal with the rapid changes, and the real need for ethical 
guidance brought about by the reconfigurations that were taking place. Postmodernists had 
learned how to deconstruct what had been built by others, but hadn't developed a method for 
constructing a viable, functioning alternative. And so, neoliberal thinkers, who had already 
begun implementing their vision during the Reagan and Thatcher years, recognized and 
seized the opportunity.
As we saw earlier, there are, of course, other logically possible starting points for a 
new era. For some, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 seem to be the beginning of 
something new. While I agree that September 11 brought about changes in the American 
political system (suspicion of government power receded in the face of a nebulous, external 
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enemy, for example), I argue that September 11 is just a culmination of events that started 
earlier. In fact, many seem to have forgotten that September 11 was actually the second attack 
on the World Trade Center; the first having occurred on February 26, 1993. This was 
followed by the bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and the attack on 
the USS Cole in 2000. The invasion of Iraq that followed September 11 was also an echo of 
an earlier conflict, and the end game of the ongoing state of conflict with Iraq that began 
during Operation Desert Storm. Thus, the events of September 11, 2001 are actually the result 
of changes occurring since the end of the Cold War, not the initiator of those changes.
Another proposed starting point is the development of the Internet. While I am a firm 
believer that the Internet is a massive driver of change and perhaps the most important 
development in world culture since the Gutenberg press, I believe that the rise of the Internet 
is also due to the changes triggered by the end of the Cold War, and not the source. In fact, 
the technology for the Internet had existed since the 1960s, and was available to home 
consumers in the 1980s. The explosion of the Internet into the world-shaping force that it is 
today is due to the creation of the World Wide Web in 1989. As the name boldly declares, the 
World Wide Web was envisioned as a way to foster international communication, research, 
and trade. It is thus representative of the same forces of globalization that were already 
sweeping the planet. That it rose to prominence during this exact moment in history is no 
accident, as the Internet was seized on as the perfect vehicle for global capitalists to expand 
internationally.
Another starting point that has been proposed is the financial crisis of 2008. The 
argument is that global neoliberal capitalism has since been discredited and that movements 
such as Occupy Wall Street were symbolic of the rejection of these values. While I concur 
that opposition to finance capital was galvanized by the impact of the crisis, I believe that this 
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opposition preceded the crisis and could be detected previously, especially during protests of 
G8 and WTO conferences (the so-called “battle in Seattle” in 1999, as one example). 
Neoliberal capitalism rose to power after the Cold War, but it was not universally beloved by 
any means. In fact, the financial crisis also had its predecessor in the bursting of the dot com 
bubble at the end of the 90s; an event that has been overshadowed by September 11. The only 
thing unique about the crisis of 2008 was its size. Although there have been some cultural 
representations of the impact of the financial crisis, they don't seem to be radically different 
from the cultural representations that came before, and thus I do not believe that the crisis 
itself generated a substantial cultural shift.
Finally, some have suggested that postmodernism came to an end because artists 
simply got tired of doing the same old thing, and theorists began to run out of new theories to 
create readings with. This may indeed be true, but it explains nothing. The question is 
immediately begged: why did they get tired of it? Why exactly at that moment? Why not ten 
years earlier or ten years later? Why not continue with postmodernism as we had grown to 
know and love it? I believe that the overwhelming changes in politics and economics 
following the end of the Cold War must have impacted cultural and intellectual production as 
well. Whether it be a stirring of hope ignited by reunification processes or discouragement at 
the fall of Marxism, an exuberance at the prospect of growing prosperity and stability, or 
dismay at the deconstruction of social protections; the changes must have triggered a 
corresponding cultural response. Furthermore, artistic production and its relative success or 
failure occur in a marketplace, and audience choices are guided by their own sense of the 
zeitgeist. Postmodern works and theories have still appeared over the last twenty years, but 
the market has demanded something else, and those willing to supply it have been favored. 
For these reasons, I believe that the end of the Cold War is the best starting point for a 
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new period, if we choose to accept that postmodernity has actually ended. Of course, it could 
be argued that postmodernity hasn't ended and that these global economic, political, and 
cultural shifts are easily contained in the postmodern paradigm. However, the appearance of 
so many theories proposing that postmodernism has ended seems to argue that there is a need 
for a new theoretical construct.
3.1.2 A New Modernity
The period after postmodernity resembles the modern era in many ways, and this is why most 
of the concepts put forth by others actually contain the suffix “modernism” in their names, 
whether it be digimodernism, cosmodernism, metamodernism, hypermodernism, or 
altermodernism. For instance, there has been a similar drive on the part of capitalists to 
discover and conquer newly opened territories, a utopian thrust to the creation and 
implementation of Western-style democracies and/or capitalist economies, and a new faith in 
the power of technology to change our lives for the better. In fact, I contend that the era of 
digital technology resembles nothing so much as the industrial revolution, bringing 
quintessential new machines that must be universally adopted, new digital jobs to replace the 
now automated old ones of the mechanical era (just as agricultural jobs had previously been 
replaced by factories), and new communication channels to further speed up economic 
activity. These modern qualities present a stark contrast with a postmodern era characterized 
by suspicion of technology, deconstruction of utopian schemes, and fear of political power. 
The Internet has even created a new generation of visionary robber barons, whose fortunes 
are used to create new industries, technologies, and media; or even for charitable aims. These 
new icons are celebrated in a way that was reserved for (counter-) cultural heroes during the 
postmodern era, whose capitalist swashbucklers were portrayed as villainous exploiters, 
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barbarians at the gate, or simply pigs. Despite concerns about the exploitation of workers in 
China, today's corporate Internet heroes are accorded a level of respect not seen since the 
days of Andrew Carnegie and JP Morgan. Something has clearly changed.
Still, there is a notable difference in this new generation of capitalists that is vividly 
illustrated by the (now changed) Google slogan, “Don't be evil.” Can anyone imagine 
Rockefeller, J.P. Morgan, or Jay Gould warning his employees against the ethical risks 
inherent in power? This is an extraordinary development, and even if it is mere propaganda, it 
still publicly recognized the possibility that the corporate drive for profit might clash with 
other ethical concerns. The titanic confidence of the modernist corporate utopians is tempered 
now by an awareness of the impact of a company's actions on the world. The global 
communication enabled by the Internet and the video and image technology it distributes 
shine a nearly instant spotlight on the kind of corporate malfeasance that once could only be 
unearthed by daring muckrakers. What has changed is the metanarrative about technological, 
economic, and social development that arose in the wake of Darwin's theory of evolution. We 
have lost the belief that everything automatically evolves into something better, that the 
forces of progress lie behind every new development. We have entered a new era of 
evaluation.
What this means is that the new modernism is less robust, less self-confident than the 
old variety. As Ulrich Beck and many others have commented, we live in an era of risk 
calculation. The hubris that once led the Soviet Union to experiment with dismantling the 
family unit by raising children in group homes or the forced sterilization driven by eugenics 
that was practiced in both Nazi Germany and the United States are mere examples of 
activities that were once considered progress that are today regarded as obviously 
problematic. Today, with the Internet at our fingertips, outrage can be instantly evoked, 
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expressed, and directed. Virtual protest changes the public narrative without the use of 
traditional media channels. The drivers of change must be careful to push a narrative that 
positions their activities on the right side of the ethical divide or face the wrath of the 
indignant public. This requires a keen sense of the prevailing attitudes and belief systems. In 
other words, the neoliberal forces of capitalism are being driven by the market, which is in 
turn being driven, at least in part, by the ethical considerations of consumers. 
In the current age, marketing is key – in an era of global competition where every 
product can be easily duplicated or simulated, a product or service is only as valuable as its 
brand's reputation makes it. The monopolies that emerged from the first industrial revolution 
have now been replaced by marketopolies, in which the market voluntarily embraces one of 
the many possible competitors. In this environment, cornering the market by controlling a 
key natural resource or area of land is an impossibility – any competitor with capital and 
vision can enter into any market. This has been remarkably disruptive to some long-
established industries, such as the music industry, newspapers, and book stores. The state-
sanctioned taxi industry is now competing with Uber and Lyft, and hotels are being 
undermined by Couchsurfing and AirBnB. The consequences of Apple and Google entering 
the automobile market have yet to be seen, but one can predict the outcome if the traditional 
car companies do not react quickly. This instability of the market means today's companies 
must assertively manage their online reputations, assuring the public that they are not, as 
Google put it, “evil.” 
3.1.3 The Death of Privilege
The new technology of the digital era has been massively influential, as Alan Kirby has 
persuasively argued. I won't go over his arguments again here, but I would like to supplement 
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them with a few of my own observations. In my opinion, the Internet and the devices that 
make it ubiquitous have triggered changes that will eventually be as profound as the 
invention of the alphabet or the printing press. In addition to the massive disruption of the 
marketplace that I have already gone into, the Internet has become a vehicle for personal 
empowerment on an unprecedented scale. Never before have so many people had the means 
to make their individual voices heard. This has already led to political revolutions in the 
Middle East, as well as enabling radical religious groups to expand their influence. In online 
form, news articles are no longer the opinion-shapers they once were – instead, they are mere 
conversation starters that are critiqued and debated by thousands of commenters whose 
reactions become the real story. I won't go as far as Thomas Friedman and assert that the 
world is flat, because the wealthy and powerful can still leverage their assets to gain more 
influence. Nevertheless, the means of worldwide mass communication are now available to 
anyone with internet access. The transformation of telephones into multi-media computers 
means that not only can mere printed language be distributed by nearly anyone, but also 
images, video, and sound. Widely available, inexpensive, or open-source software makes the 
creation of media content easy and intuitive. Websites such as YouTube give absolute 
amateurs the chance to compete with established content creators on a nearly equal basis. The 
gatekeepers are becoming increasingly irrelevant.
Furthermore, the Internet has democratized knowledge in a way that resembles the 
development of the printing press. While Kirby and others fear the dumbing down of society 
(and perhaps justifiably so), the fact is that the world's knowledge is now available to 
everyone with online access. Books, music, images, theories, videos of university courses, 
and personal testimony from voices around the world mean individuals can seek to educate 
themselves to a degree that even the wonderful institution of the public library was never able 
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to never attain. Knowledge is no longer confined to the university campus, and restricted to 
those of a certain class who can afford to attend the right institutions. While the information 
online may be suspect or even wholly inaccurate, the truth is, even esteemed university 
professors and other authority-approved experts can sometimes be wrong. Having access to 
the information gives each individual an opportunity to assess the facts directly. What has 
happened to knowledge resembles to a certain degree the changes in European Christianity 
when the Bible became available to the public. No longer was a priest class needed to control 
the narrative and instruct the unwashed masses in religion. The masses were now free to 
assess the Word of God themselves. This was tremendously disconcerting to those who found 
themselves losing power, triggering a series a of wars and persecutions. Already, oppressive 
regimes, sensing the threat to their power, have begun crackdowns on Internet content, and 
have sought ways to control what can be said online, fearing a loss of power.
The digital technology currently available makes it possible for nearly anyone to 
attain any skill and information he or she desires and to use these to compete in an open 
marketplace for prestige and profit, and to seek self-improvement and self-actualization to an 
unprecedented degree. That many are unable to take advantage of these opportunities does 
not negate their existence nor their importance. However, as Lipovetsky and others have 
pointed out, with limitless opportunity comes vast uncertainty and an anxiety caused by the 
possibility of choosing a less than optimal course. In contemporary slang, FOMO (fear of 
missing out) is the flip-side of YOLO (you only live once). This anxiety is caused by the 
abundance of opportunity in contrast with the limited resource of time itself, meaning that 
choosing the right use of one's time becomes increasingly urgent. Yet, to do this, one needs 
some kind of system of priorities with enough force of conviction to push through the infinite 
distraction that is also available. Without such a system of priorities, navigating the 
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constantly changing and endlessly complex possibilities offered by globalization and digital 
technology is nearly impossible. The death of privilege is accompanied by the weight of 
responsibility. Facing the anxiety of this responsibility is one of the primary challenges of 
contemporary subjects in developed countries. For this reason, I believe, a concern with 
ethics has risen to cultural prominence.
3.1.4 An Ethical Gap
This increased need for ethics couldn't have come at a worse time. The postmodern era spent 
much of its energy deconstructing the systems and structures of meaning upon which the 
ethical systems of modernity had been built. The subsequent development of a Lévinasian 
ethics of being for the other was more of a corrective to modernity's excesses than a 
functional guide to daily, real-life behavior. In fact, the deconstruction of metanarratives that 
characterized postmodernism created real problems for subjects desperately in need of ethical 
guidance. If all systems of ethical values are equally corrupt, how can we decide what is right 
and wrong? The immediate deconstruction of any attempt to build an alternative system of 
ethics would seem to make ethics impossible. The truth is, it was the pre-existence of a 
relatively stable, well-defined ethical structure that made deconstruction a viable approach in 
the first place. If there is no structure, there is nothing to deconstruct. Once the pre-existing 
systems had been sufficiently dismantled, something new would be needed to take its place, 
and yet, the postmodern approach made this impossible.
This was a major problem because ethics is essential. In order to make any decision, 
from the most trivial to life-altering, a system of values is needed to determine which 
decision would be “better.” In a neoliberal globalized economy, coupled with a liberal, 
democratic political system, the number of choices is nearly infinite. The contemporary 
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subject, raised in an atmosphere in which all ethical structures are viewed as equally flawed, 
flounders in confusion, paralyzed by the “paradox of choice,” as Barry Schwartz puts it. The 
ethics of being for the other, as cobbled together and proffered by postmodern theory, makes 
such choices even more complex. Can I buy this avocado, this coffee, this steak? Was anyone 
exploited during its production?
If this ethical laxity makes a trip to the supermarket into an existential drama, how 
much more difficult does it make important decisions, especially decisions that impact our 
relations with each other? Politics becomes nearly impossible when there is no way of 
distinguishing between right and wrong. Is it wrong to force people to sleep on the street like 
stray animals? Why? Why shouldn't we murder each other for sport? Why shouldn't women 
get paid less than men? Why shouldn't we torture people who might be Al Qaeda operatives? 
A shared system of values is absolutely necessary to accomplish anything as a family, a team, 
a neighborhood or a society. Even if we adopt concern for the other as our guideline, this 
doesn't help us to determine which of the infinite ways of showing concern for the other 
would be best. This problem underlies the very real confusion and disarray evident in 
programs designed to aid underdeveloped nations. Should we value ease of relief delivery 
over the teaching of self-reliance? Should we teach them our value system so they can 
duplicate our prosperity, or should we allow them to live in abject poverty, demonstrating our 
respect for their culture? Which is better?
The postmodern deconstruction of historically accumulated ethical systems may very 
well have been a valuable and necessary step in creating a better world (depending, of course, 
on what one considers to be “better”), but it has left the contemporary generation in 
confusion, anxiety, and doubt. Instead of being presented a tradition of values and handed a 
set of clear tools to accomplish the necessary tasks in life, as every previous generation has, 
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the contemporary generation has struggled with finding an effective value system. Each 
inherited solution has been questioned, problematized, revealed as compromised, and 
discarded – a process that has left an enormous gap. Thus, it should not be surprising that the 
creation, evaluation, and dissemination of ethical beliefs have become core concerns for the 
contemporary era, as the analysis of theories in Chapter One demonstrates. I believe that this 
overwhelming demand for ethical guidance should be at the heart of any analysis of the era 
following the end of postmodernity.
3.2 Signs of Postmodernism's Passing: Three Ethical Paradigms
3.2.1 The Virtue of Selfishness
The contemporary era presents us with a paradox. Globalization has emphasized the 
interconnection of the world, continually demonstrating how the part affects the whole. 
Change, conflict, or disaster in one part of the world leads to transformation in other 
seemingly unrelated regions. The opening of the Chinese labor market to foreign 
manufacturers has led to job losses, wage depression, and weakened labor organization in the 
U.S. Regional conflicts in the Middle East and Africa become international problems when 
refugees flee for safety and terrorists strike abroad. Nowhere is this interrelation so apparent 
as in environmental concerns. Rapid industrialization threatens devastating climate change 
that knows no national boundaries. The activities of any nation or region can have worldwide 
consequences. At the same time, globalization and the consumer-based market have created 
unprecedented freedom and personal choice for the individual in most industrialized nations. 
As Lipovetsky argues, it is a time of hyper-individualization, where even identity itself can be 
reconstructed and reconfigured through the purchase of consumer goods. Deconstructed 
social structures are in a “liquid” state, according to Zygmunt Bauman, and the contemporary 
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subject flows through life like a tourist or one of Bourriaud's nomads. Disconnected from 
tradition by modernity; emancipated from identity restrictions by postmodernity; the 
contemporary subject is dis-embedded like never before, a unit of one in an atomized society.
As these subjects live in a neoliberal economy that challenges them to seek self-
fulfillment, it only makes sense that they would seek out a system of ethical guidance that 
would help them to accomplish this. A deregulated, free-market economy leaves each subject 
alone to decide his or her own fate. The belief that we each have a right to the pursuit of 
happiness underlies this economic model, and thus it should come as no surprise that egoism 
is the prevailing ethical model of the neoliberal order. Moraru prefers to call it egology, but 
its essence is to place the self at the center of ethical decision making. What is right is what is 
right for me, and marketing tells us we can have it, we can be it, we can do it, if only we have 
enough money. If some don't have the money, then they need to work harder to get it, to 
improve their competitiveness in the market. If that means some will have to suffer in 
poverty, then they are the victims of their own choices. In this model, there is no other that 
commands a response, no obligation to anyone but the self. Thus, the problems inherent in 
postmodern ethics are avoided completely.
Egoism assures us that it is okay to accumulate wealth, to live in luxury, to consume 
whatever we desire, because we have the right to do so. No additional justification is needed. 
We can see this ethics reflected in political platforms that promise to reduce taxes, reduce 
social spending, and reduce regulation in the name of economic freedom. As Nealon 
suggests, neoliberals have co-opted the emancipation focus of postmodernism, and applied it 
to economics. We can also see this ethics at work culturally, in hip-hop music videos, where 
rappers wave dollar bills in the camera while spitting rhymes about their luxury brand-name 
products. The solution to the oppression of the other, these videos seem to suggest, is to let 
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them gain economic freedom, to remove the economic barriers to success. The pursuit of self-
actualization becomes the highest goal, and the other is left by the wayside. A more dramatic 
reversal of postmodern ethics could hardly be imagined.
3.2.2 A Higher Power
Another sign of the postmodern era coming to a close is the ongoing critique of the irony and 
skepticism that characterized that era. The contemporary generation, having been raised in an 
atmosphere of intense irony and distrust of authority, has made a vigorous effort to regain 
some kind of faith, belief, or hope for the future. One of the earliest and most influential 
salvos in this campaign against irony was an essay entitled “E Unibus Pluram: Television and 
US Fiction” written by David Foster Wallace and originally published in the Review of 
Contemporary Literature in 1993. In this essay, which “was received as a sort of manifesto 
for a new generation of writers” (Harrison 56), Wallace announces his dissatisfaction with the 
postmodern legacy. Taking aim at irony, he states: “I’m going to argue that irony and ridicule 
are entertaining and effective, and that at the same time, they are agents of a great despair and 
stasis in U.S. culture” (Supposedly 49). Irony, according to Wallace, “serves an almost 
exclusively negative function. It’s critical and destructive, a ground clearing...But irony’s 
singularly unuseful when it comes to constructing anything to replace the hypocrisies it 
debunks” (67). Wallace argues that commercial culture, especially television, has co-opted 
postmodernism's techniques: “[T]elevision has been ingeniously absorbing, homogenizing, 
re-representing the very same cynical postmodern aesthetic that was once the best alternative 
to the appeal of low, over-easy, mass-marketed narrative” (52). This means that “the forms of 
our best rebellious art have become mere gestures, schticks, not only sterile but perversely 
enslaving” (68), creating an aesthetic that is “malignantly addictive” (38). In the interview 
Allen 93
that accompanied publication of the essay, Wallace expounded further, commenting on the 
postmodern impasse: “The problem is that once the rules of art are debunked, and once the 
unpleasant realities the irony diagnoses are revealed, then what do we do?” (McCaffery 147). 
Postmodernism has prevented artists from moving forward: “Few artists dare to try to talk 
about ways of working toward redeeming what's wrong, because they'll look sentimental and 
naïve to all the weary ironists. Irony's gone from liberating to enslaving” (147). He suggests 
an alternative that relies heavily on sincerity: “Really good work probably comes out of a 
willingness to disclose yourself, open yourself up in spiritual and emotional ways that risk 
making you look banal or melodramatic or naïve or unhip or sappy” (149). He proposes a 
movement of “new rebels” who are “willing to risk the yawn, the rolled eyes, the cool smile, 
the nudged ribs, the parody of gifted ironists, the 'Oh, how banal.' To risk accusations of 
sentimentality, melodrama. Of overcredulity. Of softness” (Supposedly 81, italics in the 
original).
Notice the distance we have come from the “incredulity toward metanarratives” of the 
postmodern era to a call to risk “overcredulity.” Similar sentiments were expressed by 
Jedidiah Purdy, another prominent voice that has been put into the New Sincerity category. In 
his book, For Common Things: Irony, Trust, and Commitment in America Today (1999), 
Purdy calls for an abandonment of ironic distance and a return to engagement in the public 
sphere. He believes that the prevalence of irony is due to fear: “There is something fearful in 
this irony. It is a fear of betrayal, disappointment, and humiliation, and a suspicion that 
believing, hoping, or caring too much will open us to these. Irony is a way of refusing to rely 
on such treacherous things” (xii). He rejects this self-protection as negative: “An ironic 
attitude to politics and public life never invites disappointment by a movement's decline or a 
leader's philandering. There is a kind of security here, but it is the negative security of 
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perpetual suspicion” (14). We can already see some similarities to Wallace's argument, and 
Purdy also agrees that irony leads to despair: “Refusing to place its trust in the world, irony 
helps to make a world that is more likely to be worthy of despair” (20). Still, Purdy believes 
that there is hope: “[O]ur age of irony is also an age of belief – ambivalent, often frustrated 
belief, which bears the marks of its ironic competitor, but belief nonetheless” (21). He 
observes the call to what I refer to as the ecological metanarrative, a desire for unity and 
systemic coherence that is the opposite of postmodern ironic detachment: “Even in the midst 
of irony, there is a widespread hunger to feel oneself made whole, connected with true values 
that are also the values of one's community and, in some cases, of the world itself” (21). 
Here, the reference to values, extending even to a longing for universal values, makes the 
ethical nature of his argument apparent. In fact, it is the possibility of being “good” that 
draws Purdy: “I cannot help believing that we need a way of thinking, and doing, that has in 
it more promise of goodness than the one we are now following” (xxiii).
In his short story collection, Life After God (1994), Douglas Coupland explores 
similar themes. In the titular story, he depicts the postmodern aftermath: “Life was charmed 
but without politics or religion. It was the life of children of the children of pioneers – life 
after God – a life of earthly salvation on the edge of heaven” (273). Here, we see the same 
disengagement from public life Purdy described – life without politics or religion – and if we 
see the pioneers as the moderns (which would be historically correct), and their children as 
the postmoderns, then Coupland is writing about the generation after postmodernism. The 
narrator expresses skepticism about the life inherited from the previous generation: “Perhaps 
this is the finest thing to which we can aspire, the life of peace, the blurring between dream 
life and real life – and yet I find myself speaking these words with a sense of doubt” (273). 
Coupland's narrator traces this doubt to the prevalence of irony: “I think there was a trade-off 
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somewhere along the line. I think the price we paid for our golden life was an inability to 
fully believe in love; instead we gained an irony that scorched everything it touched” (273). 
The irony is clearly destructive here, scorching everything it touches, and the lack of belief – 
the lack of love – is the price exacted. Coupland goes on to blame this condition on the 
decline of religious belief: “I wonder if this irony is the price we paid for the loss of God” 
(273).
I won't go into a full analysis of every figure of this so-called “New Sincerity,” but I 
mainly want to emphasize the difference between these ideas and the postmodern approach. 
There is a real critique here of irony, detachment, and cynicism and a longing for connection 
and engagement in some kind of unifying belief. The way forward would seem to be a re-
engagement in public life and a willingness to expose the self to ridicule through a sincere 
expression of belief.
We looked briefly at Douglas Coupland's exploration of the impact of the loss of God, 
to which he attributes the rise of a destructive irony. This loss is a direct result of modernity, 
which dismantled any beliefs not supported by empirical evidence. The postmodern critique 
of this empiricism reopened the door to an exploration of religious belief, and, in fact, the 
1950, 1960s, and 1970s were not just eras of political activism and carnivalesque 
transgression, but also of mysticism and a reawakened sense of spirituality. The Beat 
Generation, with its interest in Jewish, Native American, and Eastern religious traditions, 
exemplified this unlikely mix. In fact, even the Beatles didn't just protest war, grow their hair 
long, get high, and have sex in public – they also traveled to India to meditate with spiritual 
gurus and socialized with Hare Krishnas. The so-called New Age appeared bringing 
alternative medicine and a wide range of cults and pseudo-messiahs.
The postmodern era was also accompanied by a counter-movement of religious 
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fundamentalism that has reacted with increasing fervor to each of the postmodern 
emancipation attempts, and this movement is a major component of the contemporary era. To 
some extent, the rise of the Christian right in the U.S. and, perhaps to a lesser degree, Islamic 
fundamentalism in the Middle East can be attributed to the deconstruction of values and 
social structures (such as the role of women or the acceptability of homosexuality) that are 
directly attributable to postmodern thinking rather than the modern era. Furthermore, in the 
contemporary era, religious fundamentalism has positioned itself as a viable alternative to 
neoliberal global capitalism, as described in Benjamin Barber's Jihad vs. McWorld (1995). 
Centuries-old religious tradition offers itself as the antidote to the continually new offered by 
neoliberal global capital through what Lipovetsky calls “the logic of fashion.” The confusion 
triggered by shifting identities, limitless choice, dizzying freedom, and material plenty has 
fueled a counter-movement that emphasizes stability, tradition, clearly pre-assigned social 
roles, and, to a certain extent, material asceticism.
Yet, these economic considerations are not the only factor driving the return of 
religious belief. The fact is, religious belief offers much of what the postmodern approach 
lacked and the contemporary era demands. For one, religion provides relatively clear and 
stable systems of ethical guidance. It also provides an ecological, unified, or universal system 
in which all the parts are accounted for by the whole. It offers a renewed capacity for 
engagement with public life and an opportunity for sincere belief and expression. A sense of 
meaning and connection, denied by postmodern irony and detachment, is another lure. 
Finally, in an era characterized by risk and uncertainty, belief that a Higher Power has a plan 
for everything soothes the anxiety triggered by the infinite contingency of a high-speed 
socially deconstructive economy. When one examines the roles religion fills, its return seems 
inevitable as the aftermath of the postmodern questioning of reason and science.
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Of course, traditional religion, with its oppressive social structures and its dogmatic 
truths, seems utterly incompatible with postmodernism's drive for individual emancipation 
and deconstruction of ideology. Thus, as Lipovetsky has cogently pointed out, another form 
of religious practice has evolved that is “without any institutional backing” (Lipovetsky 67). 
Here, religions are treated as products sold on the market that can be acquired for individual 
self-fulfillment and identity construction. In some cases, such as meditation and yoga, these 
practices are completely severed from their traditional religious contexts, and can be 
combined and reconfigured as the consumer sees fit. In other cases, religion is offered as a 
cure for individual psychological problems, such as drug or alcohol addiction. Twelve-step 
programs offer a self-defined version of a Higher Power that serves the needs of the specific 
user. The market is flooded with spiritual offerings such as Reiki and crystal healing. Thus, 
neoliberal capitalism has further exhibited its ingenious ability to absorb and exploit all 
attempts at resistance, by re-fashioning religion, its supposed opposite, into yet another 
product.
This consumerist version of religious belief is inherently pragmatist – it lays no claim 
to the kind of absolute truth that fundamentalism offers, but rather offers a series of tools or 
products that can be implemented if useful and subsequently abandoned when no longer 
necessary. Its truth has a certain Jamesian cash-value that can be replaced by other truths with 
a higher value when the need arises. As there was a pragmatist revival toward the end of 
postmodernism, perhaps leading the way out of some of postmodernism's particularly thorny 
traps, it should not be surprising that a pragmatist version of religious belief that 
accommodates postmodern pluralism while offering ethical guidance has become so popular.
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3.2.3 The Ecological Metanarrative
Another indicator of postmodernity's demise is the return of the metanarrative. The belief that 
the world is threatened by man-made climate change is one of the most powerful and 
pervasive metanarratives of today. This metanarrative combines several defining components 
of the contemporary era. For example, it wholeheartedly embraces a one-world universalism 
while simultaneously focusing on individual action, as summed up in the well-known slogan 
“Think globally, act locally.” Furthermore, as the use of the grammatical command form in 
that slogan implies, there is a firm ethical imperative driving the movement. Additionally, 
there is a strong technological utopianism at work, implying that we can undo the harm 
caused by human existence on this planet by merely reforming our technologies. Those who 
are, as postmodernists are supposed to be, skeptical of this metanarrative, are labeled “climate 
change deniers,” with the word “denier” lifted from “Holocaust denier,” and thus equating 
these skeptics with Nazis, the ultimate bad guys. Clearly, the metanarrative is back. Concern 
for the environment has become symbolic for the kind of thinking that Christian Moraru 
labels “ecologic,” that is, a perception of reality as a unified system in which everything is 
connected and the actions of individual components affect the whole. The earth itself is the 
ideal symbol for this mentality, and this is strongly implied in the language used to describe 
the most powerful forces shaping the world today – globalization and the World Wide Web, 
for which the words “globe” and “world” are employed to emphasize this unified conception 
of reality. Concern for the environment has become a metanarrative as powerful as those that 
characterized the modern era, providing a structure and measuring system to evaluate human 
activities and to drive plans for future development.
As with any metanarrative, the ecological metanarrative can be used as a control and 
manipulation tool to attain power. In many cases, for example, capitalists have used concern 
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for environmental issues to sell products and services. From so-called “green” buildings to 
supermarkets selling food labeled as “organic,” consumers who have internalized the 
ecological metanarrative as an ethical guide are responding to the marketing efforts of 
businesses. This tactic is known as “greenwashing,” and has even been used by companies 
like ExxonMobil, whose products are one of the primary causes of climate change. 
Companies may trumpet their use of clean energy sources or the use of sustainable resources 
in their manufacturing processes to paint themselves as being on the right side of the ethical 
line. In a particularly egregious case, Volkswagen promoted its “clean diesel” engines in a 
national advertising campaign, when in fact, the true extent of their vehicles' pollution was 
merely being hidden by computer software manipulation. In the case of corporate 
greenwashing, the manipulation can be quite visible to critical thinkers.
The ecological metanarrative has also been adopted by various political movements to 
advance other, non-environmental policies. Eco-feminism, for example, makes the claim that 
women are somehow more attuned to nature, and that environmental problems are mostly due 
to patriarchy, and thus, more power for women would be a viable solution to ecological 
problems. This is a naked attempt to subvert the influence of the ecological metanarrative to 
attain the aims of another political discourse, feminism (let me add here that I consider 
myself to be a feminist). That the rise of environmental concern occurs during the decline of 
Marxism is also no coincidence. As the demise of communism became more and more 
obvious, disillusioned Marxists turned toward the environment as a new metanarrative to 
justify their political goals. If we have indeed reached the end of history (as inevitable force 
destined to bring us to a new utopian way of life), the global environmental threat could 




We have explored the beginning of the new period and we have encountered three different 
ethical paradigms, the virtue of selfishness, the higher power, and the ecological 
metanarrative. The goal of this chapter was to provide a periodization model in which the 
three ethical models I have identified could be embedded, hopefully describing their 
importance to the contemporary era, and indicating why they are not a mere continuation of 
postmodernism. In the remaining chapters, I will explore these three paradigms in close 
readings of contemporary fiction, in order to illustrate the manner in which these ethical 
paradigms are shaping and informing contemporary culture.
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4 The Virtue of Selfishness
“A lot of folks forget because of all the bad press surrounding McCarthyism, 
but there really was a serious communist movement in this country at one 
point. In the Thirties, you could be blacklisted in Hollywood for being anti-
communist, and Rand had trouble finding work for a while because she was 
too outspoken about the realities of the 'noble experiment.' And at the same 
time all these American Marxists were lining up in support of the Comintern, 
Roosevelt was centralizing control of farming, banking, and other businesses 
as part of the New Deal. Which may have been a far cry from Stalin's mass 
murder of the kulaks, but still, you can imagine how it must have looked from 
Rand's perspective.”
Joan nodded. “Hence Atlas Shrugged.”
“Probably had a lot to do with that, yeah,” said Archie. “So if her 
defense of capitalism strikes you as being kind of loony, you have to 
understand, she had her reasons.” (Ruff 210)
4.1 Introduction
The citation above is drawn from Matt Ruff's 1997 novel, Sewer, Gas & Electric: The Public 
Works Trilogy, which is dedicated to Ayn Rand. In the novel, Ayn Rand appears in virtual 
reality, as an artificial intelligence that interacts with the protagonist. Although Rand's 
personality and ideas are ironized at times, her virtual stand-in is allowed to make valid 
points in discussions with the main protagonist, and major characters in the novel are heavily 
influenced by her views. This is an example of an ongoing rehabilitation of Rand that has 
been occurring in contemporary fiction since the end of the Cold War. This would seem to 
make a lot of sense – if the contemporary era is one of rampant neoliberalism, as most of the 
models we examined in Chapter One insist, then surely neoliberal ideas must be appearing in 
contemporary culture as well. And of course, these ideas must also be having an influence on 
contemporary ethics. Although Ayn Rand is not the only neoliberal thinker, in the U.S., her 
novels, and their illustrations of the philosophy she developed, which she named objectivism, 
may very well be the mechanism through which the popularity of neoliberalism has spread. 
Rand is also the neoliberal thinker that is most closely associated with ethics, due to her 
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controversial book, The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept of Egoism (1964). These 
factors make her an excellent resource for reading contemporary novels that may reflect 
neoliberal ideas.
Before I begin my short summary of Rand's philosophy, I want to state that I am not 
an objectivist nor a follower of Rand's philosophy. I fundamentally disagree with the very 
foundation of her philosophical system. Nevertheless, I believe her importance has been 
overlooked by contemporary theorists for a number of reasons. First of all, by expressing her 
ideas in novels that became hugely successful, she overshadowed the philosophical works she 
later published. To put it kindly, literary critics were not overwhelmed by the quality of her 
novels, or the beauty of her prose. Second, she had a confrontational and irascible personality 
that alienated even her closest followers. Finally, she was a vociferous opponent of Marxism 
and an ardent supporter of capitalism, making her unpopular in most academic circles. 
However, these factors have not hindered her from having an enormous influence on 
contemporary culture. Her disciple, Alan Greenspan, headed the U.S. Federal Reserve during 
the '90s, and her followers include former Speaker of the House Paul Ryan, Senator “Rand” 
Paul (notice his first name), Supreme Court justice Clarence Thomas, and Internet billionaires 
such as Mark Cuban and Peter Thiel. It is time, especially for opponents of neoliberalism, to 
start taking Ayn Rand seriously.
Objectivism is a philosophical system. It begins with an ontology, and then moves to 
an epistemology, an ethics, a politics, and an aesthetics. For this dissertation we'll be mostly 
concerned with its ethics, but I want to briefly sketch the rest of the system to put the ethics in 
its context. Objectivist ontology is quite simple – it consists of the statement that “existence 
exists” (Peikoff 4). This is an axiom that Rand believes cannot be proven nor questioned, for 
to do so would necessarily require one's existence, a priori demonstrating its truth. However, 
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the important factor of this ontology is its external focus – the belief in a universal external 
reality precedes all other questions – it is not “I” exist, but rather this external reality exists. 
All valid information must be drawn from this external source. Objectivist epistemology is 
complex, but to boil it down, we perceive this external reality through our senses, and form 
concepts from this input using reason. Again, reason cannot be questioned because “reason is 
the faculty of proof; one must accept and use reason in order to prove anything” (153). Any 
attempt to question reason using reason automatically contradicts itself, according to 
objectivism. Reason gives us the capacity to form concepts, which can be used to derive 
principles, which are “general truth[s] on which other truths depend” (218). These 
perceptions, concepts, and principles must be treated as real, because existence exists.
This epistemology can be expanded to ethics by the formation of moral principles, 
which are “a type of scientific principle, identifying the relationship to man's survival of the 
various basic human choices” (218). Survival is the most important principle: “The 
Objectivist ethics holds man’s life as the standard of value – and his own life as the ethical 
purpose of every individual man” (Rand 21, italics in the original). Good is defined as that 
which reason tells us leads to continued survival: “Since reason is man’s basic means of 
survival, that which is proper to the life of a rational being is the good; that which negates, 
opposes or destroys it is the evil” (19). Rational beings maintain their survival by exercising 
their reason and by working to produce the means of survival: “Since everything man needs 
has to be discovered by his own mind and produced by his own effort, the two essentials of 
the method of survival proper to a rational being are: thinking and productive work” (19). 
Those who think and do productive work ensure the survival of all: “If some men do not 
choose to think, but survive by imitating and repeating, like trained animals...never making 
an effort to understand their own work, it still remains true that their survival is made 
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possible only by those who did choose to think” (19-20). If productive work is the means to 
survival, it follows, then, that the use of force to steal the product of others is not acceptable 
to objectivist ethics: “If some men attempt to survive by means of brute force or fraud, by 
looting, robbing, cheating or enslaving the men who produce, it still remains true that their 
survival is made possible only by their victims” (20). For Rand, “survival” does not mean 
merely a continued physical existence, but rather a survival as a rational being with a free 
will. Happiness, then, is the measure of survival: “In psychological terms, the issue of man’s 
survival does not confront his consciousness as an issue of 'life or death,' but as an issue of 
'happiness or suffering.' Happiness is the successful state of life, suffering is the warning 
signal of failure, of death” (23). This chain of argument leads to Rand's provocative ethical 
assertion that the self rather than the other should be the focus of ethics:
The basic social principle of the Objectivist ethics is that just as life is an end in itself, 
so every living human being is an end in himself, not the means to the ends or the 
welfare of others – and, therefore, that man must live for his own sake, neither 
sacrificing himself to others nor sacrificing others to himself. To live for his own sake 
means that the achievement of his own happiness is man’s highest moral purpose. (23, 
italics in the original)
For Rand, it is important that “happiness” not be based on mere subjective feeling, but rather, 
happiness must be rationally defined: “To take 'whatever makes one happy' as a guide to 
action means: to be guided by nothing but one’s emotional whims. Emotions are not tools of 
cognition; to be guided by whims – by desires whose source, nature and meaning one does 
not know – is to turn oneself into a blind robot, operated by unknowable demons” (25). Thus, 
hedonism in any form is rejected. So too, does she reject any form of altruism: “The moral 
cannibalism of all hedonist and altruist doctrines lies in the premise that the happiness of one 
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man necessitates the injury of another” (26, italics in the original). Self-sacrifice is not 
considered noble and good, but rather the essence of evil in objectivist ethics, but this is 
accompanied by the belief that one must not allow others to sacrifice themselves. Thus, only 
a voluntary exchange of the results of the productive work of the individual can be used to 
obtain the products of another's work. This requires capitalism: “Capitalism is the system of 
productiveness; it is the system of and for producers. As to consumers under such a system, 
they are men who pay for what they consume, i.e., men who themselves earned the means of 
payment” (Peikoff 387). This ethics lies behind the neoliberal rejection of social welfare 
programs that redistribute wealth through taxation.
The final component of objectivism is its aesthetics. For objectivism, only external 
reality can be the basis of our concepts and principles. Denying this reality is self-destructive, 
and thus, evil. However, art, despite its basis in the unreal, the imaginary, serves a purpose: 
“The root of man's need of art lies in the fact that human consciousness is conceptual – and 
that a conceptual being needs the guidance of philosophy” (Peikoff 414). Art's purpose is to 
embody and represent the concepts and principles that arise from our exercise of reason, 
including ethical principles. Art should project ideals not reality. This deliberately chosen 
aesthetic may very well lie behind much of the criticism of Rand's fiction as being unrealistic.
It is easy to see how objectivism solves the problems inherent postmodernism, 
whether we consider the relativist/nihilist version or the ethics of being for the other. 
Objectivism rejects all of these ideas from the ground up. It not only insists on the existence 
of objective reality, but also that our perceptions of that reality are accurate, and the concepts 
that we form based on these perceptions are valid. The pluralism and subjectivity that are of 
such concern for postmodernism is nowhere to be found. It utterly rejects any form of being 
for the other and demands that each subject make his or her own survival and happiness the 
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focus of activity. Because it offers such clear cut solutions to the ethical dilemmas of 
postmodernism, it should not be surprising that such an ethics has thrived in a time of ethical 
uncertainty and confusion. Objectivism offers absolute certainty, clear and easily defined 
principles, a thoroughly systematic and integrated belief structure, and easy answers to all 
moral questions. It also completely absolves one from concern and guilt about the suffering 
of others. And to top it off, it allows us to get rich, fat, and happy. That its fundamental 
axioms are flawed seems a small price to pay.
I will now proceed to examine how a neoliberal ethics of the self manifests itself in 
contemporary fiction.
4.2 Two Girls, Fat and Thin by Mary Gaitskill
In Mary Gaitskill's novel, Two Girls, Fat and Thin (1991), the philosophy of Ayn Rand plays 
a central role in the plot, although Rand is disguised by the pseudonym Anna Granite, and her 
philosophy is named Definitism rather than Objectivism. As the title suggests, the story 
revolves around two women, Justine Shade, a journalist who is writing an article about 
Granite and her Definitist movement, and Dorothy Never, a devout Definitist and former 
employee of Granite's. Although both women share the experience of having been sexually 
abused as children, they have different, perhaps even opposing, philosophies about how to 
deal with the trauma. Justine, whose name evokes Sade, is fascinated by social power, by 
dominance and submission, and puts herself in the role of masochist, seeking sexual 
humiliation. Dorothy, on the other hand, has retreated into herself, creating a rich internal life, 
and drawing heavily from Anna Granite's (i.e. Rand's) novels and philosophy of selfishness. 
Although Justine is thin, attractive and cool, and possesses a postmodern outlook, Dorothy, 
who is fat and unattractive, is portrayed as stronger and psychologically healthier. Ultimately, 
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the two characters interest one another because of their similarities and differences, and 
despite her initial disdain for Granite and her philosophy, Justine comes to admire Dorothy. 
By the end of the novel, Justine is rescued from a violent and sadistic lover by Dorothy, and 
the two form the beginning of a relationship. Although many reviewers saw the novel as a 
parody of Ayn Rand and Objectivism; in fact, the novel shows how Rand's philosophy of 
selfishness could be implemented to counteract and defend against the weaknesses of 
postmodernism.
Justine Shade is a freelance journalist who works part time as an “assistant secretary 
for a doctor of internal medicine” (12), a job that is “lulling and comfortingly dull” (12). 
About her journalism we are told, “She was very serious about her career as a journalist, but 
she sold very few articles. This was because she got ideas at the rate of about one a year” 
(12). As we can see, career-wise, she has not accomplished much, being merely the assistant 
to a secretary, and a freelance journalist. Early descriptions of her are also not particularly 
flattering: “Justine Shade was a neurotic, antisocial twenty-eight-year-old. She had few 
friends, and as she saw them infrequently, her main source of entertainment was an erratic 
series of boyfriends who wandered through her small apartment, often making snide 
comments about her decor” (12). Here, she is portrayed as neurotic, antisocial, lonely, and 
erratic. The wandering boyfriends make snide comments about the decor of her small 
apartment, demonstrating not just the inferiority of her living arrangements, but also 
contempt for her. She is frequently described as childlike: “Her voice was flat, nearly 
metallic, except for the high pitch that made it the voice of a prematurely serious child” (9). 
When the novel's other main character, Dorothy Never, meets her, she tells us: “I was a little 
disappointed by her. I had imagined a mature and handsome woman wearing a tailored gray 
suit and carrying a small tape recorder. Justine looked like a college kid: tight jeans, pointy 
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red shoes, and a T-shirt with an indecipherable picture and the the words 'Girl World' on it” 
(22). Once again, she is portrayed as a “kid,” wearing clothing inappropriate for an adult, and 
she disappoints Dorothy. Over the course of the novel, she is depicted drinking too much and 
getting involved in an abusive, sexually masochistic relationship. She is a typical example of 
the kind of postmodern subject that frequents contemporary fiction.
Justine becomes interested in writing about Anna Granite when a patient at the 
doctor's office recommends her books, saying, “'Oh, you've got to read her. She's the most 
unique writer. Of course, I don't believe in what she says politically, but still she's so 
powerful. Especially now, when people are so into whining and abdicating responsibility, it's 
good to read somebody advocating strength and power, and doing things'” (16). She asks her 
co-worker about Granite's books and is told, “Very good writing, very dramatic. The clarity, 
the way she states her case. I read The Bulwark at a time when I was undergoing a crisis and 
it gave me such moral support to read about those strong characters doing great things'” (17). 
Justine finds the continued popularity of the books fascinating and decides to write an article 
about the Definitist movement that has sprung up in Granite's wake. Even in these early 
citations of the impact of Granite's work, the view is quite positive, using adjectives such as 
“powerful” and “unique” accompanied by testimony about its value in providing “moral 
support.” The first quote posits Granite's work as an antidote to the contemporary era, an era 
of “whining and abdicating responsibility,” a description that echoes contemporary criticisms 
of postmodernism. For most of the novel, Granite's (and thus Rand's) work is described in 
similarly glowing terms, although it remains clear throughout the novel that Gaitskill views 
Rand's fiction with ironic distance. For instance, when describing the ending of one of 
Granite's novels, she writes, “Katya had perished on an ice floe in an effort to escape to 
America, Captain Dagmarov had killed himself on realizing he was philosophically in error, 
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and Rex, having been broken by the collectivist society around him, was writing pornography 
for a living” (19-20). These short passages read like parodies of Rand's novels, with their 
fierce ideological melodrama and livid condemnation of collectivism. Rand herself, on the 
other hand, is portrayed quite sympathetically, and the details of her life are represented 
rather accurately. Although it is tempting to view this novel as satirizing Ayn Rand, a closer 
examination reveals that the descriptions of the influence of her philosophy are actually 
enthusiastically positive, as we shall see shortly.
Justine posts ads in the newspaper and on local bulletin boards asking to interview 
adherents of Definitism, and the respondents are in universal support of Granite: “They all 
described what Granite had done for them, how she had made them value their lives, how she 
had inspired them to strive for the best they were capable of, whether as secretaries or 
engineers” (18). One of the respondents is Dorothy Never. When Justine gets the phone call, 
she thinks that Dorothy “sounded like a nut” (19), but nevertheless had “a voice that, 
although riddled with peculiarity and tension, stroked Justine along the inside of her skull in a 
way that both repelled and attracted her” (19). Gaitskill employs a subtle yet clever device to 
portray the difference between the two women. She narrates Justine's passages in the third 
person, as though Justine is an object, yet she narrates Dorothy's sections in the first person, 
emphasizing that she is indeed a subject. This device functions quite well at demonstrating 
the difference between the philosophies of the two women.
Dorothy began her relationship with Definitism, she says, “'As a teenager, when I read 
The Bulwark. I would say from about the tenth page on, it became the most important 
influence in my life – certainly the only positive influence'” (22). To explain this description 
of her childhood, Dorothy immediately confesses that she had been sexually molested by her 
father, a shocking admission that triggers Justine to admit that she, too, had been molested. 
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Dorothy begins to narrate how discovering Granite's books gave her the strength to handle 
her childhood trauma, saying:
“[B]y the time I was seventeen, I had a very negative view of life, and a horrific view 
of sex. Then I read Anna Granite and suddenly a whole different way of looking at life 
was presented to me. She showed me that human beings can live in strength and 
honor. And that sex is actually part of that strength and honor, not oppositional to it.” 
(24) 
Very important to Dorothy was Granite's moral code: “'That morality is based on the right to 
choose for yourself, that your life is yours – she held up a vision for me, and her vision 
helped me through terrible times. I mean by the time I discovered Granite, I had just about 
given up'” (24). After discussing Anna Granite's private life, which closely mirrors Rand's, 
Dorothy states that the most important aspect of Granite's philosophy is that “'it takes life 
seriously, which is rare. She said reality was definable – no one was saying that in the sixties. 
She said you were important in reality, that you could control it. She was the first person to 
tell me I was important and that I could come out and say so'” (30). Here, Dorothy is 
contrasting an emerging concept of reality as a social construct with Rand's view that we 
have access to an objective reality and that our beliefs and actions must correspond to that 
reality. She asserts that evil is a result of not accepting an objective reality, saying, “'Evil 
comes from denying reality. Period. If my father hadn't deluded himself, he wouldn't have 
been able to do what he did. You have to distort reality to rationalize evil acts'” (31). Dorothy 
directly criticizes the ethics of being for the other: “People only accept the validity of 
movements that champion the underdog and scorn those that champion people of great 
accomplishment. You always have to take the dumbest as your lowest common denominator” 
(32). Furthermore, she offers a refutation of this approach, while directly criticizing feminism 
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and Marxism: “'I had a friend once named Kim who happened to be retarded. We used to 
belong to a women's support group, and those women there, those Marxist, feminist bitches, 
they ignored Kim, they hurt Kim, they would kill Kim if they thought it would further a 
cause. They would victimize the weak and helpless. Not me. And not Granite'” (33). Justine 
asks her the question, “'Why do you think Definitism frightens people so?'” (31). Dorothy 
responds with a defense of Granite's philosophy: “'Because it's powerful. It glorifies the 
freedom of the individual, and nowadays that sort of philosophy is labeled fascistic. People 
think if you make moral judgments, or work hard for a goal and don't let yourself be deterred, 
if you accomplish something, that you're right wing and somehow unfeeling to other people's 
plights'” (32). She goes on to defend Granite, saying, “'People made a lot of assumptions 
about Granite that simply weren't true. It's possible to have great humanity and be a 
Definitist'” (32). As we can see, our first encounters with Definitism present the philosophy 
in a positive light, emphasizing its moral content and its powerful influence on Dorothy, who 
fiercely champions both Granite and her philosophy.
The next section of the book details the similarities and differences of the two 
women's childhoods, and in part explains their diverging philosophical developments. One of 
Justine's earliest memories is being sexually abused by a friend of her parents named Dr. 
Norris. When she informs her mother that “'Dr. Norris touches me here'” (64), her mother 
merely replies, “'He just doesn't know that little girls don't like to be touched there'” (64), 
minimizing her abuse. Justine responds to the abuse by becoming obsessed with being a 
helpless victim. For example, we are told that “[w]hen Justine was seven, she ordered the 
Catholic boy who lived down the street to tie her to his swing set and pretend to brand her, as 
she had seen Brutus do to Olive Oyl on TV” (71). She develops a fascination with cartoons in 
which the woman is bound and helpless, and this morbid interest is directly related to her 
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molestation: “She wanted to be tied up and whipped after watching cartoon characters being 
beaten and tortured by other characters for the viewer's amusement. She watched the 
animated violence with queasy fascination, feeling frightened and exposed. It was the same 
feeling she had had when Dr. Norris touched her” (72). The fantasies extend to a keen focus 
on the torments of hell, as narrated by Mrs. Slutsky, mother of Richie, the aforementioned 
Catholic boy. The vision of eternal torment haunts her: “At night she would lie in bed and 
imagine being tormented forever because you had envious thoughts or were angry at 
someone. She didn't have the vocabulary to express, even to herself, the feeling these images 
evoked in her; it was too overpowering for her” (73-4). Again, this feeling is linked to her 
sexual abuse: “It seemed to occupy the place that all her daily activities and expressions came 
from, the same place Dr. Norris had touched” (74). Masochistic role play becomes her only 
outlet: “[S]he soothed the demanding feeling by tying herself to her bedpost, gagging herself, 
and forcing morose but compliant Richie to beat her” (74). The narrator suggests that this 
approach was not a healthy one, telling us, “[S]he didn't think of it like this until much later, 
when she could only look at the ancient entrenched feeling as an animal looks at a trap on its 
leg” (74). Justine's method of dealing with her abuse, voluntarily placing herself into the role 
of victim and deriving a morbid pleasure from it, has turned into a trap that she is unable to 
escape.
The fascination with power and transgression continues into Justine's adolescence. 
She joins a group of girls who are distinguished by their cynicism and cruelty: “[T]hey 
exuded an awful cynicism that impressed people and they knew dirty things” (112).  They are 
portrayed as destructive and threatening: “The six of them terrified the other kids as they 
patrolled the playground, looking for trouble” (112). Her high school experience is described 
as one characterized by power and fear:
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The assigned classroom was filled with murderously aggressive boys and rigid girls 
with animal eyes who threw spitballs, punched each other, snarled, whispered, and 
stared one another down. And shadowing all these gestures and movements were 
declarations of dominance, of territory, the swift, blind play of power and weakness. 
Justine saw right away that she'd be at home here. (110-1)
Rather than frightening her, the violent and terrifying atmosphere makes her feel comfortable, 
feeds her inner fascination with victimization. Justine herself victimizes several classmates, 
including sexually humiliating a teenage girl. The aggression of her group of friends is 
noticed by the authorities, but they cannot be stopped: “Parents were always calling to 
complain about them pulling down their son's pants or dropping someone's lunch in the toilet. 
Teachers cajoled, pleaded, and occasionally ranted, but they couldn't do anything and they 
knew it. Justine believed teachers to be secretly on their side as they trampled the weak and 
the uncool” (112). These passages detailing power and transgression seem like they were 
tailor made to illustrate postmodern theories dealing with power dynamics, transgression, and 
abjection.
Justine's brutal childhood experiences forge her into a cool and charismatic presence: 
“All those hours of running with mobs, tormenting other children, and having sex in 
bathrooms had created an aura of sensuality and mystique that she radiated without effort” 
(166-7). Yet, she hides this persona from her parents, shoplifting sexy outfits from a mall and 
changing into them at school, until she is caught stealing. When her mother picks her up from 
the store, “Justine shrugged her shoulders and scowled while her mother and the manager 
agreed on how awful she was” (174). After her mother catches her at school in a forbidden 
outfit, she is sent to a psychiatrist named Dr. Venus – a rather obvious reference to Sacher-
Masoch that not so subtly underlines Justine's obsession with dominance and submission. 
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Justine relates her sexual adventures to Dr. Venus, and “[a]s she talked she felt as if she were 
talking about someone else – someone who was complex and interesting, a femme fatale, yet 
a sad sensitive femme fatale who'd seen and done too much too soon, like one of those 
teenagers in decadent-society TV specials who drank or something” (182). This passage 
shows that Justine has learned to see herself as an object, to observe herself from the outside, 
evaluating herself for coolness, comparing herself to a type of fictional character, the femme 
fatale. When she is finished telling Dr. Venus about her sexual explorations, “she felt like a 
character in a rock song” (183). Again, she is distanced from her experiences, and views 
herself through the lens of popular culture – in the first quote, TV, and in the second, the 
ultimate in cool, a rock song. As her distance from herself grows, so too does her distance 
from her social circle: “[S]he now felt herself in her aloneness, and she savored herself 
bitterly” (190). This social isolation is a product of the persona she has cultivated, desperately 
seeking to protect herself from victimization and feelings of humiliation. After her parents 
divorced, “she calmly moved from parent to parent to school, counting the months, holding 
her aloneness around her like a magic cloak. When she moved to New York after graduating 
from college years later, the cloak was wound about her so completely she no longer knew it 
was there” (191).
Dorothy's childhood follows a similar path, but the outcome is quite different. 
Although her sexual abuse comes later than Justine's, she grows up in the shadow of an angry 
and abusive father. However, she shelters herself from this harsh reality by immersing herself 
in the fantasy of fictional worlds. For example, she relates: “When I was nine I read 'The 
Little Match Girl,' the fairy tale about a starving girl who freezes to death outside the home of 
a middle-class family as they eat Christmas dinner” (83). Her reaction, unlike Justine, is not 
to see herself as the victim, but rather to imagine herself in a heroic role: “For days I was 
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obsessed with fantasies in which I appeared in the story, a wealthy child philanthropist, to 
sweep the match girl away to my opulent home” (82). The most important of these early 
fantasies was Peter Pan: “When she [her mother] read Peter Pan, I stopped drawing pictures 
of heaven and began drawing Never-Never Land” (92). The imaginary world is described as 
protecting her: “Its very name made me feel a sadness like a big beautiful blanket I could 
wrap around myself” (93). Dorothy develops a rich inner world, which she keeps hidden from 
others: 
The boundaries of my inner world did not extend out, but in, so that there was a large 
area of blank whiteness starting at my most external self and expanding inward until it 
reached the tiny inner province of dazzling color and activity that it safeguarded, like 
the force field of clouds and limitless night sky that surrounded Never-Never Land. 
(135)
The neglect of her external world leads her to develop “what my mother came to call my 
'unattractive habits.' First, I stopped brushing my teeth, except on rare occasions” (69). She 
also begins an unhealthy relationship with food: “In addition, I began giving in to gross and 
unhealthy cravings: candy bars, ice cream, cookies, sugar in wet spoonfuls from the bowl, 
Hershey's syrup drunk in gulps from the can, Reddi Whip shot down my throat, icing in huge 
fingerfuls from other people's pieces of cake” (70). These habits lead to her becoming fat, 
socially awkward, and unattractive. In response to her withdrawal from the family world, her 
father begins to berate her: 
Slowly, starting first with veiled attacks on “selfish turds” and “fat slobs,” he began to 
tell me how awful I was. Soon he would be leaning towards me on his elbows, his 
mouth forming the words so vehemently that he showed his teeth. “You sit there on 
your fat butt night after night wearing the clothes I bought you, stuffing yourself with 
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my food, stupid and ugly, contributing nothing.” (142)
Dorothy's inner fantasy world helps her withstand the abuse:  “Those dinner tribunals 
occurred with such frequency that I developed the ability to divide myself while they 
occurred; the external person who sat and cried while her father reviled her and the internal 
person who helped herself to more salad as he ranted” (142). However, the abuse eventually 
turns sexual, as her father begins coming into her bedroom at night to molest her. Dorothy 
views the sexual abuse as just an extension of her damaged relationship with her father: 
“[U]nderneath the fear and shame, underneath the excitement, it seemed that what was 
happening now between my father and me was only the physical expression of what always 
happened between us, even when he verbally reviled me, especially when he verbally reviled 
me” (150). Dorothy's distance from the outside world extends to her relationships with the 
other children at school, with whom she is unable to connect. Although they cruelly tease her, 
she sees through their unkindness: “I sensed that if their mundane words covered cruelty and 
aggression, the cruelty and aggression covered other qualities. Vulnerability, tenderness, 
curiosity, kindness – I sensed these qualities in the child harridans around me, yet I could not 
experience them. Even more bewildering, it seemed that they did not experience them either” 
(135). The sections of the novel detailing Dorothy's childhood display a depth of perception 
and introspection that we do not encounter in the sections dealing with Justine. Her rich inner 
life enables her to be more successful at resisting traumas, even before she encounters Anna 
Granite's work.
Gradually, Dorothy's fantasy world begins to incorporate adult novels, including 
George Orwell's 1984: “It wasn't the brutality I loved, it was the bravado in Orwell's 
monotonous treatment of horror, and the pathetic human efforts to stand against it, or even 
believe in the existence of something else” (153). Eventually, she encounters The Bulwark, a 
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novel by Anna Granite, which profoundly affects her: “I was deeply moved by the 
description of Asia Maconda and Frank Golanka, the proud outcasts moving through a crowd 
of resentful mediocrities, surrounded by the cold glow of their genius and grace” (158). 
Granite replaces Orwell in her private fantasy world because Granite's characters cannot be 
broken: “It was the same brave evocation of beauty that I had loved in Orwell – except that 
this was strong, contemptuous beauty, a beauty indifferent to anything but itself and its own 
growth. In Orwell's world, beauty was unreachable, and the attempt to reach it was fatal...In 
Granite's world, it thrived proud and undeniable” (159). Dorothy uses her identification with 
Granite's characters to resist the damage of her father's abuse: “I myself was another aspect 
of Asia, as I sat silently at the dinner table while my father crouched above his plate reviling 
me. I felt, in addition to the inevitable dislocated shame, a strange kind of pride” (160). By 
projecting an idealized fantasy realm of possibility, she endures her father's sexual assaults: 
“Like Katya in The Last Woman Alive, I nurtured myself with dreams of what could be. On 
those nights when my father came to me, these dreams were the mainstay on which my 
listing comprehension attached itself, the immobile constant that stood watch while I 
struggled to maintain silence and stillness” (161). Although it may seem that these fantasy 
escapes are somehow emotionally unhealthy, Dorothy insists that “'it wasn't the craziness in 
me that was responding to Anna Granite, it was the sanity'” (10).
Once Dorothy leaves home to go to college, the reality of her childhood hits her: “I 
left to go to class and sat looking at the people around me, marveling at my difference from 
them. I had had sex with my father” (194).  This realization creates powerful feelings of self-
loathing: “[M]ost of the time I felt as if my body had been turned inside out, that I was a 
walking deformity hung with visible blood-purple organs, lungs, heart, bladder, kidneys, 
spleen, the full ugliness of a human stripped of its skin” (194). Although she seeks help from 
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a counselor, she is unable to bring herself to tell her story. Finally, she turns once again to 
Anna Granite's books for help: “The first thing I read was how utterly alone Solitaire 
D'Anconti was in the world and how much pain it had caused her. I could understand that” 
(197). In Granite's work, she finds a meaning for her own pain: “It described her pain as a 
thing of beauty and grandeur, her isolation as a sign of her innate superiority, comparable to 
mountain peaks and skyscrapers. 'Every loneliness is a pinnacle,' wrote Anna Granite” (197). 
In this section, Gaitskill does a brilliant job balancing her ironic recreation of the simplicity 
of Rand's fiction with a deep depiction of the intensity of its value for Dorothy, whose 
extremely traumatic childhood not only generates tremendous empathy in the reader but 
demands to be taken seriously. The following quote exemplifies this balance: 
I read of Solitaire's physical beauty and intellectual brilliance, how she “grimly seized 
the rapier of hatred thrust upon her by the squalling mob and fought her way out, 
forcing the hot anger of her pain into the icy steel of her intellect.”  So, not every 
social misfit was ugly and/or fat! They didn't all lie on the bathroom floor banging 
their heads! Some of them ran corporations, which is what Solitaire grew up to do. 
(197)
Gaitskill manages to replicate Rand's heavy-handed, cliché-ridden prose, while at the same 
time, demonstrating why it appeals to Dorothy. And the impact is profound, as Granite's work 
leads Dorothy to determine that “[t]he world, previously an incomprehensible prison, was 
now an orderly place where I could live with dignity. Even what my father had done to me – 
as a result of his denial of reality – was not too horrible to look at, could be explained and 
then rejected. I could determine my own world and reject anything that made it an unhappy 
place” (198-9). Dorothy, unable to continue living her old life, decides to abandon her 
studies, pack her things and move to Philadelphia in order to attend Anna Granite's lectures 
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there. She paces her rented room, fantasizing about meeting Granite, yet afraid, because “the 
intimacy and understanding that I fantasized was such that it would rip my skin off. She 
would look at me and know everything I'd endured. I wouldn't have to hold back, I could tell 
her about it all, I could tell her about the part of myself I'd held away from everyone, the tiny 
but vibrant internal Never-Never Land I'd lived in when there was no other place for me” 
(202-3).
In person, Granite's lectures effect her as deeply as her books. As she later tells Justine 
during their interview, “'I felt I was connecting with the life force of humanity. At the first 
lecture I sat there and wept. I just wept'” (25). Her emotions are so powerful that she has 
difficulty concentrating: “I was so overwhelmed by my emotional response to Granite, that I 
could only comprehend her speech in fragments. She talked about how tragic it was when the 
individual was sacrificed for the majority, how the needs of the weak became an excuse for 
undermining the strong” (226). These ideas provide solace for Dorothy in confronting her 
trauma: 
I had been stronger than my parents. I had been damn strong to survive a childhood 
completely lacking in emotional or mental sustenance and in fact would have killed 
most people. And it was my strength that made my father hate me. It wasn't because I 
was worthless, not because I was ugly or fat. It was because I was worth something 
and he knew it and he wanted to destroy me for it. (226, italics in the original)
Dorothy, overwhelmed with emotion, approaches Granite after her lecture. In her depiction of 
Granite, Gaitskill eschews most of the irony that characterizes her simulations of Rand's 
fiction, making Rand seem not just sympathetic, but somehow heroic. Choked up by her 
emotions, Dorothy is unable to speak. Granite's response is empathetic: “'I can see you've had 
a lot of pain in your life'” (227), she says. Dorothy acknowledges her pain, saying, “'There 
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were times I didn't know how I would survive. Even recently. I just wanted to die'” (228). 
Granite's response is reassuring: “Her eyes radiated the gentlest strength I had ever 
experienced, her tough, hot, callusy hands supported me with the full intensity of her life. 
'Yes,' she said. 'I can see that'” (228). Dorothy continues on: “'But I did survive, and the 
reason I survived was you. I had to tell you that. I had to thank you'” (228). Unlike Dorothy's 
fears of being destroyed by this meeting, Granite's empathetic, reassuring support enables 
Dorothy to reclaim her agency:
She looked at me and, as in my fantasy, she saw me, saw my pain – which no one had 
ever acknowledged or even allowed me to acknowledge. However, unlike my fantasy, 
to be seen and acknowledged by her wasn't to be penetrated and ripped apart by an 
obscene burst of energy. I did not feel her gaze boring through my pores to envelop 
my swooning spirit; I felt her at the perimeter of myself, waiting for me to reveal 
myself. So I didn't swoon. I stood and met her gaze and felt myself, habitually held in 
so deep and tight, come out to meet her with the quavering steps of someone whose 
feet have been asleep for a long, long time. (228)
Granite, despite being visibly exhausted, insists that Dorothy tell her everything. For the first 
time in her life, Dorothy is able to reveal her secret: “What I had been unable to say to 
anyone, barely even to myself, came out in normal sentences. I didn't even feel 
embarrassment, let alone shame” (228). At the end of this extraordinary exchange, Granite 
offers Dorothy a job as a secretary, at “almost double the standard hourly wage” (229), 
despite Dorothy's lack of work experience. Dorothy accepts, although she feels unworthy of 
Granite's esteem. Finally, Granite insists that Dorothy choose a new name for herself, and she 
chooses “Dorothy Never” (230). In this emotionally powerful scene, Granite, and thus Rand, 
is painted in the most positive light, and the impact of her beliefs and her presence are 
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described as life-saving, healing forces that enable Dorothy to reclaim herself and shed her 
traumatic past, literally creating a new identity.
Justine's interview with Dorothy has an impact on her: “It would be an exaggeration 
to say that Justine's meeting with Dorothy disturbed the years-old insulation of her cloak of 
loneliness. But something about the encounter sent an invisible ray under the cloak” (209). 
Justine initially reacts to her meeting with Dorothy by suspecting that she is crazy; however, 
she somehow still admires her: “[T]he fat woman was obviously very tough in some way. She 
had that craziness locked into formation, doing drills, getting her up and out and moving 
through life, with a roof over her head and money in her pocket, instead of roaming the 
Hades of beggars and bag people, many of whom had had, Justine suspected, normal homes 
and lives at some point. Where had this strength come from?” (239). 
The question begs an answer and the answer is obviously the work of Anna Granite, whose 
philosophy has provided Dorothy the tools to overcome her childhood. Justine, despite being 
attractive and thin, has not managed to attain Dorothy's level of strength. This is emphasized 
several times throughout the novel. For example, Justine's job is assistant secretary, and the 
woman she assists is named Glenda. Justine doubts her abilities, believing that Glenda is 
superior to her: “Probably it was obvious to everyone, on a deep level, that Glenda was a 
conduit for the forces of order, rationality, and strength, and that she, Justine, was a mere 
appendage, useful insofar as she was a conduit for Glenda. Further, it seemed that this had 
been true all her life and would probably always be true” (306). As Justine continues meeting 
and interviewing Definitists, she becomes more critical of herself and begins seeing the value 
of the philosophy. For example, she contemplates the potential benefit of striving for an ideal 
self: “According to Definitist thought, for every imperfect entity, be it human or material, 
there exists a perfect counterpart; a lovely princess for every pimply shop girl. This perfection 
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was not an annulment of the shop girl, but an ideal for her to aspire to, and the clerk who 
whistled at her in the street could see and love the princess in her, just as she could see the 
glamorous playboy in him” (234). This causes her to look critically at herself: “Maybe, 
thought Justine bleakly, there is a perfect Justine Shade somewhere. A tall, full-lipped beauty 
who wears silk and leather. She lives in a beautiful, austere apartment and condescends to 
write a half-dozen or so brilliant pieces of journalism a year” (234). The thought of this ideal 
makes her long to improve her life: “This can't go on, she thought. Somehow, I have to go out 
and Live” (234). The more she encounters Definitists and their views, the more she begins to 
see things through Granite's philosophy:
She was disconcerted to find herself thinking that perhaps, since she'd been in New 
York, the entire country had deteriorated as seriously as Manhattan had, that 
everywhere people were wading ankle-deep in rolling, rotting trash, that everywhere 
homeless people pissed in the streets and railed at the well-to-do who slunk shame-
faced along the walls. This of course was exactly what Anna Granite had said would 
happen, due to weak-willed liberals and government meddling. For a moment she 
looked at the possibility of total collapse as if she were a Definitist and found the idea 
to be somehow dramatically and ethically satisfying. (289)
As we see, the philosophy briefly provides even Justine with a moral viewpoint, which is 
precisely what she has lacked her whole life. Gaitskill goes so far as to provide a literary 
critique to accompany the social one. While visiting a school built on Definitist principles, 
the English teacher decries the curriculum of contemporary schools: “'[Y]ou'd be shocked 
what they teach. Joyce, Kafka – horrible stuff about people's lives being destroyed by a 
crying baby. Or going to a carnival and getting lost and not being able to find what you 
wanna buy and getting depressed. Or a guy turning into a cockroach – it's unbelievable. It's 
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all about defeat and helplessness. No wonder the kids hate it'” (290). Gaitskill is once again 
presenting an ironic view of the Definitist ideology, but when Justine starts to object to this 
simplistic view, she finds herself disarmed: “Justine started to argue for the intrinsic value of 
beauty in writing, but as he continued, she found herself seduced by his blunt sensibility, so 
full of feeling yet so dumb, by his cheerful way of going after literature like a dog would a 
bone” (290).
Justine's self-doubts begin to torment her, and a call from her mother triggers a 
panicked response. She goes out into the city on a self-destructive impulse to get drunk and 
sleep with a stranger. She eventually ends up meeting Bryan, who is described as threatening: 
“His voice was soft and gentle in a TV-lover boy style, but his pale eyes glittered with the 
adrenal malice of a sex criminal who likes to crack jokes while reaming his sobbing victims” 
(243). He informs her that he frequents the Hellfire Club, an S&M club, he says, “'You know, 
master, slave, people being tied up and beaten, women getting fucked by dozens of guys. I'll 
bet you'd like it'” (246). Justine feels threatened by Bryan, remembering that the Hellfire 
Club was “the last place a beautiful model had been seen before being ritually murdered” 
(246), yet she feels attracted to him, and “[s]he struggled to understand this attraction before 
she was overwhelmed by it” (245). Justine gets blackout drunk and goes home with Bryan. 
The aftermath of her encounter with Bryan is described this way: “Justine had just awakened 
in the hellish but reassuringly familiar suburb of Hangover. Her eyeballs hurt, her vision was 
static, the mucus in the passages of her head had turned to mud. Insects with many slow-
moving legs patrolled her skin” (281). Later, she remembers having sex with him; yet, the 
memory “was not the least bit arousing; however she recognized something compelling in it, 
a compulsion akin to that of a starving lab animal which will keep pressing the button that 
once supplied it with food, even though the button now jolts its poor small body with 
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increasing doses of electric shock” (291). This startling simile makes clear that Justine's 
behavior is self-destructive and compulsory, and doesn't fulfill her needs. The experience 
leaves her upset and feeling like she is losing control: “Her mind had been moving in this 
psychotic direction all morning, and it was beginning to alarm her. Even worse, it seemed as 
though other people could see the distressed twistings and turnings in her head” (305-6). She 
berates herself for her attraction to the dangerous Bryan, thinking, “If she was going to be 
upset, it should be because she'd gone home with an abusive mental case, not because he 
wasn't going to call her” (283). Her subsequent meetings with Bryan exhibit a strong contrast 
with Granite's philosophy. Bryan describes an essay by Hegel: “'His basic idea is that people 
crave freedom but that, because of the realities of their lives, they are inherently unfree. And 
that the only way people can have a sense of freedom is by taking the freedom of others – 
enslaving others'” (314). Although undoubtedly a misreading of Hegel's essay, as an ethics it 
is the polar opposite of Objectivism, which holds that only by respecting the freedom of 
others can an individual be moral. Justine's relationship with Bryan becomes more and more 
abusive, both verbally and physically. Justine welcomes the abjection: “[S]he could barely 
feel the welts rising on her back. Her knees hurt, she thought. He beat her as she squirmed on 
the floor, caught in the steel trap that had closed on her when she was five years old” (346). 
Again, she experiences a distancing from herself: “She was aware of her humiliation, but it 
was so far away and had so little to do with her that she couldn't feel that either. Still, she 
clung to it fiercely, as if it were her only chance to feel” (349). Their relationship becomes an 
abusive mockery of love: 
'Tell me you love me,' he said. 
'I love you.' 
He pissed in her face. (349)
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These experiences cause Justine to neglect her health: “The eating of meals had become 
burdensome to her; she was losing weight and becoming anxious about her health, yet she 
couldn't make herself eat nutritionally sound food” (356).
Clearly, Justine's connection to Sade and her fascination with power, dominance, and 
abjection place her interests in the realm of postmodern theory, but it isn't completely clear 
that Gaitskill is aware of this. She doesn't name theorists or mention “postmodern” or get 
very deeply into theory other than the ideas of Anna Granite. Nevertheless, Justine's ideas and 
viewpoint often mirror the postmodern. For example, when Justine meets with Dorothy, she 
brings up the subjectivity of the reader (or the death of the author): “'I mean what happens 
when people look at a thing and see in it something other than what its creator intended and 
aren't aware of the difference. That happens all the time, especially about writers. I just think 
it's interesting in the context of what Granite said about objective truth'” (325). Dorothy 
rejects this: “'[W]hy are you paying attention to dumb stuff like people thinking her work 
meant this or that when the important thing was what it in fact did mean?'” (329). Justine 
explains further: “'[W]hen people adopt a political position or philosophy, they rarely take it 
into their personality whole hog, whether they think they do or not. It is filtered through a 
life-long construct of individual perception, emotional needs, and assumptions about life'” 
(329). Dorothy views this as anathema to Definitism, but still finds it interesting: “This 
reeked of subjectivism, and I of course saw it as rot. Yet...it was interesting rot. I couldn't help 
but be curious even as I rejected it” (329). Here, the contrast between a postmodern embrace 
of subjectivity and the Objectivist insistence that we accurately perceive an objective reality 
is clearly delineated. Dorothy presses the point that this contrast is a moral one: “'The 
desserts we just ate – they embody qualities of lightness, gentleness, sweetness, and comfort 
– moral qualities because when you decide whether or not to have these things in your life, 
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you make a moral choice. Moral choice is not ambiguous; it is as concrete as the chairs we sit 
in'” (333). Justine rejects this viewpoint, but feels attracted to its certainty: “Hopeless, 
thought Justine, as are most attempts to quantify and contain. Still, she had to admit, there 
was something consoling, seductive even, about this vision of chairs and pieces of cake 
suspended, along with everything else, in a glistening web of order that connected them to all 
the morality in the universe” (333). In this exchange, Gaitskill is showing the weaknesses of 
the two viewpoints, but also how they complement each other, leading each character to be 
drawn to the ideas of the other. The two characters need each other, and the implication is that 
the two opposing viewpoints need each other as well. This is demonstrated more concretely 
by the novel's ending.
When Justine's article about Definitism is published in Urban Vision magazine, 
Dorothy feels betrayed because the article doesn't reflect a serious engagement with Granite's 
ideas. Instead, it mocks Granite and her followers, and blames Granite for neoliberalism:
“This cultural utopia of greed, expressed in gentrification and the slashing of social 
programs, has had its spokesperson and prophet for the last fifty years, a novelist 
whose books are American fantasies that mirror, in all its neurotic excess, the frantic 
twist to the right we are now experiencing. Anna Granite, who coined the term 'the 
Truth of Selfishness,' has been advocating the yuppie raison d'être since the early 
forties; it is only now that her ideas are being lived out, in mass culture and in 
government.”(357)
Justine's writing style is postmodern: “Justine went on for several paragraphs in that breezy 
pop Vision-speak, invoking television shows, movies, and media jokes about the inner 
conflicts of American psychology” (361). Dorothy storms out of her apartment to find Justine 
and confront her. Meanwhile, Justine is being severely abused by Bryan: “'You cunt,' he said. 
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'You fucking worthless cunt.' She didn't answer him because she had his belt tight around her 
throat. Her body convulsed and her sight went. He released his grip, and her vision cleared. 
Her arms and legs were cold; she tried to move her fingers and wasn't sure she succeeded” 
(368). Although Justine has willingly played along with his sadism, these passages make it 
clear that she is in real danger: “Her skin was so red it could have been scalded, her forehead 
was almost contorted with tension while her lower face was weirdly lax, her eyes were like 
terrified animals bolting in every direction and finding no release” (379). Dorothy storms into 
Justine's apartment to find that “Justine Shade lay naked on her bed, her hands and feet tied to 
its corners, her head raised, her wild mascara-smeared eyes staring at me with utter 
incomprehension” (379). Dorothy is shocked by her condition: “I saw marks on her thighs 
and breasts, and dried blood on her lips” (379). Bryan suggests that Dorothy join in the 
sadistic fun, but Justine pleads with Dorothy to untie her, saying that Bryan “has gone 
completely off the deep end” (380). Dorothy pushes Bryan out of the apartment, locks the 
door, and releases Justine. They lie on the bed together, and it is clear that something has 
blossomed between the two. Dorothy's first appearance in the novel tells us the result in 
hindsight: “I had thought of Anna Granite as the summit of my life, the definitive, devastating 
climax – and yet perhaps she had been only the foreshadowing catalyst for the connection 
that occurred between me and Justine, the bridge without which our lives would have 
continued to run their spiritually parallel courses” (11).
As this reading has illustrated, Justine and Dorothy represent postmodernism and 
objectivism respectively. Gaitskill gives us a comparison of the two viewpoints and despite 
her ironic recreation of Rand's fiction, objectivism comes out as the stronger philosophy. The 
novel's conclusion, bringing the two figures together and suggesting that they need each 
other, that they complement each other, demonstrates that objectivism has the answers for the 
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weaknesses inherent in postmodern ethics.
4.3 Big If by Mark Costello
Mark Costello's novel Big If, published in 2002, engages with the neoliberal era and explores 
an ethics of selfishness, while not explicitly referring to Ayn Rand or other neoliberal 
thinkers. The novel revolves around the main protagonists, siblings Vi and Jens Asplund, and 
describes their differing life choices in the face of an uncertain, risk-oriented neoliberal 
landscape. Vi works for the government as a Secret Service agent tasked with protecting the 
Vice President. Her decision to take a government job has left her without family or friends, 
living at the whim of the state. For long periods of time she loses all sense of who she is, that 
is, she loses the sense of being a subject. The other Secret Service agents around her have 
fared no better – each is struggling with marital, emotional, and family problems. Her brother 
Jens, on the other hand, is a highly intelligent and creative programmer for an online video 
game startup called BigIf. He is happily married to Peta, a successful real estate agent, and 
has a young son named Kai. He feels a great pride in his accomplishments, both financial and 
creative. The video game world that Jens and his colleagues have built functions along 
neoliberal principles, with a functioning economy shaped by the invisible hand of the market. 
BigIf is about to go public, and this means that Jens will soon strike it rich. However, Jens' 
father, Walter, who has recently died, had expressed his disapproval of Jens' game shortly 
before his death. This leads Jens into a moral dilemma that forms the heart of the book's 
neoliberal message; a dilemma whose solution demonstrates an ethics of selfishness and 
defies the reader's expectations. While Jens and Vi seem to represent the contemporary era, 
their father Walter might represent modernity, while their mother, Jessica is more in line with 
a postmodern ethics. BigIf wrestles with the limitations of these approaches while positioning 
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a neoliberal ethics of selfishness as an alternative.
Vi Asplund works for the Secret Service and is tasked with protecting the Vice 
President. The impact of Vi's work, the demands it makes on her, leave her feeling empty, as 
though she does not have a self. In a way, her government job has taken away her sense of 
being a subject. Costello's descriptions of her are peppered with phrases such as these: “Vi 
had lived in Tower South since coming to Protection, but standing at the window of her 
studio that morning, she wondered for a moment if anybody lived here. Her plants lived here, 
three geraniums along a dusty windowsill. Her clothes lived here...but Vi herself was 
generally gone” (69). The sense of her being gone is not only a physical one, but a larger one 
in which her entire self is erased by her job. Vi accepts this lack of a personal life: “Most of 
the agents had fairly shitty home lives, so Vi didn't feel too bad having none at all” (86). 
However, she does at times notice the loss, and at once such moment, she pays a visit to her 
brother Jens to try to recover her lost self: “She thought, I'm never in a home these days, a 
real home with real people living in it. Tower South, Vi's cubicle/studio near the Pentagon, 
didn't count as home” (252). Once she arrives at her brother's house, she notices the 
difference between their lives: “But this formica-bright condo in The Bluffs was a real home 
to a real family – a sample of the country the bodyguards defended. Vi thought, that's the 
problem – I've lost touch” (252). Vi makes an attempt to recover herself, to reconnect to her 
brother and restore her sense of herself as a subject, but the attempt fails as she cannot stop 
herself from scanning passersby for potential threats as if she were still executing her duties 
as a Secret Service agent: “Vi had come home to belong, to join the crowd for once, but she 
couldn't stop scanning hands as they walked along the streets of the downtown that weekend. 
Jens had caught her at it. 'Your eyes are always moving, Vi, like REM sleep only you're 
awake'” (129). Jens compares her state to that of someone asleep, as if she were not conscious 
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of her own actions. In a sense, she is programmed, much like the monsters in Jens' video 
game, who also continually scan for triggering events. Jens confronts her about this, saying, 
“'Why did you even come back here, Vi? I feel like I don't even know you'” (130). 
Afterwards, Vi returns to work and tries to return to her sleepwalking reality: “Vi popped her 
ears, in and out, riding on the jet, steeling herself to work the crowds, to forget them all, 
Walter, Jens and Peta, to get herself to emptiness and vacant mode” (130). The job has 
become her life, but she is not happy about it at all, in fact, she begins to think about 
retirement: “For the first time since leaving her hometown to join the Secret Service, Vi did 
the math and figured out that she was fifteen years and three months from retirement with 
pension” (251). At this stage, her pension is the only reward that her life-consuming job 
offers.
The other agents that Vi works with fare no better in their government jobs. For 
example, “There was Herc Mercado, twice divorced and not yet thirty, who often slept on 
O'Teen's couch because his latest manic girlfriend had locked him out and he was sick of 
breaking his own door in. There was O'Teen himself, a balding bachelor who had tried 
computer dating but found that he kept getting matched up with losers” (86). O'Teen has no 
family, but he does have a gambling problem: “O'Teen was a ratty Philadelphian, a lovelorn 
ex-computer dater and ruinous sports gambler. He lived alone in Arlington, where he had full 
cable and his mother and his bookie on speed dial” (126). There was Tashmo, the aging 
womanizer, described as “cranky, middle-aged, thirty years a bodyguard, whose wife was 
always after him to fix the car, fix the disposall [sic], who didn't give him a goddamn 
minute's peace the one day a week Tashmo managed to get home” (86). Tashmo had a 
reputation problem among the other agents: “Tashmo wasn't beloved by the other agents. 
They saw him for the selfish civil service schemer that he was” (272). Tashmo's great 
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dilemma is how to inform his wife that he is no longer cheating on her without admitting that 
he cheated on her in the first place. Tashmo has ja friend who is a former agent who has 
entered the private sector: “Loudon Rhodes, the ex-Reagan bodyguard, was living in L.A., 
running a private security firm, making millions in retirement” (111). He tries to convince 
Tashmo to leave the Secret Service to join the private sector: “He was always telling Tashmo 
that he ought to hang it up, retire, join the real world” (111). Notice how the private sector is 
referred to as the “real world,” a world in which there are millions of dollars to be made. Vi's 
supervisor is Gretchen, a single mother who has little time for her son.  Gretchen was a less 
than ideal supervisor: “Gretchen was a cold and scolding supervisor, richly hated by her 
agents” (74), who “believed in leadership by fear” (250). Yet, she is plagued by internal 
conflict: “She was starting to have fundamental doubts about herself. Not about her job, her 
methods as lead agent, the way she drove her people” (272), but rather, instead, “she was 
doubting something else. Was she a good mother?” (272). She tries to keep in touch with her 
son while she is traveling with the Vice President, but she “knew her morning phone calls 
weren't a substitute for mothering” (270).  She fears for her son's well-being and 
development: “It didn't sound like much in the mothering department – a phone call, what 
was that? Pathetic – especially with Tev at such an awkward age and with all that trash out 
there, drugs and gangs and thievery and evil on CD, computer, television, movies, drops of 
poison in the well” (270). Finally, there is Vi's friend Bobbi Taylor-Niles, whose escape plan 
is to marry a rich man: “[S]he planned to marry a distinguished man of years and reputation, 
wealthy or at least well-to-do, a carnal, cynical arrangement maybe, but Bobbie had tried 
every other kind of marriage” (87). Bobbi's past can best be described as checkered: “The rest 
of her biography – three divorces, four abortions, seven maxed-out credit cards, one personal 
bankruptcy – was an accident, a draft. She would quit the service on her wedding day and say 
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goodbye to Vi and the crowds” (89). Bobbi has a nightmare that sums up the personal 
sacrifices of the government job. She dreams of an assassin trying to kill the Vice President, 
and of hurling herself in front of the bullet, but something is wrong, she tells Vi, “'Oh sure 
and I'm a hero and I go down in history, all the way down to a footnote probably, but what the 
fuck? I took the bullet like a good girl, and that's the fucking job – we plot against the 
plotters, right? Plan and counterplan. Only we didn't stop this plot, Vi, because the real target 
of the shooter was me'” (30, italics in the original). The nightmare drives home the message 
that the Secret Service job is one of thankless self-sacrifice, in which the lives of its civil 
servants are deliberately destroyed, in the name of a collective good. Far from being the ideal 
way to live, the ideal ethics, this selfless approach leads to unhappiness, even madness. As 
Bobbi tells Gretchen toward the end of the novel, “'It's crazy, Gretchen. We're all going 
crazy'” (304).
In contrast to Vi, Jens has a life in the “real world,” where he “wrote patches and 
utilities for a start-up in West Portsmouth called BigIf, a massive multiplayer war game on 
the Internet” (28). Jens is described as special, as a genius, even from early childhood: “Jens 
got all the brains in the family; this was understood and not especially disputed. He was 
locally considered something of a wonder, a math and physic prodigy” (13). After starting out 
with a deep interest in weather patterns, and later, ham radio, Jens eventually finds his true 
calling: “Ham radio and Morse – they were his two loves back then, the twin cyclones of his 
heart. But, looking back, he saw that they were part, one part, of a youthful preparation for 
Jens' shattering encounter with the true God: software” (150). Jens obtained access to a 
computer at school and “was changed forever” (22). His first piece of software seems to 
emphasize his focus on himself: “He spent a summer getting paler in the beaker storage 
closet. He came out in September with his masterpiece, a program he called 
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JENSISNUMBER1.exe, which used a distant printer to spit out the sentence JENS IS 
NUMBER 1!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!” (22). Although indicative of his adolescent mindset, the program 
also asserts his own sense of self-importance, emphasizing a feeling of selfish 
accomplishment. This feeling is ecstatic, the opposite of the way Vi feels about her non-
existence: “Like the God of Israel, it went by many names, one for every face it showed: 
logic, code, loop, routine, algorithm, source. JENSISNUMBER1 – he remembered how it 
made him feel, the power and control, making the computer an extension of your will” (150). 
His love of software drives him to accomplishment: “Someday they would speak of the giants 
of computer science, Ada Lovelace, Alan Turing, Dennis Ritchie at Bell Labs, and Jens 
Asplund, father of the Jensatronic hyper-object language” (22). After bouncing around 
different jobs while in grad school, Jens joins BigIf with the specific goal of getting rich: 
“Many games were started in the fad, all of them pursuing the same vision strategy: take the 
VC money, build a game, do the marketing, get the player loads up to a stable-profit, self-
sustaining waterline, then take the baby public and everyone gets rich, a can't-miss plan” 
(167). The game is actually successful and the company is planning to go public soon, but Vi 
doesn't like the video game because she feels that it is a waste of Jens' abilities: “There was a 
whiff of sellout and lost promise about Vi's brother” (29). Nevertheless, Jens vigorously 
defends his game: “'If you could see the source code, the logic of monsters, you'd see that it 
was beautiful'” (29). He compares his game to a great work of art: “'The technology is cool, 
state of the art. Our main software shell is eighteen million lines of beautiful cold code. It's 
the Finnegan's Wake of software, Vi, except it's longer and more complicated than 
Finnegan's Wake, and I wrote a good part of it'” (29). Jens' view of his accomplishment is 
echoed by Head, who leads the software development team: “Head said that Hollywood was 
dead, that the Web was the future of all entertainment narratives. Deep immersive gaming – 
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this was the new movies and they should all be damned glad to be among the founding 
fathers, the Chaplins and the Griffiths and the Lumières” (166). Here, Jens is compared to 
important cultural figures, and his game is viewed as a historically important development. 
This description of Jens echoes the grandiose modernist characters in Rand's novels, cultural 
and industrialist heroes who forge the way for the future, accomplishing greatness through 
their genius.
In fact, throughout the novel, Costello uses language that implies that Jens has a kind 
of God-like status, standing over his creation and observing it with a sense of pride. For 
example, the first description of Jens using the computer is: “He ran models of the Big Bang” 
(22). Here, the creation of the universe is linked to the creation of Jens' first program. Jens is 
also described as experiencing great ecstasy when he creates his virtual world's sun: “Jens 
and Naubek hacked out the refraction math, a way to get the white of the sub turning yellow-
orange-bloody-red as it descends. Jens knew that he would never feel that way again” (294). 
Jens uses his childhood fascination with weather patterns to fashion realistic portrayals in his 
virtual world: “Toxic clouds drifted through the sky; the gamespace went dark beneath them, 
the shadow calculators taking over. The clouds were born at random intervals but moved 
pursuant to actual Weather Service models for the American southwest – Jens' touch, and he 
was proud of it” (155). Jens takes a personal pride in the thoroughness and complexity of his 
game, giving it dimensions that reflect reality: “Life, wisdom, speed, strength, agility, time, 
fate, magic, beauty, death – everything was numbers crunched through algorithms endlessly. 
My algorithms, Jens thought” (156). Jens and Naubeck immerse themselves deeper and 
deeper into the programming, which Costello describes as their “creation”:
They plunged deeper into code with each passing day. As they fell in love with their 
creation, the world around their maze seemed to fall away. For a long time, in the heat 
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of their creating, they knew and didn't know (they knew but they forgot) what the 
code was for. If a subroutine is beautiful – flexible and balanced, efficient, 
multithreaded, not one line longer than it needs to be – does it matter that its purpose 
is to make a cartoon fart? (294, italics in the original)
Once the game goes online, the progress of players can be observed on a large screen: “The 
big screen was a camera on the game, looking down, seeing all, like God or the Goodyear 
Blimp” (153). This God-like status is attained by mastery of logic, which is reflected through 
the “if” statements used by the programmers: “Jens' code was made of IF-switches and 
WHILE-loops, of flow-control structures. Tell the system: test for Z, a data state. IF Z is true, 
do something; IF Z is false, do nothing or do something else” (156, italics in the original). 
His sense of the game's value is tied to his belief in the beauty of its logic: “He had built this 
game, written it, the IFs and potential threads. He was certain of its beauty. When Walter 
judged him, when Vi criticized with her scanning eyes, Jens knew they couldn't see the 
beauty of the IFs” (156).
Jens' game itself demonstrates neoliberal economics and illustrates the invisible hand 
principle. The game becomes a global success, driven by Jens' creation of the the monster 
Hamsterman: “The first monster (Jens' design with Naubeck's help) was the cunning, 
grinning, barrel-chested rodent biped Hamsterman, who became the game's first breakout 
star. Kids in malls on five continents wore Hamsterman T-shirts, Hamsterman high-tops, 
chewed Hamsterman bubble-gum” (154). Thus, through the Internet, the game is not only a 
global product, but it is also used as a medium to market other products such as T-shirts and 
shoes, but also includes in-game advertising of products. Furthermore, the world inside the 
game functions as an almost ideal Objectivist economy. The goal of the game is to move west 
from the starting point, and “you had to earn money to buy provisions. There were several 
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software-sanctioned ways to do this. Wise players hired out as guides. Strong players worked 
as bodyguards. Even a new player could find a spring and sell the water, or gather firewood 
in the overlush forests, or make and sell bread and boots and tunics, and survive that way” 
(157). The game world is an almost ideal neoliberal universe, with no government 
intervention in the market, and with each player trading on his or her strengths to earn a 
living. A problem arises, however, in the form of a class of takers who produce nothing: 
“Players engaged in rampant brigandage to get money to buy weapons to become more 
fearsome brigands to get money to buy better weapons” (159). This theft of the product of 
other player's hard work has a deterrent effect on the game world's economy: “Soon, normal 
human players, sick of dying or living in fear, desubscribed and monthly revenues 
downspiked” (160). This distortion of the market creates a crisis for the game's creators, who 
are worried about the impact on the value of their product: “The VCs panicked and the IPO 
was canceled. The bosses ordered patches in the shell to stop the war. Many patches were 
discussed. One would have stopped any player from hiring more than ten mercs at a time. 
There were numerous conceptual problems with this” (160). The game owners, panicking 
over the threat to their investment, feel the need to intervene in the economic activity of the 
game world: “They met and talked, managers and engineers, sipping seltzer water in 
conference rooms, charting counter-warlord strategies on smeary whiteboards. Why not 
declare a safe haven around the squatter camps? Or send the holybots through the desert 
spreading some kind of peace message?” (160). In the end, the invisible hand of the market 
intervenes before external regulation becomes necessary: “The crisis peaked and passed. 
Superwarlords got bigger on more killing, A few became megasuperwarlords, but one after 
another, each of them was swallowed up by his or her own retinue, which had grown too big 
to pay, feed, or lead. The mercenaries, going unpaid, mutinied, killed the megas, and fought 
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over spoils” (160). The result is a restoration of natural order, all without the need for heavy-
handed intervention by the game creators: “Slowly normal players returned to the shops and 
roads and everything was back where it started” (160). Thus, BigIf not only represents the 
neoliberal capitalist era of globalized cultural products such as online video games, but it also 
functions according to neoliberal principles within its own gameplay.
Jens' father Walter, an insurance adjuster, clings firmly to his beliefs, which read like a 
short summary of modernism:
Walter Asplund believed in many things, the dignity of humankind, the Genius of 
Democracy, the sanctity of the contract, The Origin of Species, the mission of the 
bloodmobile, the [insurance] charts devised in Hartford, poplin suits in summertime, 
brown bread with baked beans, little oyster crackers (with chowder, not with oysters), 
baseball, tennis, The New Yorker, travel hats he purchased from the back of The New 
Yorker (which he sometimes wore to baseball games), the pleasures of night skiing 
with his children on the bunny hill in Rye. He believed, that is, in almost everything 
but God. (11)
Here, we find everything from democracy to evolution to humanism to medicine, along with 
the cultural and economic structures of the modern world, and, like a good modernist, a 
rejection of religion. In fact, his rejection of religion is so fierce that “[h]e sat up in the den 
when his family was asleep, writing on his money, striking out the GOD from IN GOD WE 
TRUST, lest anybody think that by paying with the slogan he was buying into it” (11). 
However, Walter has a bout of existentialist angst when he does this, as he “was never really 
satisfied with his altered motto. He did not believe that we trust, or could trust, or should 
trust, in nothing” (12). So, Walter begins replacing the word “God” with “us.” This constant 
altering of the money ensured that Walter's views began to literally circulate in his 
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community: “Finding a little piece of Walter in one's wallet forced the town to see itself as a 
set of lives, or one collective chorus-life” (12). Walter refuses to celebrate Christmas as a 
religious holiday and instead replaces it with a secular celebration of humanism: “Walter read 
a short reflection by Mr. H. G. Wells. Later they opened gifts, which Walter said was their 
way of honoring the dignity of humankind” (21). Evelyn, Walter's wife and Jens and Vi's 
mother, views Walter's ideas with skepticism, responding to his reading: “'Whoop-de-doo,' 
said Evelyn, raising her wineglass in a sarcastic toast” (21). In addition to her irony, Evelyn 
seems much more aligned with a postmodern ethics. After Walter's death, she relocates to 
Florida, and communicates by e-mail: “Her e-mails read like the letters of Louisa May Alcott, 
thoughtful, trenchant essays filled with observations about race relations in mid-Florida, and 
the country's moral soul, and the cruelties she saw doing volunteer work at the local shelter 
for battered and abandoned pets” (256). Her volunteer work at the animal shelter is an 
express criticism of capitalism: “Evelyn said the problem was that people saw their pets as 
consumer goods, like shoes or a new hat” (256). Her focus on race relations and animals is a 
rejection of Walter's humanism, and echoes the postmodern ethics of the other: “Evelyn said 
that pets and how we treated them were the secret index of our soul, and you could see the 
future of the nation at any shelter in the land” (256). Walter questions the rationality of 
Evelyn's concern for animals, but she turns the argument against him: “'I do what I can. I 
don't save every animal, or even most of them, but I do what I can, which is more than you 
can say, Walt. All your arguments add up to No. No, there is no God. No, there'll be no 
Christmas carols in the house. But what have you ever actually done? You scribble on your 
money. Cross out God'” (257, italics in the original). Walter and Evelyn seem to represent the 
two generations before Jens and Vi, and the result is a lack of ethical certainty among their 
children: “[U]nlike her bookish father, Vi had no morality” (12).
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The novel's central conflict revolves around Walter's criticism of Jens' video game 
accomplishments. Shortly before he dies, Walter tells Jens he should stop working on the 
game: “'Your game is immoral, Jens. Worse, it's amoral. It's a waste of your gifts. You must 
quit right now'” (151). Jens questions his father's command: “'Why?' said Jens. 'To satisfy 
your idea of purity?'” (151). To this Walter replies with concern for Jens' well-being: “'No,' 
said Walter. 'You have to quit because you'll be unhappy if you don't'” (151). For Walter, 
happiness is found in adhering to a moral code, living in accordance to principles handed 
down by society, much like the insurance charts handed down to him by his employer. But 
Jens rejects this vision, asking “'What's wrong with being a success?'” (151). After his father's 
death, he complains about the exchange to his sister Vi: “'You should have heard him on the 
subject of the game. 'BigIf is immoral, Jens – worse, it's amoral.' Nice distinction, Dad. Am I 
happy? I'll be happy when we go IPO. I'll be happy when I'm comfortable for life'” (29). 
Here, Jens equates happiness not with doing his duty in a system of right and wrong, but with 
financial success and career achievement. His path to happiness differs from Walter's 
concept: “Am I happy? When I'm creating a cool application, a sweet design, I'm happy 
because I don't have to think about What It All Means. I left that to Walter, my self-appointed 
conscience'” (29). Nevertheless, his father's words haunt him, leaving him in doubt about the 
ethical values of his game. This doubt is exacerbated when his boss decides to implement 
new monsters that resemble humans, saying, “'We've got to up the ante folks. We've got to 
crank the dread. Our monsters are cartoons. Their life and death – cartoonish. We need human 
monsters. People want to shoot a face'” (168). Using the word “face” in this context summons 
echoes of Lévinas, directly contradicting postmodern ethics. Jens is asked to create a monster 
named Todd, a teenage school shooter whom the players hunt down in the halls of a high 
school. Jens feels reluctant to work on this new monster: “There was something in this 
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business of making monsters real or realistic which filled Jens with a deep sense of unease, as 
if the game were poised to cross some kind of line” (144). His doubt, spurred on by Walter's 
criticism, causes Jens to procrastinate: “He found it hard to concentrate on the code for Todd, 
simple though it was or should have been. His inability to finish the assignment was like a 
head cold which descended every time he clicked his buffers and opened a draft of Monster 
Todd” (141). Instead, he works on a different piece of software, “a program he liked working 
on, a program he enjoyed, a nice bright piece of value-neutral engineering” (144). 
Unfortunately, this leads to trouble at work. Jens tries questioning the concept of Todd, as if 
he doesn't understand what his bosses are requesting, but this doesn't work. His boss says:
“Here's a concept, Jens. In every high school in this country, there is a quiet, troubled 
boy who is always thinking about murder. Maybe he is ugly, fat, or unpopular. Maybe 
he's a half-assed Satanist or a pimpled white supremacist angered by the failures of 
his skin. He's certainly a loser without normal friends or healthy extracurriculars...He 
brings the gun to school one day, planning to mow down. I say let's put that kid, a 
trademark of our time, up on screen.” (169-70)
When Jens continues his reluctance, he is warned: “'We can fire anyone, Jens. I believe we 
could even fire you'” (171). Learning that his close colleague, Naubeck, has just been fired, 
Jens feels deep uncertainty: “Could they fire him? What would he tell Peta if they did? What 
about the plan for their family future – Hang on for the IPO, get the options, reassess?” (171).
As the novel shifts to Jens' wife Peta's point of view, we get an interesting contrast to 
Walter's perspective. A successful real estate agent, Peta has embraced neoliberal capitalism. 
Her primary customers are the wives of newly rich Internet entrepreneurs: “She was paid to 
coddle women like Mitzi Hindenburg (wife of Barry Hindenburg, the screensaver visionary) 
and Chappie Xing (wife of Ai-Me Xing, also known as Winston, the father of the 3-D e-mail 
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singing postcard and other online breakthroughs). Peta always steered them to closing in the 
end” (177). By giving her this specific group of customers, Costello portrays for us the 
financial benefits of getting rich during the Internet boom, illustrating the other side of 
Walter's ethical qualms. Peta has developed some theories about the newly rich generation: 
“Peta was no Marxist (who could be in this market?), but she did believe that there was a new 
ruling class and a new proletariat. The rulers controlled the means of scheduling, The proles 
were those who bore the brunt of dithering and cancellations” (177). Although ironically 
voiced, the theory introduces a portrait of the contemporary generation and its inability to 
make decisions or define values. This section of the novel focuses on Peta's attempt to find 
the perfect house for Lauren Czoll, the wife of the CEO of Jens' company, who will soon 
strike it rich when the company goes public. Lauren is unreliable and indecisive: “Lauren, 
being a new ruler, wasted everybody's time, coming late, forgetting some appointments” 
(178). As she shows Lauren property after property, unable to find the right one, Peta 
identifies Lauren's indecision as a generational problem: “All Peta really needed was an 
answer to the question What does Lauren want? What will make her happy – truly, deeply, 
finally happy? Why was this so difficult for people nowadays?” (178). Here, she illuminates 
the contemporary dilemma, that of not having a set of values to guide decisions: “It seemed 
to be the new plague of this age, this confusion over wants and needs. Poverty was pressure, 
Peta knew, but wealth created pressure too. The pressure on the software wives was quiet and 
corrosive – if you can have anything, buy anything you see, why are you still nervous and 
dissatisfied?” (178 italics in the original). Here, we see the problem of the limitless choices of 
a neoliberal economy, creating ethical uncertainty. Peta notices this problem in Jens, and 
connects it to his procrastination over programming Monster Todd: “Peta saw corrosion in 
her clients and in Jens. Poor Jens was building monsters, on the verge of finally getting rich, 
Allen 142
but it wasn't good or pure enough somehow” (178).
Although it is clear which side of the argument Peta is on, one of her experiences 
while working as a volunteer on election day emphasizes the other side, ratcheting up the 
intensity of Jens' dilemma for the reader. Among the volunteers are members of the 
organization “Mothers for the Truth about Gun Violence” (278). Peta considers talking to the 
women and asking them about their political views, but she is frightened: “Peta wanted to ask 
the women from The Truth why children shot children, why there was, or seemed to be, a 
trend, and what could be done to stop them in the future...But the women from the Truth were 
kind of spooky” (280). Peta intuits that the women are themselves victims: “Peta guessed or 
suspected that what bound the women to The Truth, and to each other, was that they had all 
lost children in school shootings” (280). Peta is responding to visible cues that signal their 
experience of trauma: “They had a wounded, disemboweled look, and a Moonie farawayness 
in the eyes” (280). Her reaction to the women is visceral; the thought of their loss triggers 
fear, and, in fact, “the phrase itself, school shooting, made her kind of sick” (280, italics in 
the original). Briefly, she puts herself, and by extension, the reader, in the the shoes of these 
mothers: “For a moment Peta felt for them. It's Kai ten years from now who dies in the 
hallway with the others. It was fully real to her for as long as she could stand it, a moment 
and no more” (280-1). This brief discussion buried in the description of a political campaign 
appears to be a rather obvious device to bring home the real impact of Monster Todd and the 
reasons why it may not be ethical to create such a monster in a video game. The Mothers for 
the Truth are representatives of the potential victims should Jens' game inspire violence. In 
fact, Costello almost replicates the story line of the game itself in his description, writing: 
“There had been a rash of shootings that year and the year before, one in Oregon, one or 
maybe more in Southern California. Peta saw the stories in the paper, on TV, children 
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shooting children after study hall, parents asking why. There was always at least one hero 
story in the mix, the brave teacher who disarmed the kid or led the other kids to safety 
through a locker room” (280). The game would let the players play the role of the hero. Jens' 
game is no longer some abstract proposition or some avenue to riches; it becomes a potential 
threat to his own child, Kai.
The stage is set for a classic literary dilemma in which the character must choose the 
right path: “Jens had come to see his father's point. BigIf was immoral or amoral – the sheer 
scale of the killing, the product tie-ins with the frequent-flier miles, and the sinister new 
monsters (Postal Worker, Todd), the ones who look like us. This was the case for quitting. On 
the other hand, Jens knew it made no sense to leave BigIf now, after all his work, with his 
options vested” (292). As Jens struggles with the decision, he turns to his sister to help him 
sort it out, telling her about his conversation with Walter: “'He told me I had to quit. Quit? 
This game is my chance to make some real money. I'm not greedy, but I'd like to get out of 
the rat race, have more time with Kai, maybe see Peta not have to work so hard, so she's not a 
zombie every night. I'd like to do some pure research – and, yes, maybe really leave my mark 
with something great. Are these wrong things to want?'” (258, italics in the original). Vi 
assures him that it is not wrong to want these things, but he continues to try to justify himself 
to her: “'I know the game itself, the stuff you see, the monsters and the plugs for snow 
blowers and frequent-flier-mile tie-ins – well, it's pretty bad. But the code, the engineering – 
that's totally different. I don't expect him to understand the beauty, or frankly the honor, of 
the engineering. But I do expect him to trust me, trust my judgment'” (258, italics in the 
original). Jens tries to argue that his motivations are more serious than mere financial gain: 
“'Dad thought I wanted the money 'cause I wanted yachts and sports cars. And if that's your 
motivation, then sure, working at BigIf is probably pretty shameful. But I've never been that 
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way. And that's what hurt me when he said I had to quit'” (258). Vi offers no guidance about 
his ethical choice, but instead tries to heal his anger toward his father: “'Give Walter a break. 
The guy was human, big surprise. If you're happy in your life, what difference does it 
make?'” (259). After Jens speaks with Vi, the reader is left waiting at the crossroads, not 
knowing which direction Jens will take, with the stakes clearly illustrated: “He had joined the 
game to make cool objects out of software, and, yes, for the money and the options, the 
chance to cash out young and return to pure research. He had built BigIf with Naubeck and 
the others, and his options were waiting for the IPO, and everything was good, but was it 
what he wanted? He was undecided” (291).
As the reader contemplates Jens' quandary, it seems almost inevitable that he will 
have to make the “right” choice, the “good” choice, that he will have to honor his father's 
wishes and leave the game, give up the money, and be the self-sacrificing hero of literature 
we all know and love. Yet, what follows is almost shocking. Jens begins to lean in the other 
direction, focusing on his own self interest:
Jens had tried to tell his father that it didn't matter that the code was for a war game. 
Walter didn't understand, of course. How could he? He wasn't there the night they 
wrote the sun. Jens thought of Vi at the house. He thought of what she had said – not 
everything in your life has to do with you. He hadn't understood it at the time, but 
now he thought that she'd meant that he ought to mind his own life and family, and 
not worry about BigIf, and whether it was good or bad, perfect or imperfect, the 
cartoons or the code. Give yourself a break, give Walter a break, don't worry about 
purity, just live. Peta could have said the same thing probably, but from Vi it carried 
weight. (294)
After all the deliberation and worry, Jens goes into work and speaks to Meredith, his boss, 
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who had fired his colleague Naubeck, and threatened to fire him. He apologizes to her for his 
recent behavior: “'I admit I lost my head and I apologize for that. And I just wanted to make 
sure that we're fine, you and me, with our relationship. I know I haven't been the most 
productive member of the team either. Hell, I'll say it Meredith: I've been in a slump. Monster 
Todd – he troubles me'” (295). The opportunity for Jens to make an impassioned plea against 
Monster Todd has arrived, but instead Jens acknowledges the economic realities of his 
situation: “'I didn't come to pick a fight or grovel. I know we're living in the marketplace – 
that's fine and I accept it'” (295). Here, he accepts the reality of his position as an employee 
in a capitalist economy and says it's “fine.” Instead of refusing to create the unethical monster 
or trying to talk Meredith out of creating it, he relinquishes his moral qualms, saying,  “'I 
couldn't work or I couldn't work on Todd. It was like flu bug, Meredith, like a three-day flu, a 
head cold, a nothing stupid kind of thing, and yet you're totally wiped out, you're good for 
nothing, and there's nothing you can do but wait until it clears. What I came to say is that it 
cleared. Now I'm better. I feel like I can work and that's why I thought I ought to clear the 
air'” (296). 
After all the buildup, this passage is anti-climactic – there is no heroic moment of 
self-sacrifice, no speech of moral condemnation, no defiance of authority. Jens accepts his 
position in a capitalist marketplace and acts in his own self-interest despite the potential 
danger this might pose to society and even his own child. The decision is not portrayed as an 
act of cowardice and no character condemns it. Instead, Jens gains a sense of peace, going to 
Peta's office to tell her of his choice: “Jens had come to tell Peta that everything was going to 
be all right now. He felt it in his chest as he waited in the hall, new health and peace. He 
would get back to work and finish Monster Todd, the school shooter whom other kids could 
hunt through the halls” (298). Jens has chosen his own happiness and his own financial 
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success over abstract duty to a humanism embraced by his father. Earlier in the book, as Vi 
contemplated her father's defacing of the dollar to replace “God” with “us,” she offers us an 
alternative perspective on his views that foreshadows Jens' decision: “She knew he hadn't 
meant that we trust in the U.S., the United States, a unit of community meaninglessly large. 
No, he'd meant that we should trust in a small town, in the people of a town, or maybe just 
the people that you know” (39). Walter's humanism is reduced to a manageable size, to the 
“people that you know,” and the duty to the unknown public that has robbed Vi and her 
colleagues of their personal lives is replaced with taking care of yourself and your family. 
The ethics of selfishness has prevailed.
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5. A Higher Power
The world shifted, catching lots of smart people off guard, churning up 
issues you had thought settled forever beneath the earth's crust. The more 
sophisticated you are, the more annotated your mental life, the more taken 
aback you're likely to feel, seeing what the world's lurch has brought to light, 
thrusting up beliefs and desires you had assumed belonged to an earlier stage 
of human development.
What is this stuff, you ask one another, and how can it still be kicking 
around, given how much we already know? It looks like the kind of relics that 
archaeologists dig up and dust off, speculating about the beliefs that had once 
animated them, to the best that they can be reconstructed, gone as they are 
now, those thrashings of proto-rationality and mythico-magical hypothesizing, 
and nearly forgotten.
Now it's all gone unforgotten, and minds that have better things to 
think about have to divert precious neuronal resources to figuring out how to 
knock some sense back into the species. It's a tiresome proposition, having to 
take up the work of the Enlightenment all over again, but it's happened on 
your watch. (Goldstein 4-5)
5.1 Introduction
The above passage opens Rebecca Newberger Goldstein's novel 36 Arguments for the 
Existence of God (2010). Goldstein proposes a “shift” that has brought back something we 
had thought buried – something she identifies as pre-Enlightenment that must be 
“reconstructed” to be understood. From the title of her novel, and her description of this shift 
as “proto-rationality and mythico-magical hypothesizing,” we can infer that she is referring 
to the return of religious belief. The novel's protagonist, Cass Seltzer, is a psychologist who 
specializes in the psychology of religion, and is described as “the William James for the 
twenty-first century” (58). In the novel, Goldstein explores how religion can provide ethical 
certainty and structure even in a world where religion is supposedly obsolete. This novel is 
only one of a wide range of novels exploring this theme, many of which directly cite William 
James or draw from his ideas. In the following argument, I'll try to suggest why James' 
pragmatist concept of religion can thrive in a postmodern environment. This will be followed 
by readings of two novels that will attempt to illustrate how this Jamesian concept of religion 
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is being explored in contemporary fiction.
The postmodern condition, as Lyotard famously pronounced, is characterized by 
“incredulity toward metanarratives” (xxiv): we no longer accept the totalizing truth systems 
prevalent during modernity, replacing them instead with with a number of smaller narratives. 
Another way of describing this would be to say we move from a monistic concept of “reality” 
or “truth” to a pluralistic view of “worlds” or “truths.” This loss of the absolute might seem to 
pose a threat to most religious systems, which usually lay claim to direct access to some 
plane of higher, universal truth, so how can religious belief be returning in such a 
philosophical environment? Shouldn't the kind of skepticism described by Lyotard be 
inimical to religious belief? 
Actually, some postmodern theologists have seen the pluralism and multiple truths of 
postmodernity as an opportunity. In The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology 
(2003), Kevin J. Vanhoozer points out that postmodernity calls for “the return of the 
repressed” and the “embrace of the 'other'” (32) as part of its critique of modernity, since the 
creation of universalist thought systems requires disregarding or eliminating anything that 
doesn't fit the system. Vanhoozer goes on to claim that “one candidate for 'most repressed 
other' in modernity is religion” (32). The development of scientific, non-religious ontology by 
biologists, chemists, and physicists; the widespread implementation of secular government 
and education; and the philosophical implications of Nietzsche's proclamation that “God is 
dead” relegated religious faith to “the margins of private preference” (32), as Vanhoozer 
describes it. If we accept, then, that religious belief was marginalized during modernity, the 
emergence of postmodernity opens the door to a return of religion, or as theologian Graham 
Ward puts it: “The emergence of the postmodern has fostered post-secular thinking” (qtd. in 
Vanhoozer 32). The pluralism inherent in postmodernism represents an opportunity for 
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religion to regain equal standing with science and secular thought, since it eliminates the need 
for the reconciliation of conflicting narratives that plagued theologians during the modern 
era. The acceptance of multiple simultaneous truths means that religion, science, and secular 
thought can co-exist peacefully without the need for a universalizing metanarrative.
If postmodernity removes the certainty of the absolute, alerting us to the fact that our 
truths and our concepts of reality are constructed and contingent on innumerable factors such 
as class, race, gender, nationality and so forth, and helping us to emancipate ourselves from 
discursive power structures; it offers little in the way of guidance about how to navigate the 
resulting sea of uncertainty. If all systems of ethics are culturally contingent and manipulable 
by hegemony, then how is the postmodern subject supposed to make real-world decisions 
about how to live? If both our perceptions and our interpretations of those perceptions are 
suspect, then decision-making becomes nearly impossible. Ethical structures, such as those 
contained in most religions, provide guidelines on how to act, and thus ease the quandaries 
inherent in the postmodern perspective, although, of course, these structures remain every bit 
as problematic as ever. Taking advantage of the postmodern turn to plurality, postmodern 
subjects can adopt and incorporate religious ethical structures without needing to reconcile 
them with other constructions of reality, including those offered by postmodernism itself.
 Of course, in order to accomplish this, we would need a concept of religion that 
relinquishes claims to universality; one that accepts the contingencies of individual 
experience, and tolerates other “truths.” Such a vision of religious belief is offered in James' 
The Varieties of Religious Experience, which is why I believe this book has become a key 
text for contemporary writers. For James, a belief is “true” if it is useful or good to believe: 
“The True is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief” (Pragmatism 
42, italics in the original). For James, this adoption of a functional truth serves an ethical 
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purpose, helping us to lead a better life: “[I]f there be any life that it is really better we should 
lead, and if there be any idea which, if believed in, would help us to lead that life, then it 
would be really better for us to believe in that idea” (42, italics in the original). He extends 
this concept to religious belief as well, “If theological ideas prove to have a value for 
concrete life, they will be true, for pragmatism, in the sense of being good for so much. For 
how much more they are true, will depend entirely on their relations to the other truths that 
also have to be acknowledged” (40, italics in the original), as he expressed it in his seminal 
book, Pragmatism (1907). Thus, as we can see, a pragmatist conception of religion fulfills 
the demands we outlined earlier: it serves the purpose of providing ethical value while at the 
same time retaining a pluralist concept of truth, allowing the simultaneous embrace of 
scientific and secular beliefs. James' version of religious belief could be embraced by a 
postmodern subject in need of ethical structure.
In The Varieties of Religious Experience, we find a whole range of ideas that will 
reappear a century later in contemporary fiction. James examines religion as a personal 
matter, excluding specific dogmas, organizations, or symbols, and instead focusing on 
individual experience. He proposes that religious experiences can effect personal 
transformation, leading the immoral to adhere to strict ethical codes, the dejected to become 
hopeful and motivated, the selfish to become saintlike in their selflessness, and the fearful to 
gain courage. It matters not to James whether a vision of God, for example, is “real” or 
merely a hallucination caused by neurological dysfunction or intoxicating substances – its 
“truth” lies in the impact of the experience. This approach to religion closely aligns with 
numerous contemporary novels in which dejected, hopeless, indecisive, and self-destructive 
characters have some kind of religious experience and subsequently achieve ethical 
transformation. Among these novels I count Infinite Jest (1996) by David Foster Wallace, 
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Thumbsucker (1999) by Walter Kirn, Indecision (2005) by Benjamin Kunkel, This Book Will 
Save Your Life (2006) by A.M. Holmes, and Luminarium (2012) by Alex Shakar, in addition 
to the two novels I will read shortly.
Before I begin with that, I would like to examine a few concepts that I will identify in 
the following close readings that are drawn from James. First of all, James offers a purely 
pragmatist definition of religion, created to avoid dispute over dogma: “[T]he feelings, acts, 
and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to 
stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine” (Varieties 42). The “divine” he 
defines as: “any object that is godlike, whether it be a concrete deity or not” (45, italics in the 
original), and he further parses “godlike” by defining it as that which is “most primal and 
enveloping and deeply true” (45). We can see that James' definition of religion is vague and 
individual, and does not refer to any specific dogma, but rather allows each individual to 
form his or own conclusion about the divine. He frequently refers to this godlike object as a 
“higher power” or “higher powers.” James explores what he describes as mind-cure: “[T]he 
intuitive belief in the all-saving power of healthy-minded attitudes as such, in the conquering 
efficacy of courage, hope, and trust” (90). This curative effect of positive thinking can also be 
attained through religious belief if we believe “that a higher power will take care of us in 
certain ways better than we can take care of ourselves, if we only genuinely throw ourselves 
upon it and consent to use it” (108). Thus, the belief in a higher power serves a practical 
function in helping to maintain a healthy-minded attitude and reap the physical and 
psychological benefits of this attitude.
James catalogs and describes a wide range of religious experiences which I do not 
have space to recite here, but I would like to provide a glimpse some of their qualities. For 
example, James names four characteristics of mystical states of consciousness. First, they are 
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ineffable: “[I]ts quality must be directly experienced; it cannot be imparted or transferred to 
others” (300). Next, they have a noetic quality, they “are states of insight into depths of truth 
unplumbed by the discursive intellect. They are illuminations, revelations, full of significance 
and importance” (300). Third, they are transient: “Except in rare instances, half an hour, or at 
most an hour or two, seem to be the limit beyond which they fade into the light of common 
day” (300). And, finally, they are experienced passively: “Although the oncoming of mystical 
states may be facilitated by preliminary voluntary operations...the mystic feels as if his own 
will were in abeyance” (300). Furthermore, James goes to great lengths to give examples of 
people experiencing a “presence” of some kind that cannot be perceived through the senses: 
“Probably every religious person has the recollection of a particular crisis in which a directer 
vision of the truth, a direct perception, perhaps, of a living God's existence, swept in and 
overwhelmed the languor of more ordinary belief” (68). These descriptions of religious 
experiences echo the experiences of characters in the novels I will examine next.
5.2 The Marriage Plot by Jeffery Eugenides
In The Marriage Plot (2011), Jefferey Eugenides explores how a pragmatist approach to 
religion can help solve the ethical weaknesses of postmodernism. The novel begins with an 
extended critique of postmodern theory and its rise to popularity in the American academic 
world that runs for over 100 pages. The three main characters, Madeleine Hanna, Mitchell 
Grammaticus, and Leonard Bankhead, are all depicted as critical and disapproving of 
postmodern theory. Mitchell Grammaticus, whose Greek ancestry and name make him a 
logical stand-in for the author, decides to change his major from English to Religious Studies 
after reading William James' The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902), and this book 
forms a basis for his thinking throughout Eugenides' novel. Mitchell's pragmatist religious 
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approach leads him on a spiritual quest whose purpose seems to be ethical in nature. Mitchell 
attempts to enact an ethics of being for the other, but fails. Only after a religious experience 
of the kind described by William James leads him to make the right choice in his relationship 
with Madeleine does Mitchell believe he can live ethically. Leonard Bankhead, who suffers 
from bipolar disorder, has a psychotic episode, which he interprets as a religious experience, 
and ends up making a choice similar to Mitchell's. Eugenides' novel, although ostensibly 
about a love triangle among college students in the 1980s, is also a meditation on the state of 
the novel, as the title suggests. The resolution of the characters' ethical problems is also 
portrayed as a solution to the problems facing literature. Thus, the pragmatist approach to 
religion appears to be a solution for both the problems of postmodernity and the postmodern 
novel as well.
The first approximately 100 pages of The Marriage Plot are primarily concerned with 
the narrative of Madeleine Hanna, an English major at Brown University. Madeleine is 
associated with and defined by her relationship with literature from the opening sentence of 
the novel: “To start with, look at all the books” (3), after which her reading tastes are 
cataloged. Aside from setting up the plot of the love triangle with Leonard and Mitchell, 
many of these pages present an extensive critique of the postmodern theory Madeleine 
encounters during her studies. Early on, we are informed that “[t]he wholesome, patriotic 
values of her parent's generation were now on the ash heap of history, replaced by a nihilistic, 
post-punk sensibility that Madeleine herself didn't understand” (9). The “wholesome” values 
of her parents have been displaced by a nihilism that Madeleine doesn't understand, leaving 
her with a “feeling of being out of step for this day and the rest of her life” (13). Although at 
this stage, postmodern theory has yet to be evoked, the scene is being set to launch an explicit 
attack that goes on to name names. Even the romantic plot that serves as the structure of the 
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novel employs a critique of postmodern theory at certain points. For example, we are told, 
“Madeleine's love troubles began at a time when the French theory she was reading 
deconstructed the very notion of love” (24). It later becomes clear that “she had an unhealthy 
obsession with A Lover's Discourse” (99), Roland Barthes' postmodern deconstruction of 
love. This book in particular comes in for a heavy dose of criticism and is dismissed as 
ineffective. As Madeleine tries to cope with the difficulties in her love life, she uses a 
deconstructive approach that utterly fails: 
A Lover's Discourse was the perfect cure for lovesickness. It was a repair manual for 
the heart, its one tool the brain. If you used your head, if you became aware of how 
love was culturally constructed and began to see your symptoms as purely mental, if 
you recognized that being “in love” was only an idea, then you could liberate yourself 
from its tyranny. Madeleine knew all that. The problem was, it didn't work. She could 
read Barthes' deconstruction of love all day without feeling her love for Leonard 
diminish one bit. (100)
Here, deconstruction is shown to be ineffective, inapplicable to real world problems. This is 
further emphasized through the third-person indirect freestyle narrator's descriptions: “The 
magnolia trees hadn't read Roland Barthes. They didn't think love was a mental state; the 
magnolias insisted it was natural, perennial” (82).
We could dismiss this critique of Barthes as being merely connected to Madeleine's 
relationship struggles and not a critique of postmodern thought if this were the only instance 
of such criticism. However, other theorists and works receive a similar treatment. As 
Madeleine begins to encounter this trendy new literary theory, she displays skepticism: 
“Madeleine began hearing people saying 'Derrida.' She heard them saying 'Lyotard' and 
'Foucault' and 'Deleuze' and 'Baudrillard.' That most of these people were those she 
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instinctually disapproved of – upper-middle-class kids who wore Doc Martens and anarchist 
symbols – made Madeleine dubious about the value of their enthusiasm” (29). This 
dubiousness is echoed once again by the third-person narrator, who keeps quite close to 
Madeleine's viewpoint: “College wasn't like the real world. In the real world people dropped 
names based on their renown. In college, people dropped names based on their obscurity” 
(29). Here, the narrator suggests that the enthusiasm for postmodern theory was based on the 
obscurity of the theorists and not on their “real world” accomplishments, and that it amounted 
to nothing more than a kind of name-dropping. When Madeleine finally decides to take 
Semiotics 211, the course focusing on postmodern theory, she does so for social, rather than 
intellectual reasons: “Madeleine had always been popular at school. Years of being popular 
had left her with the reflexive ability to separate the cool from the uncool, even within 
subgroups, like the English department, where the concept of cool didn't appear to obtain” 
(30). 
Semiotics 211 is led by professor Michael Zipperstein, a former New Critic, who had 
turned to postmodern theory after “he'd met Roland Barthes at a dinner party and been 
converted, over cassoulet, to the new faith” (24). Although he is described as having a “guru's 
dome and beard” (25), Zipperstein and his course are treated as skeptically as the other 
postmodernists. Rather than being swayed by its academic or intellectual value, we are told 
that the appeal of semiotics was social: “Going to college in the moneymaking eighties 
lacked a certain radicalism. Semiotics was the first thing that smacked of revolution” (30). 
However, there is no indication that the revolutionary quality of postmodern theory was 
desirable for political reasons, but rather, “[s]emiotics was the form Zipperstein's midlife 
crisis had taken. Becoming a semiotician allowed Zipperstein to wear a leather jacket, to fly 
off to Douglas Sirk retrospectives in Vancouver, and to get all the sexy waifs in his classes” 
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(61). So, Zipperstein is mostly concerned with his image, and it is implied, his interest in 
semiotics has more to do with his ego than with scholarship: “Instead of leaving his wife, 
Zipperstein had left the English Department. Instead of buying a sports car, he'd bought 
deconstruction” (61). Although this withering commentary might seem to be enough criticism 
for poor Zipperstein, Eugenides makes sure we get the message. After assigning his own 
book, The Making of Signs, to the class, we are told, “Even Madeleine, who found all the 
reading hard-going, could tell that Zipperstein's contribution to the field was reformulative 
and second-tier” (32). If we are not yet sure that Zipperstein is to be held in contempt, the 
coup de grace comes when Thurston Meems, the novel's representative semiotics student, 
pronounces his judgment: “'Zipperstein's sort of brain-dead, don't you think?'” (109). After 
Madeleine complains that Zipperstein “never says anything” (109), Meems agrees, “'He's 
inscrutable. He's like Harpo Marx without the horn'” (109). Although I am personally a fan of 
Harpo Marx, this is hardly a ringing endorsement of a university professor.
Madeleine's reactions to the reading selections in Semiotics 211 continue this vein of 
criticism. The reading selections, we are told, “were eccentric if not downright arbitrary” 
(32). Madeleine finds the texts unrewarding: “In Week Four, Zipperstein assigned Umberto 
Eco's The Role of the Reader. It hadn't done much for Madeleine. She wasn't all that 
interested, as a reader, in the reader. She was still partial to that increasingly eclipsed entity: 
the writer” (53). This leads her to make a judgment on the entire field of semiotics: 
“Madeleine had a feeling that most semiotic theorists had been unpopular as children, often 
bullied or overlooked, and so had directed their lingering rage onto literature” (53). Finally, 
she finds a text that she likes, Jonathan Culler's On Deconstruction, only to find it dismissed 
by Thurston Meems. She argues, “'Maybe it's just me, but wasn't it a relief to read a logical 
argument for once?'” (54). Her reaction to Derrida's Of Grammatology is less than 
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enthusiastic: 
Since Derrida claimed that language, by its very nature, undermined any meaning it 
attempted to promote, Madeleine wondered how Derrida expected her to get his 
meaning. Maybe he didn't. That was why he deployed so much arcane terminology, so 
many loop-de-looping clauses. That was why he said what he said in sentences it took 
a minute to identify the subject of. (59-60)
This point is emphasized by direct citations of Derrida, mocking his writing, “Could 'the 
access to pluridimensionality and to a delinearized temporality' really be a subject?” (60). 
After Semiotics 211, Madeleine flees to the library to read nineteenth-century novels, “to 
restore herself to sanity” (60); the implication being that postmodern theory is driving her 
insane. Madeleine definitely prefers reading a well-constructed novel: “How wonderful it 
was when one sentence followed logically from the sentence before! What exquisite guilt she 
felt, wickedly enjoying narrative!” (60).
We could choose to see this extended critique of postmodern theory as merely 
representative of Madeleine's viewpoint, and dismiss her as perhaps too conservative or too 
conventional to appreciate postmodernism, if it weren't for the fact that the other two main 
characters of the novel also reject it. In fact, it is this distaste for postmodern theory that 
brings Leonard and Madeleine together, launching the main plot of the novel. During a 
discussion of Peter Handke's A Sorrow Beyond Dreams (1972), Thurston Meems praises the 
author's remorseless fictionalization of his mother's suicide, and the narrator tells us of 
Meems: “He aspired to be a person who would react to his own mother's suicide with high-
literary remorselessness, and his soft, young face lit up with pleasure” (33). Leonard makes 
his first speaking appearance in the novel by criticizing this response, commenting, 
“'[W]asn't anyone put off by Handke's so-called remorselessness? Didn't this book strike 
Allen 158
anyone as a tad cold?'” (34). During the back and forth between Meems and Leonard, in 
which Meems states that “'[b]ooks aren't about 'real life.' Books are about other books'” (35), 
and Leonard remarks, “'[I]f your mother kills herself it's not a literary trope'” (35), Madeleine 
finds herself rejecting Meems' views and being attracted to Leonard. Madeleine's first social 
encounter with Leonard comes after she complains to him about not coming to her aid during 
a classroom discussion. “'I thought you were on my side'” (55), she tells him. When Leonard 
misses a week of class, it means that “Madeleine was left to contend with semiotics, and with 
Zipperstein and his disciples, all by herself” (59). These early encounters serve to place 
Madeleine and Leonard together in opposition to Zipperstein and his followers, and thus in 
opposition to postmodern theory. This is what unites them. Leonard openly expresses his 
distaste for semiotics, saying, “'I didn't get interested in philosophy because of linguistics. I 
got interested for the eternal verities. To learn how to die, et cetera. Now it's more like, 'What 
do we mean when we say we die?' 'What do we mean we mean when we say we die?' '” (57-
8, italics in the original).
Complicating matters somewhat is the description of Leonard that Eugenides offers. 
Leonard, a genius with a double major who suffers from mental illness, has long hair, wears a 
bandanna, chews tobacco, is rather large, speaks in a soft, delicate voice, shaves irregularly, 
and has “St. Bernard's eyes” (51) matches a detailed description of David Foster Wallace. 
Leonard even wears Timberland boots, just as Wallace was known to do. An early scene 
describes him as having his hair “in a masculine ponytail like a Scottish warrior” (63). This 
seems like a reference to William Wallace, the hero of Braveheart (1995), whom David 
Foster Wallace, perhaps jokingly, once claimed as an ancestor (Lipsky 168). Another 
giveaway is the description of a picture of Leonard “standing in a snowy field, wearing a 
comically tall stocking cap” (Eugenides 115), which matches the dust jacket photo of 
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Wallace's book, A Supposedly Fun Thing I'll Never Do Again (1997), which happens to boast 
an endorsement from Jefferey Eugenides on its cover. However, Eugenides has repeatedly 
denied that Leonard is based on Wallace, and so we are left to either disbelieve the author, 
whose character in a novel about the state of the novel is a nearly exact replica of one of his 
generation's most important novelists, or to assume that Eugenides, whose alter ego in the 
book, Mitchell Grammaticus, competes with Leonard for Madeleine's affections, has some 
major Freudian issues to work out. I actually believe the latter scenario to be more 
interesting, but I think it is clear that the uncanny resemblance between Leonard and Wallace 
is too obvious to be accidental, especially in a novel as meticulously constructed as The 
Marriage Plot. In any case, it complicates the character of Leonard, adding a layer of subtext 
to his scenes. When Madeleine sees Leonard's apartment, the narrator tells us, “The 
apartment had a message. The message said: I am an orphan” (76). This word choice is 
unusual because Leonard, although he comes from a dysfunctional family, is not actually an 
orphan. However, Wallace once stated in a famous interview, “The postmodern founders' 
patricidal work was great, but patricide produces orphans, and no amount of revelry can 
make up for the fact that writers my age have been literary orphans throughout our formative 
years” (McCaffery 150). Add to this the description of Billy, a young man Madeleine briefly 
dates: “On the wall of his living room Billy had painted the words Kill the Father. Killing the 
father was what, in Billy's opinion, college was all about” (Eugenides 39, italics in the 
original). Billy, a filmmaker, claims his father is Godard, the French director, indicating to us 
that the patricide he is advocating is artistic. Viewing scenes like this through the filter of 
Wallace's words and seeing Leonard as a stand-in for Wallace adds an extra layer of meaning 
to some parts of the novel, connecting Leonard to Wallace's very public criticism of 
postmodernism. These speculations reinforce my argument, so I choose to include them here, 
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but they are not essential – Madeleine and Leonard both reject postmodern theory even if we 
choose to accept Eugenides' denials.
The third major character, Mitchell Grammaticus, spends less time contending 
directly with postmodernism, but this is because he decides not to study English: “Like 
Madeleine, Mitchell had started out intending to be an English major. But after reading The 
Varieties of Religious Experience for a psychology course, he'd changed his mind” (117). 
Inspired by William James and his pragmatist examination of religious experience, he 
chooses Religious Studies instead. Yet, Mitchell also responds to postmodern theory with 
skepticism. During his trip to Paris, he and his college roommate, Larry, stay with Larry's 
girlfriend, Claire, who is studying in Paris. Claire is introduced holding a copy of New 
French Feminisms, whose “austere cover bore a regiment of names. Julia Kristeva. Hélène 
Cixous. Kate Millett” (172). Claire is thus directly associated with postmodern feminist 
theory. And yet, the narrator undermines Claire's commitment to feminism with descriptions 
like this: “Though auditing a class at the Sorbonne taught by Luce Irigary and titled The 
Mother-Daughter Relationship: The Darkest of Dark Continents, Claire had followed 
maternal example by setting out guest towels” (170). Here, a simple description of guest 
towels is used as an opportunity to ironize Claire's relationship to postmodern theory. As with 
Professor Zipperstein, the narrator attributes Claire's interest in theory to fashion, as we are 
told that “[u]nder the pretense of becoming a critic of patriarchy, Claire uncritically accepted 
every fashionable theory that came her way” (181). Mitchell immediately comes into conflict 
with Claire over her enthusiasm for postmodern theory. Upon finding out that Mitchell had 
studied religion, she begins criticizing religion for its sexism. Mitchell attempts to engage in 
conversation with her, offering her explanations he had learned, and even agreeing with her. 
Claire continues arguing. Finally, after Claire condemns her mother's performance of a mikva 
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(a ritual bath to cleanse the body after menstruation), she says, “'The whole institutionalized 
form of Western religion is all about telling women they're inferior, unclean, and subordinate 
to men. And if you actually believe in any of that stuff, I don't know what to say'” (175). At 
this point, Mitchell loses his patience, and replies, “'You're not having your period right now, 
are you?'” (175). This scene is important, not just because it sets up a conflict with Claire, but 
also because it reveals Mitchell's internal weaknesses in the way he regards women, 
triggering a self-examination of his attitude toward them. The conflicts with Claire continue, 
as she mocks him for reading Hemingway. Mitchell rejects her view: “He was perfectly 
aware that certain once-canonical writers (always male, always white) had fallen into 
disrepute. Hemingway was a misogynist, a homophobe, a repressed homosexual, a murderer 
of wild animals. Mitchell thought this was an instance of tarring with too wide a brush” 
(178). Eventually, Mitchell decides to leave Larry and Claire alone and stay in a hotel 
instead, even though it strained his budget to do so: “Mitchell was glad to be out of her 
apartment. He was happy to be out in the rain! It was worth it to pay for a hotel if it meant 
not listening to Claire spout her platitudes for one more second!” (181). Here, Claire's 
feminist views are dismissed as platitudes, and Mitchell is happy that he no longer has to 
listen to them.
The conflict with Claire does lead Mitchell to a reconsideration of his own behavior 
and attitudes. Yet, although he questions whether “he wasn't being just as knee-jerk in 
resisting the charge of misogyny as college feminists were in leveling it, and if his resistance 
didn't mean that he was, somewhere deep down, prone to misogyny himself” (178), Mitchell 
continues rejecting postmodern theory, arguing to himself that “[c]ollege feminists made fun 
of skyscrapers, saying they were phallic symbols. They said the same thing about space 
rockets, even though, if you stopped to think about it, rockets were shaped the way they were 
Allen 162
not because of phallocentrism, but because of aerodynamics. Would a vagina-shaped Apollo 
11 have made it to the moon?” (201). Finally, he begins to question his desire for Madeleine, 
asking, “[H]ow much of his desire to marry Madeleine came from really and truly liking her 
as a person, and how much from the wish to possess her, and, in so doing, gratify his ego?” 
(203). He imagines a solution to the fact that “it was probably true that he objectified 
women” (201). This solution, however, does not come from postmodern theory, despite the 
fact that his response to Claire's arguments has led him to be more critical of his own views. 
Rather, his solution is drawn from his religious studies: “The more Mitchell read about 
religions, the world religions in general and Christianity in particular, the more he realized 
that the mystics were all saying the same thing. Enlightenment came from the extinction of 
desire” (202). This is a key scene, as it foreshadows his decision to relinquish his pursuit of 
Madeleine; however, at this point in the novel, he is not yet able to accomplish this, despite 
that fact that “[h]e was sick of craving, of wanting, of hoping, of losing” (203).
Mitchell's pragmatist approach to religion is what leads him to eventually be able to 
make this decision, and at this point, I'd like to examine the novel's exploration of this 
approach. We have already seen that Mitchell changed his major to Religious Studies because 
of William James' The Varieties of Religious Experience, and this pragmatist classic informs 
not just Mitchell's way of thinking, but much of the novel, as well. After a one-page summary 
of the book and a description of its importance to Mitchell, we are told that “Mitchell kept 
coming back to a paragraph about the neurotic temperament he'd underlined that seemed to 
describe his own personality, and, at the same time, to make him feel better about it” (118). 
This is followed by a nearly page-long quote, in which James contrasts the neurotic 
temperament with the healthy-minded one, suggesting that the neurotic “'have the 
emotionality which is the sine qua non of moral perception'” (qtd in Eugenides 118). Here, 
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we can see the direct link Eugenides makes between ethics/morality and James' pragmatist 
examination of religious experience, giving Mitchell a path to moral perception, and thus, 
ethical decision-making. 
This passage is followed by a detailed description of Mitchell's religious studies that 
sharply contrasts with Madeleine and Leonard's experiences with postmodern theory. Here, 
Mitchell meets Professor Hermann Richter, who “had the reassuring attributes of Mitchell's 
own father – the diligence, the sobriety, the masculinity – while leading a life of unfatherly 
intellectual cultivation” (119). Richter stands in sharp contrast to the postmodernist Professor 
Zipperstein, who, remember, was compared to Harpo Marx without a horn. Richter “seemed 
worldlier than most professors and less ideologically programmed” (119) and “[i]t was 
impossible to imagine him as a boy” (119). In contrast to Zipperstein's indifference in the 
classroom, “Mitchell observed Richter's thoroughness, his compassionate revelation of error, 
his undimmed enthusiasm for presiding over the uncluttering of the twenty or so minds 
gathered around the seminar table. Getting these kids' heads in working order even now, so 
late in the game” (120). Richter took a scientific approach to examining religion, looking 
“unflinchingly at the reasons why the Christian faith had, around the year 1848, expired” 
(119). So Richter is anything but a dogmatic believer, and still, he “insisted that 
unquestioning nihilism was no more intellectually sound than unquestioning faith. It was 
possible to pick over the corpse of Christianity, to pound its chest and blow into its mouth, to 
see if the heart started beating again” (120). The extraordinary image of resurrecting a 
religion whose primary motif centers around resurrection is an apt metaphor for the 
pragmatic approach that has appeared increasingly since the postmodern era began drawing 
to a close. Richter, whose name is the German word for “judge,” assesses religion to see what 
is still viable and what is not.
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Unlike Madeleine, who graduates feeling out of step and without a plan for her life, 
Mitchell believes that his education has value. While taking his final exam, “he felt, for the 
first time, as though he weren't in school anymore. He wasn't answering questions to get a 
grade on a test. He was trying to diagnose the predicament he felt himself to be in” (121). He 
believes that it was “not just his predicament, either, but that of everyone he knew” (121, 
italics in the original). This generational predicament was a struggle to fill the void left by the 
absence of religion: “Everyone he knew was convinced that religion was a sham and God a 
fiction. But his friends' replacements for religion didn't look too impressive. No one had an 
answer for the riddle of existence” (121). As this section of the novel takes place during 
postmodernism's heyday, the comment about “replacements for religion” seems directed at 
postmodern theory. During his exam, Mitchell applies the pragmatist approach: “As he 
responded to the essay questions, Mitchell kept bending his answers toward their practical 
application. He wanted to know why he was here, and how to live” (121). The narrator sums 
up his education with the pronouncement: “It was the perfect way to end your college career. 
Education had finally led Mitchell out into life” (121). When Mitchell graduates, he sees 
“Herr Doktor Professor [sic] Richter prancing by, his face lit with a childlike joy it had never 
displayed in the seminar room for Religion and Alienation. As if Richter had found the cure 
for Alienation. As if he had beaten the odds of the age” (149). Richter is portrayed here as 
having solved the generational struggle Mitchell and his friends are grappling with. Unlike 
Zipperstein, he has the answers. The contrast with the portrayal of Madeleine's experiences in 
Semiotics 211 couldn't be more stark.
The pragmatist influence continues throughout the novel. For example, we are 
occasionally told about Mitchell's religious reading, and among the works described is Saint 
Teresa's Interior Castle (1577), which is one of a number of works mentioned that are also 
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examined in The Varieties of Religious Experience. What interested Mitchell about Interior 
Castle “wasn't so much imagery...but its practicality. The book was a guide for the spiritual 
life, told with great specificity” (257). Here, we see Mitchell attracted to the practical aspect 
of Saint Teresa's work, rather than its aesthetic qualities. Mitchell's religious search occurs 
not out of a deeply held belief in God's existence, but as a pragmatic attempt to explore the 
possibility of God's existence: “In stiff-backed pews, smelling candle wax, he closed his eyes 
and sat as still as possible, opening himself up to whatever was there that might be interested 
in him. Maybe there was nothing. But how would you ever know if you didn't send out a 
signal?” (255). When he is arguing with Claire, he offers her a pragmatist explanation for the 
tradition of portraying God as masculine: “I'm saying that for some people, tradition is good. 
For others it's not so important. Some people think God reveals Himself through history, 
others that revelation is progressive, that maybe the rules or interpretation changes over time” 
(174). He even goes so far as to suggest to her to alter her own conception of God: “'If you 
dislike a conception of God as masculine,' Mitchell said to Claire, 'why replace it with one 
that's feminine? Why not get rid of the whole idea of a gendered divinity?'” (174). Here, God 
is treated not as an absolute whose nature is fixed or dogmatic, but as a mere conception that 
we create ourselves – an approach very much inspired by James.
The influence of William James in the novel is not limited to Mitchell. Eugenides 
emphasizes the concept of a higher power during a portrayal of Leonard's time in a mental 
hospital. Although Leonard is not actually hospitalized for substance abuse issues but rather 
bipolar disorder, Eugenides steers the discussion to the kind of 12-step program that David 
Foster Wallace depicts in Infinite Jest: “Most of the patients with substance abuse problems 
had picked up the religious inclination of 12-step programs” (329). One of these patients, 
Darlene, is more developed than the other characters, and she is described as having used 
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religion to free herself from addiction: “By the time she was twenty, she was addicted to 
heroin and alcohol. To get off the heroin and alcohol, she'd gotten religion” (327). Although 
Darlene is a mentally ill addict, she and her religious inclinations are perceived by Leonard in 
a positive light: “Darlene didn't seem weak, credulous, or stupid. Though she often referred to 
her 'Higher Power,' and sometimes to 'my Higher Power that I choose to call God,' she 
seemed remarkably rational, intelligent, and nonjudgmental” (328). Here, William James' 
concept of a higher power is explicitly named, and the character using it is described as 
“rational” and “intelligent.” It helps to keep in mind Leonard's uncanny resemblance to David 
Foster Wallace, both physically and psychologically, and thus it comes as no surprise that the 
group therapy that Leonard experiences is portrayed as positively as the Alcoholics 
Anonymous meetings in Infinite Jest: “No one wanted to do or say anything that might hinder 
someone's recovery. In this way the unit was very unlike the world outside, and morally 
superior to it” (329). 
When Mitchell arrives in Calcutta to begin working with Mother Theresa, he admires 
a man known to us as only the “beekeeper”: “The beekeeper was a deeply sincere, deeply 
good person. If Mitchell was a sick soul, according to William James's categories, then the 
beekeeper was definitely healthy-minded” (391). This description is followed by a quote 
from William James about his concept of healthy-mindedness, once again demonstrating the 
extent of William James' influence on Mitchell's thinking. Descriptions of Madeleine also 
match the healthy-minded category that James introduces to us; for example, we are told that 
“[a]ll her life she'd avoided unbalanced people. She'd stayed away from the weird kids in 
elementary school. She'd avoided the gloomy, suicidal girls in high school who vomited up 
pills” (458). Rather, she “was pro-sunlight and anti-dust; she was for spring cleaning, for 
beating rugs over porch railings, for keeping your house or apartment as free of cobwebs and 
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grime as you kept your mind free of indecision or gloomy rumination” (348). This healthy-
mindedness is attributed to her upbringing: “Madeleine had never been close to anyone with a 
verifiable mental illness. She instinctively avoided unstable people. As uncharitable as this 
attitude was, it was part and parcel of being a Hanna, of being a positive, privileged, sheltered 
exemplary person” (154). These descriptions of Madeleine do not directly reference William 
James, but they are so similar to his concepts that they seem almost as if they had been taken 
out of his book. This is further proof that James' pragmatist account of religious experience 
serves not only to inform Mitchell's views, but also provides an intellectual framework for the 
novel as a whole.
Mitchell's criticism of his contemporaries mirrors criticism of postmodernism as being 
uncommitted and hedonistic: “He thought about the people he knew, with their excellent 
young bodies, their summerhouses, their cool clothes, their potent drugs, their liberalism, 
their orgasms, their haircuts. Everything they did was either pleasurable in itself or 
engineered to bring pleasure down the line” (258). In his quest to escape from this hedonistic 
self-absorption, Mitchell decides to travel to India to work with the nuns of Mother Teresa. 
His motivation for going to Calcutta is to achieve goodness, and the “healthy-minded” 
beekeeper becomes a model for him: “It was to be around people like the beekeeper that 
Mitchell had come to Calcutta, to see what they were like and to have their goodness rub off 
on him” (391). His attempts to help the sick are a deliberate attempt to live an ethics of being 
for the other: “Mitchell had never so much as changed a baby's diaper before. He'd never 
nursed a sick person, or seen anyone die, and now here he was, surrounded by a mass of 
dying people, and it was his job to help them die at peace, knowing they were loved” (375). 
He quickly realizes that this ethics is difficult to enact: “[B]y the end of the second week he 
had become uncomfortably aware that he was performing only the simplest, least demanding 
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tasks at the Home” (387). The unpleasant realities of actually sacrificing oneself to face the 
other's need begin to repel him: “He was afraid to bathe the men. He was scared of what their 
naked bodies might look like, of the diseases or wounds that might lie under their robes, and 
he was afraid of their bodily effluvia, of his hands touching their urine and excrement” (387). 
The descriptions of his struggle are punctuated by his encounters with other travelers, whose 
comments highlight his difficulties. A character named Rüdiger, for example, tells him, “'You 
think you are not a vain person. You are maybe not so much into your body. But you are 
probably more vain about how intelligent you are. Or how good you are'” (395, italics in the 
original). Rüdiger puts his finger on one of the biggest pitfalls of the postmodern ethics of 
being for the other: that the secret motivation of this ethical approach might actually be more 
about vanity than the actual need of the other. He tells Mitchell that this concern has been 
dealt with by Luther: “'The problem is, no matter how much we try to be good, we cannot be 
good enough. So Luther says you must be justified by faith'” (399). Some of the women 
volunteering share their gripes about the hard, thankless work, and one of them bemoans the 
loss of her freedom, saying, “'Can't I become a saint and go to the beach, too?'” (401). 
Interestingly, Mitchell's difficulties don't prevent him from deepening his religious 
explorations:
Mitchell's concern that he wasn't coming up to the mark of Kalighat coexisted, oddly 
enough, with a surge of real religious feeling on his part. Much of the time in Calcutta 
he was filled with an ecstatic tranquility, like a low-grade fever. His meditation 
practice had deepened. He experienced plunging sensations, as if moving at great 
speed. For whole minutes he forgot who he was. (396)
This description seems to put religious feeling, along with forgetting the self, into a different 
category than helping the other, so that Mitchell's failure to enact an ethics of being for the 
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other doesn't hinder him from religious experience. In fact, we are told that “he had got into 
the habit of walking around Calcutta in the presence of God” (397). Feeling the presence of a 
higher power is one of the primary experiences described in The Varieties of Religious 
Experience, and notice that here, it is not connected to helping others, but is rather a personal, 
internal experience. Finally, Mitchell musters the courage to do the dirty, difficult jobs, but 
during his first attempt, he encounters a man who desperately needs kidney dialysis, but 
cannot get it. When Mitchell offers to help him, he replies, “'I want to shit'” (405). Mitchell, 
unable to help him, and confronted with the prosaic, corporeal reality of illness, can take no 
more: “Already knowing that he would regret this moment for a long time, maybe for the rest 
of his life, and yet unable to resist the sweet impulse that ran through his every nerve, 
Mitchell headed to the front of the home, right past Matthew 25:40, and up the steps to the 
bright, fallen world above” (405). Mitchell abandons his attempt to live an ethics of the other, 
and leaves Calcutta to pursue his other obsession – his desire to marry Madeleine.
Upon returning to the U.S. from India, Mitchell quite conveniently runs into 
Madeleine and Leonard at a party. Leonard has been suffering from bipolar disorder and has 
recently been hospitalized for a manic episode; incidents that have put his marriage to 
Madeleine under tremendous strain. At the party, Leonard, remembering Mitchell from a 
religious studies course they had taken together, “began asking Mitchell about his own 
religious inclinations” (504). Mitchell, we are told, “provided testimony about his own 
specific variety of religious experience” (504). Notice the indirect reference to the title of 
William James' book. Leonard “listened intently, receptively. He appeared eager for any help 
Mitchell might provide” (504). Leonard then reveals that he has had an experience that he 
hasn't told anyone else about “because he hadn't been in his right mind at the time, and this 
tended to discredit the experience” (504-5). Leonard further reveals that “the vision, or 
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whatever it was, was the most awe-inspiring moment of his life. He said that it 'felt religious'” 
(505). The experience of flying off into space and floating past Saturn and then coming back 
to Earth, Leonard insists, “felt like the most lucid moment of my life'” (505). He asks 
Mitchell whether it was “O.K. to think of the experience as religious, since it felt that way, or 
was that invalidated by the fact that he was technically insane at the time?” (505). Mitchell 
replies that “mystical experiences were significant only to the extent that they changed a 
person's conception of reality, and if that changed conception led to a change in behavior and 
action, a loss of ego” (505). This is a direct reference to James' rejection of what he calls 
medical materialism, the attempt to invalidate religious experience with medical 
explanations. After receiving this advice, Leonard leaves Madeleine, and it is implied that he 
has done so because “whatever success he achieved in life wasn't going to come easy. It 
would always be shadowed by his disease. Bankhead had wanted to save Madeleine from 
that” (506). Leonard's unselfish decision is a product of a religious experience interpreted 
through pragmatism, and makes Madeleine available to Mitchell.
Mitchell seizes his opportunity, actually going to stay with Madeleine at her parents' 
home, and beginning a tentative sexual relationship with her. At this point, it looks like 
Mitchell will achieve his dream of marrying Madeleine. However, Mitchell continues his 
religious pursuits, sneaking off to sit in a Quaker Meeting House, and finds that “[t]he deeper 
Mitchell went inside himself, the more troubled he was” (510). Sitting in the Meeting House 
meditating, he has a kind of religious experience of his own: “A still small voice was 
speaking to him, but it was saying things he didn't want to hear. Suddenly, as if he was truly 
in touch with his Deep Self and could view his situation objectively, Mitchell understood why 
making love with Madeleine had felt as strangely empty as it had” (511). Here, sitting in the 
Meeting House, “[t]he truth poured into him like light” (511), and he realizes that “his 
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believing that Madeleine would marry him stemmed from the same credulity that had led him 
to think he could lead a saintly life, tending the sick and dying in Calcutta” (493). Here, his 
idealistic love of Madeleine is compared to his botched attempts to practice an ethics of being 
for the other. Furthermore, “the voice also told Mitchell that, in addition to never living with 
Madeleine, he would never go to divinity school either. It was unclear what he was going to 
do with his life, but he wasn't going to be a monk, or a minister, or even a scholar” (511). 
This religious experience, triggered by Mitchell's pragmatist attempts to explore spiritual 
truths, leads him to finally make the decision to relinquish his desire to marry Madeleine. 
Thus, Mitchell's pragmatic religious explorations have finally allowed him to reach the 
enlightened state of relinquishing desire, and the result is that “[h]e was feeling a lot better 
about himself, as if he might do some good in the world” (512). The end result of his 
pragmatist experiments is not just the relinquishing of his desire to marry Madeleine, but also 
the possibility of “doing good,” in other words, the possibility of ethics; a result not reached 
through a pursuit of a postmodern ethics of being for the other, but as a result of a pragmatist 
pursuit of religious belief and a religious experience.
In the final two pages, Mitchell approaches Madeleine and asks her a key question 
about literature: “'[W]as there ever any novel where the heroine gets married to the wrong 
guy and then realizes it,and then the other suitor shows up, some guy who's always been in 
love with her, and then they get together, but finally the second suitor realizes that the last 
thing the woman needs is to get married again, and that she's got more important things to do 
with her life?'” (512, italics in the original). She replies that there wasn't. Mitchell asks her if 
she thinks it would be a good ending, and with the final word of the novel she replies “'Yes'” 
(513). This word brings not only the novel to a close, but also the novel's interest in updating 
the historically important marriage plot, which is the focus of Madeleine's literary studies. 
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Early in the novel, Madeleine takes a class called “The Marriage Plot: Selected Novels of 
Austen, Eliot, and James” (26), which is taught by the 79-year-old Professor Saunders. 
Saunders teaches Madeleine that “the novel had reached its apogee with the marriage plot and 
had never recovered from its disappearance. In the days when success in life had depended on 
marriage, and marriage had depended on money, novelists had a subject to write about. The 
great epics sang of war, the novel of marriage. Sexual equality, good for women, had been 
bad for the novel” (27). Thus, the postmodern emancipation of women is identified as a 
problem for the novel itself, which had been in decline ever since: “As far as Saunders was 
concerned, marriage didn't mean much anymore, and neither did the novel” (27). Thus, when 
Mitchell ends his pursuit of Madeleine, and proposes his alternate marriage plot, he doesn't 
just achieve the possibility of goodness for himself, he also redeems the novel from its 
postmodern decline. It is important to remember that Eugenides accomplishes this feat by 
having both male suitors undergo religious experiences of the the type that William James 
explores in depth, and having both of them relinquish Madeleine. Therefore, Eugenides uses 
a pragmatist concept of religion to solve not only the ethical dilemmas of postmodernity, but 
also what is portrayed as the postmodern decline of the novel itself.
5.3 Jamesland by Michelle Huneven
Michelle Huneven's 2004 novel Jamesland provides a typical example of how a pragmatist 
view of religion is being offered as a solution to the ethical dilemmas of the contemporary era 
in recent American novels. In this novel, two of the main characters, Alice Black and Pete 
Ross, are depicted as lost, unhappy, and self-destructive until they begin a relationship with a 
Universalist Unitarian minister named Helen Harlan. Although both are adults, they are 
frequently compared to adolescents. Pete is recovering from a divorce, an arrest, and multiple 
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suicide attempts. We find out that Alice Black is a direct descendant of William James, and 
has attempted to distance herself from her family legacy, only to find herself in what she 
refers to as “Jamesland.” A mystical vision impels her to seek guidance, and Helen provides 
her with interpretations for her vision. It turns out that Helen Harlan is a devoted follower of 
William James, and her favorite book is The Varieties of Religious Experience. The religious 
sermons she delivers are non-denominational, and she actually cites William James more 
frequently than the Bible throughout the course of the novel. Neither Pete nor Alice are 
religious believers, but Helen's non-dogmatic, pragmatic approach to religion inspires both of 
them to improve their lives and work to overcome their flaws. By the end of the novel, they 
have both returned to their professions, fallen in love with each other, and regained emotional 
health. After a religious experience of her own, Helen, too, decides to move on with her life. 
Through a combination of religious experiences and pragmatist philosophy, all three have 
determined how to live.
At the beginning of Jamesland, we are introduced to Alice Black, who is in emotional 
turmoil over her affair with a married man. A physical description informs us of her 
condition: “[H]er brown eyes were dull, with inflamed rims and swollen lids from last night's 
weeping. She hadn't cut her shoulder-length straight brown hair in six or seven months, and 
even when perfectly clean, it separated into strings” (24). She is hung over from drinking too 
much the night before, and “she looked more underfed than glamorously slender” (24). The 
description tells us that, although she is 33 years old, she is in a state of arrested 
development: “All told, she looked exactly as she had at twelve, after a temper tantrum. 
When would she ever look grown up?” (24). In addition to having an affair with a married 
man, Alice has had a checkered past: “God knows she'd slept around more or less 
indiscriminately, had had sexually transmitted diseases and could've been sued for criminal 
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conversation on many occasions” (229). She is afflicted with “a blank, obliterating fear that 
her life had veered off course, as she'd always suspected it would, and that she could no 
longer distinguish what was real from what was not” (9). Her last name, Black, is a rather 
obvious symbol of her dark condition, and we are told that “sitting next to Alice was like 
being perched on the rim of a black hole” (238). Alice's opinion of herself is that “she'd 
stalled out” (242), and that “she didn't know who she was or what she should do” (242). Alice 
had studied biology and had worked in a laboratory before quitting to pursue creative writing, 
which she has also quit, and now she has no idea what to do with her life: “She'd had no 
trouble working in the lab or writing for her extension class or showing up for jobs, but was 
still impossibly distant from her true vocation, whatever that might be” (34). As the novel 
opens, despite her academic qualifications, she works as a bartender at “the Fountain, a dark, 
fusty, intermittently hip and increasingly gay cocktail lounge” (15).
Another main character, Pete Ross, may be in even worse condition. Although he is 
over forty years old, he is currently living with his mother: “Dr. Freeman, his prescribing 
psychiatrist, along with his mother and probation officer, had concocted this regime of 
midlife reparenting” (31). Pete has recently been released from a psychiatric ward, where he 
was held after several suicide attempts: “Self-damage at first had been only a daydream, 
romantic, vengeful and deeply satisfying to contemplate. He'd show them. But it got away 
from him; like inviting the devil to checkers, he'd conjured a more ferocious entertainment 
than he had sought” (104). His suicidal behavior was accompanied by drug and alcohol 
problems: “A year or so ago, Pete devoured the contents of a medicine cabinet, drank most of 
a pint of whiskey and went driving” (125). Professionally, Pete is a chef, and the trigger for 
his depression had been the failure of his restaurant, and the subsequent collapse of his 
marriage. After destroying his estranged wife's apartment in front of his son, he is on 
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probation and under a restraining order. Not only is he in bad shape emotionally; 
“[p]hysically, he'd let himself go. His potbelly was reaching gross proportions. His posture 
was terrible, his clothes clean yet rumpled” (51). Huneven goes to great lengths to emphasize 
that Pete is in a state of suspended adolescence, describing his “adolescent sneer” (245), and 
writing that he “embodied the mannerisms of a hyperactive child” (92-3), or that “[d]espite 
his middle age, he was always as disgusted as a teenager” (51). Due to his probation 
conditions, he feels “way too much like he was sixteen and having to divulge his plans in 
order to get the car” (206). In another scene, he is described as “swinging his grocery bag 
against his leg like an eight-year-old” (94). These descriptions emphasize not just the return 
to childhood enforced by his probation, but also his overall lack of maturity.
At the time of the novel's beginning, Pete has just begun his recovery: “For Pete, the 
bottom was rising. At least not every oncoming car, or height above twenty feet, or electrical 
cord and length of nylon rope, presented itself as the solution to all of his problems” (32). He 
has begun exercising and practicing meditation, but these practices have yet to bear results: 
“He'd only recently begun his exercise routines, and his blood pressure was still sky high, his 
heart flabby as cheese. Sitting in silence, he was indeed face-to-face with what is – or, rather 
with what he is: a system near its breaking point” (30). He is struggling with a total lack of 
meaning in his life: “Nothing, he understood, mattered. This wasn't mere nihilism. His usual 
angle of perceiving the world had slipped, and from his new, wide-open vantage point, it was 
utterly clear that being sick or well, rich or poor, saint or murderer, even alive or dead, was 
not in the least bit important” (178). His sections of the novel are punctuated by “Pete's 
continuing investigation: How do people live in this world?” (26, italics in the original). This 
central question, how do people live, is repeated again and again, and emphasizes the ethical 
nature of his dilemma. Pete “did want to live. Most of the time, at least. To do so, he'd had to 
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start all over, first by relearning the trick of acting within reasonable bounds, a skill 
abandoned once he went to work on his estranged wife's apartment” (87). His mother, now a 
nun, has left the convent in order to help him relearn adulthood: “It had been agreed: Mom 
was to scold him, nudge him, signal the limits, train him as a mother bird or coyote or human 
would so he didn't end up in tarp-walled rooms above the river, sleeping on ferny beds and 
brushing his teeth with river scum” (87). We can see, then, that Pete's primary problem is that 
he needs to develop and adhere to the limits – the “reasonable bounds” – of a system of 
ethics. To help with this, he begins meditating: “At his mother's suggestion, Pete started 
coming to Helen for meditation instruction” (51), and Helen guides his meditation practice. 
When Helen asks Pete what he hopes to gain from meditation, he replies, “'A whole new 
personality'” (82). Pete complains to her about his experience of meditation, saying, “'How 
come I have no idea who I am? Why, whenever I try to look at myself, do I see absolutely 
nothing?'” (160, italics in the original). Helen reassures him, “'People meditate for years to 
experience that'” (160). The devastated state of these two characters is typical for the novels 
that explore the pragmatist approach to religion. They are usually lost, underemployed, often 
with substance abuse or psychological problems. Their lives lack direction and meaning. 
Improvement comes through either an actual religious experience of the kind described by 
William James or through an encounter with pragmatist philosophy. This is emphasized in 
Jamesland when Helen's boyfriend, a minor character at best, suddenly begins talking about 
William James, informing us that “'he showed that people can have all different kinds of 
spiritual awakenings, not just the blinding-light, God-of-the-preachers kind. Like the gradual, 
educational variety of religious experience. So there's hope for everyone'” (68).
In Jamesland the novel, both options apply. In Pete's case, his slow improvement 
comes through Helen Harlan's application of pragmatist philosophy. During one of her 
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conversations with Pete, for example, he asks her, “'What is your beef with God?'” Helen 
replies “'It's been a very long time since I had any notion or concept of God I could have a 
beef with'” (139, italics in the original). Here, we see Helen's adoption of a Jamesian concept 
of a self-defined God. Her identification with James is also quite explicitly detailed. For 
example, in the bookcase in her study, “two Bibles were shelved above the many editions of 
The Varieties of Religious Experience” (73). As a joke, she describes her Wednesday evening 
sermon as “'A religious variety show. The variety show of religious experience!'” (62). In one 
of these sermons, she openly cites James, saying, “'James tells us that the truth of an idea is 
determined by the goodness that idea manifests in our lives. The cash value, as it were, of a 
concept'” (166). And, in case we are not yet persuaded of the influence of James on Helen, 
Huneven makes it absolutely clear. When asked about her beliefs, Helen replies, 
“I suppose, theologically, I'm in sync with William James. I believe we're part of a 
greater something – God, the interconnected web of existence, whatever you want to 
call it. Cultivating a relationship with this greater something constitutes my religion. I 
believe that this relationship with the other – God, if you will – is transformative, 
regenerative and essential for a life lived fully.” (223-4)
Not only is her theology pragmatist, but this quote lays out the novel's entire premise: that a 
pragmatist relationship with a “higher power” is ethically transformative and regenerative. 
We also see this higher power being described as “the other,” as if to replace the postmodern 
“other” with a pragmatist one. When Helen's interlocutor objects, “'But that sounds more 
psychological than religious...Like a religion bled of specifics'” (224), she replies, “'So be 
it...Especially since specifics cause all the trouble. It's insisting on this or that point of 
orthodoxy or doctrine that has led to wars, inquisitions, burnings at the stake.'” (224). 
However, Helen insists that she is religious, too: “'I actually am religious in that I believe the 
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great religions are storehouses of wisdom and practical guidance” (224). Here, she focuses 
not on absolute truths, or metaphysics, but rather on the practical component of religion, or, 
in other words, the ethical component, the part that deals with practice. Helen insists on the 
necessity of the higher power, saying, “'[R]elating to a power greater than yourself generates 
the energy required to create change and to change – and otherwise you'll burn out'” (225).
Helen has an interesting problem, in that her Universalist Unitarian congregation is 
not so interested in the religious part of her religion: “'[C]ome Sunday they like to see their 
friends and hear the music. They like their bazaars and rummage sales, potlucks and cocktail 
hours. They just don't like religion'” (96). In fact, their primary purpose, according to Helen, 
is ethical: “'the difference between me and most of my congregational is theological. They 
come to church not to worship God but to be better humans and effect social change'” (224-
5). For much of her congregation, ethics comes not from a relationship with God, but is rather 
a human creation: “'The older people in my congregation came of age between the world 
wars. They're dyed-in-the-wool secular humanists who believe goodness and mercy and 
justice come exclusively from humans'” (95, italics in the original). Helen disagrees, insisting 
that a higher power is necessary, saying, “'[I]f you deny the divine, you risk deifying the 
human ego. Any concept of an other – let alone a higher – power becomes untenable'” (96). 
Once again, notice the play with the word “other” during Helen's discussion – the higher 
power represents an idealized other with which we have a relationship and which is somehow 
above us, and this allows us the possibility of ethics. Unlike the postmodern approach of 
being for the other, where a real person, a “face” is present, here, an idealized, self-defined 
other is created as a stand in. Helen expounds on these Jamesian concepts during a sermon 
about surrender: “You can't just surrender. You have to surrender to something, and have a 
sense of what that something is. Preferably, it's something greater and larger and more 
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encompassing than yourself, something dynamic rather than transfixed, something that 
enlarges rather than constricts, something that energizes the spirit and doesn't deplete it” 
(275, italics in the original). This sermon makes a profound impact on Pete, “To Pete's mind, 
Helen's sermon on surrender was brilliant, her best yet” (275). His encounters with pragmatist 
philosophy slowly and steadily begin to take effect.
If Pete's ethical transformation follows the path of exposure to pragmatist philosophy 
through the guidance of Helen Harlan and the words of her sermons, Alice's transformation 
comes as a result of a mystical experience. After yet another traumatic breakup with her 
married boyfriend, she has a vision of a deer inside her home, accompanied by the mysterious 
appearance of her aunt Kate, who resides in a nursing home. After confirming that her aunt 
hadn't left the nursing home at all, Alice begins to fear that the vision is a result of mental 
illness, which runs in her family: “[A]t age thirty-three, wasn't she out of the woods for adult-
onset schizophrenia?” (17). She attempts to reach out to her family, but receives no 
assistance, and when she asks a psychiatrist who frequents her bar, he tells her, “'[T]his could 
be a wake-up call'” (35). Eventually, Alice finds a flyer from Helen Harlan's church with a 
picture of “Buddha, on a lotus throne, talking to half a dozen tiny deer” (46). This leads her to 
Helen's Universalist Unitarian church, where the Buddhist guest-speaker informs her that 
“'symbolically, deer in Buddhism represent listening to the dharma'” (54). Eventually, Alice 
meets Helen and they discuss the vision and the guest-speaker's statement, and when Alice 
admits her confusion about his words, Helen says, “'[M]aybe the deer symbolize a new way 
of listening. A more spiritual way, perhaps'” (60, italics in the original). In the beginning, 
Alice is shy and suspicious about Helen, fearing that she will be judged and found wanting: 
“However irreligious Alice considered herself, she automatically ascribed special spiritual 
powers to ministers. She assumed they could look at a person and see things that person 
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didn't know about herself – if she was a good person, say, or owned by darkness” (58). Alice's 
prime concern here is moral, she fears that she will be found out as evil, particularly in light 
of her affair with a married man. Nevertheless, Helen's deep and sincere interest in her 
problems, and her practical approach to dealing with them, encourage Alice to form a 
relationship with her.
Huneven ranges into New Sincerity territory with her descriptions of Alice. When 
Helen quite frankly asks Alice to be her friend, Alice is taken aback, since “Helen really 
wasn't the kind of person she was drawn to: too sincere, too hokey, too much about 'support 
systems'” (78). However, we learn that this distancing from sincerity was something that 
Alice had developed during adolescence to protect herself from her feelings: “When she 
began making friends in school, Alice had been surprised by how deeply she felt about them; 
the strength of her devotion unnerved her, as did the jealousies friendships inspired...She'd 
had to learn to calm down, to ape indifference, to be cool even as she clamored and yearned 
within” (79). Meeting Helen has reawakened this suppressed side of her character as she 
recognizes herself in Helen: “Helen Harlan's unabashed desire for human connection seemed 
just as uncool, unwieldy and embarrassing as her own” (79). In another part of the novel, 
when Helen invites her congregation to get up and dance, Alice feels uncomfortable: “She 
had managed, when properly intoxicated, to move rhythmically to rock and roll, disguising 
her ineptitude as willful humor and irony, as if she knew perfectly well how to dance but 
chose to be silly” (297). These comments about irony and humor being used to mask 
insecurity are nearly direct quotes from David Foster Wallace, who is seen as a founding 
figure in the New Sincerity movement. As we'll see in a moment, this movement is addressed 
and rejected later in the novel.
Besides needing companionship in the face of a difficult, hard-headed congregation, 
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Helen decides to befriend Alice as a way to pay William James back for the value his ideas 
had brought to her life: “William James had helped Helen through her own spiritual 
difficulties, and here was an opportunity to return that favor” (65). As a way to get a grip on 
Alice's mystic vision, she suggests watching films that feature deer, such as Bambi and The 
Yearling. Helen invites Pete to these gatherings, and he rediscovers his love of cooking while 
preparing meals for them. Helen also explores additional interpretations of Alice's vision, for 
example, directing her to a famous Bible verse, Psalm 42, which is quoted as, “As the hart 
panteth after the water brooks, so panteth my soul after thee, O God. My soul thirsteth for 
God, for the living God: when shall I come and appear before God?” (qtd in Huneven 73). 
Helen explains this by saying, “'[T]he deer's a symbol for spiritual longing'” (77). Here, the 
suggestion that God is what she is lacking leads Alice to an examination of her own religious 
upbringing: “The notion of spiritual longing produced another quickening of fear. Was it 
possible that this is what she was feeling?” (77-8). Alice begins to reconsider her religious 
background: “Alice's religious training had come largely from her father, Meyer, who in his 
frequent rants on the subject insisted that religion was superstition and that a belief in God 
was infantile wish fulfillment, a form of regressive dependency” (73). However, her mother, 
herself a direct descendant of William James, had proposed another possibility, “Mary, Alice's 
mother, occasionally suggested in measured tones that religion might, at times, enhance a 
person's life. She'd cite her great-grandfather James, who asserted that people who choose to 
believe in God and an afterlife often lead calmer, happier and more productive lives” (74, 
italics in the original). Alice had wanted to form a religious belief: “For years Alice hoped 
that the right religion would send out an invisible tendril to make itself known and draw her 
home” (75); however, she had been discouraged by ideas that could be viewed as 
postmodern: “[S]he'd already heard the bad news: religion, no matter its trappings, was 
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nothing more than a man-made construct devised to obscure the insignificance of human 
existence and then used to gain power over others” (75). At first, Alice remains skeptical of 
Helen's interpretations, thinking, “[I]f Helen considered the deer incident a vision of some 
sort, and Alice, therefore, a fledgling mystic – well, Alice could only disappoint there, too. 
She had no interest in visions and saw no cachet in having them; nothing like a little mental 
illness in the family to deromanticize such goings on” (97). Eventually, however, she opens 
up to the prospect, asking Helen, “'What if a person doesn't want mystical gifts?'” (149), to 
which Helen replies, “'I'm not sure there's much choice...Unless it's to work with or against 
such gifts – and against seems the surer road to madness'” (149). Alice, accepting this 
judgment, says, “'And if one did decide to work with, how would one go about it?' (149, 
italics in the original). Helen's reply offers one of the key moments in the novel, and is, in 
some way, a turning point for Alice, “'One would start, Alice, by changing one's pronouns. 
One would start by saying I'” (149, italics in the original). Here, Helen proposes that Alice 
return to being a subject again, take control of her life and decisions, and work with her 
spiritual longings rather than against them. Becoming ethical requires becoming a subject 
once more.
This spiritual guidance begins to bear fruit. As a first start, Alice decides to change her 
appearance: “Tuesday morning, she walked into Hair Today and asked for a cut and color” 
(150). To emphasize that it is Helen's efforts that are driving this change, we are told that 
Alice “pulled Helen's sermon from her purse” (150) and began to read it while waiting for her 
haircut. Afterwards, “Alice drove to the Salvation Army thrift store to look for clothes that 
weren't black” (151). Her all black wardrobe had been the product of an attempt to avoid 
ridicule from an ex-boyfriend: “Spiro had made fun of what he called her ecowarrior look – 
the jeans and logo'd T-shirts, the hiking boots and Birkenstocks – and advised her to go with 
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black jeans and T-shirts and Doc Martens, a slinky black slip dress for clubs, a black leather 
jacket over all” (151). Abandoning the nihilism and self-abnegation of her defensive 
reactions, Alice reasserts herself and her right to choose her own appearance. On a 
recommendation from Helen, she takes a new job working as a transcriber with a researcher 
who specializes in psychics who believe they can communicate with William James. Here, 
she meets Dewey, a fellow researcher, younger than Alice, who seems to represent the New 
Sincerity movement. Dewey's name is quite interesting as it seems not only to be a nod to 
William James' fellow pragmatist, John Dewey, but to also indicate a kind of innocence, as if 
he were still wet behind the ears. Certainly, Dewey is portrayed as young and innocent:
Alice had never met anyone so unironic. As perplexed as he was by some of the 
things she said, Dewey wasn't the least offended, as if it never occurred to him that 
anybody else would ever be other than perfectly kind. And she used to be kind, a real 
pushover, but she had set out to change that much as she had set out to lose her 
virginity, with the full intent to shed herself of a liability. (174)
Alice finds herself liking Dewey: “Dewey seemed so hopeful and good – so uncynical and 
unironic – that Alice quite liked him even as she wondered how he could possibly be, at 
twenty-six, so unbesmirched” (197). Alice feels that his innocence marks him as off-limits to 
her: “He'd have to go young, very young to find a taker for such sincerity and innocence” 
(199). Yet, when he reveals his attraction to her, she responds: “Looking into Dewey's sweet, 
excellent face and clear gray eyes made her feel jaded, sex-hungry, a thief of affections and 
potential violator of honorable intentions” (229). She questions whether she is good enough 
for him: “Didn't he know that she was too jaded, hard-hearted, ruined?” (199, italics in the 
original). Alice begins to wonder if a relationship with Dewey could be the way out of her 
dilemma, asking herself, “Could Dewey Hupfeld be her chance, finally, at what everyone else 
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already had?” (200).  Unfortunately, things don't work out between Alice and Dewey. One 
reason is his tendency to neglect her in favor of helping others. For example, he doesn't show 
up for one date because he drove a university student to the hospital after a bicycle accident. 
Alice responds, “'Couldn't anyone else take the guy to the hospital?'” (236). Another time, 
“they went hiking in the desert, and he'd given their only water bottle to a hot fat woman 
when Alice herself was thirsty” (248). Another time, Alice has to drive downtown in rush 
hour traffic to pick Dewey up because he has loaned his car to someone else. Here, Huneven 
seems to be rejecting an ethics of being for the other, showing the downside of selflessness. 
Pete emphasizes this when he meets Dewey by openly criticizing him:
“You're so nice, Doo-doo, you give away water to a fat stranger while your girlfriend 
gets dehydrated – but you got to be nice. You're so nice you stand Alice up to take 
some moron to the emergency room – never mind that ten or fifty other people were 
willing to do it, never mind that even your little Jesus college must have an ambulance 
service on hand. Never mind disappointing Alice. You get to be the hero. I've got your 
number, Meister Nice.” (279)
Ultimately, despite his unironic sincerity, and his willingness to help the other, Dewey is 
found wanting. Alice finally breaks up with Dewey after experiencing a burst of religious 
feeling. They are taking a walk along the Los Angeles river when Alice encounters a religious 
offering: 
Just offshore, under inches of moving water, sat someone's offering: on a trembling 
bed of rice and beans sat four potatoes, two green apples and two oranges. Scattered 
throughout were foil-wrapped candies – turquoise, fuchsia, that copper – and golden 
butterscotch orbs, all lit by the sun and glowing like jewels in the leather-brown 
stream. For the first time in Alice's life, some kind of prayer, some admission to the 
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universe, seemed in order. (284)
This experience, an “admission” of religious feeling, a belief in a higher power, inspires Alice 
to break up with Dewey. 
At this stage, having changed her life and begun delving into her background as a 
descendant of William James, Alice begins to feel a change in herself:
Alice felt far from everything and everyone she knew, in exile from her own life, out 
here among kind, if humorless, religious folk. Her family had no idea where she was, 
Nick could never ever find her. In another sense, she knew exactly where she'd landed 
– the one place she'd avoided all her life, while dreading its inevitability. Along with 
mad and maddening Aunt Kate, she' come smack to the heart of Jamesland. To finally 
encounter the benign specifics of this long-dreaded place...was almost a relief. (174)
Jamesland, the novel's title, seems to indicate a place of sincere, non-dogmatic exploration of 
spirituality and mysticism, and to be a relief from the suffering and self-rejection of the 
outside world.
After breaking up with Dewey, Alice realizes that Pete, who has been following the 
same path that she has, is a better match for her, and they begin a relationship. Pete takes an 
offer to be the chef at a new restaurant, and Alice takes an opportunity to begin working with 
animals at a zoo. There are some rough patches and plot twists, but ultimately, both are 
portrayed as happier and healthier. Helen, for example, says of Pete, “'He seems so much 
clearer and stronger every time I see him'” (261). Pete eventually gets clearance from the 
court to see his son again, who asks, “'Are you better, Dad?'” then clarifies, “'Mom said you 
were sick'” (337). Pete replies, “'I'm much better, sweetheart'” (337). Alice, too, is shown to 
be in better shape. Helen tells her, “'You do look good, Alice. Healthy'” (322). Alice responds, 
“'Fat you mean. I've gained all the weight Pete's lost.' And then Alice laughed, a pure, happy 
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noise” (322). Alice and Pete are doing well when Helen decides to leave the ministry to 
pursue Jungian therapy instead, but “[b]oth she and Pete had Helen on their speed dial” (335). 
When Pete encounters Helen again after an absence, he reveals how important Helen's 
guidance was for his recovery: “'I miss those midweeks,' he blurted, and almost added, They 
saved my ass. But he'd be hard pressed to explain how those dank chilly evenings with cranky 
old people, sputtering candles and an endless stream of hokum trickling from the podium 
could have accomplished such a feat” (322, italics in the original). When Helen asks Alice if 
she had gotten anything out of her sermons, she replies, “'Of course...Like my whole life'” 
(339). The message is clear, a pragmatist religious approach can restore even the most 
damaged and lost to health and happiness.
Helen's decision to leave her church is also driven by a religious experience. While on 
a cruise in Mexico, she goes swimming with whales, and encounters a whale in the ocean. 
The experience disturbs her to her core: “Unlike the other swimmers, she was in no sense 
exhilarated; she could not say, like Nancy, that she'd felt 'privileged and honored' in the 
whale's presence. Scorched, struck down, and obliterated were the words that entered her 
mind” (288, italics in the original). She experiences the whale as a brief glimpse of a higher 
power, leaving her awestruck: 
Even the idea of prayer struck her as distasteful, so much so that she couldn't imagine 
ever wanting to pray again – not from lack of faith, but rather from too close a brush 
with its source. Curled against the wall on her bunk, Helen understood why God did 
not want to make full-frontal appearances to humans. A single whale was too much to 
bear. (288)
The experience triggers a reexamination of her life, after which she ends her relationship with 
her boyfriend, and decides to change careers. She, too, finds the path out of her dilemma after 
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a religious experience that awakens her to the right decision.
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6 The Ecological Metanarrative
They passed through the ruins of a resort town and took the road south. Burnt 
forests for miles along the slopes and snow sooner than he would have 
thought. No tracks in the road, nothing living anywhere. The fireblackened 
boulders like the shapes of bears on the starkly wooded slopes. He stood on a 
stone bridge where the waters slurried into a pool and turned slowly in a gray 
foam. Where once he'd watched trout swaying with the current, tracking their 
perfect shadows on the stones beneath. They went on, the boy trudging in his 
track. Leaning into the cart, winding slowly upward through the switchback. 
There were fires still burning high in the mountains and at night they could see 
the light from them deep orange in the sootfall. (McCarthy 29-30)
6.1 Introduction
In his harrowing depiction of an apocalyptic future, The Road (2006), Cormac McCarthy 
describes a landscape wasted by an unnamed environmental catastrophe. The trees are 
charred and black, the air filled with ash, the pavement melted, the water polluted – and there 
is no life. With nothing to eat, the few surviving humans scavenge through the ruins for 
remnants of civilization, and eventually turn to eating each other. The nightmarish setting 
provides the backdrop for what could easily be described as a horror story. Yet, it is more than 
that; it is also a warning of what faces us if we continue to endanger the environment. In 
other words, McCarthy uses his narrative to illustrate the need for a certain kind of ethics. I 
am calling this ethical paradigm the ecological metanarrative because I want to indicate that 
unlike the postmodern skepticism toward metanarratives, this paradigm offers an affirmative 
system of belief that rests on an all-encompassing universalism foreign to postmodernism.
Ecological models of reality in American philosophy go back at least as far as the 
Transcendentalists. Ralph Waldo Emerson, for example, presents one in his famous essay 
“Nature”:
Nature, in its ministry to man, is not only the material, but is also the process and the 
result. All the parts incessantly work into each other's hands for the profit of man. The 
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wind sows the seed; the sun evaporates the sea; the wind blows the vapor to the field; 
the ice, on the other side of the planet, condenses rain on this; the rain feeds the plant; 
the plant feeds the animal; and thus the endless circulations of the divine charity 
nourish man. (12)
Here, Emerson recognizes the components of an ecosystem, showing the necessary 
interconnection of each component for the survival of humanity. The concern for ecology is 
directly tied to the uses that humans can make of nature, whether material or spiritual. This 
anthropocentrism is characteristic of the Transcendentalists. Thoreau, whose observations of 
nature laid some of the groundwork for the development of ecology, also shared this concern 
for the depletion of natural resources:
The very willow-rows lopped every three years for fuel or powder, - and every sizable 
pine and oak, or other forest tree, cut down within the memory of man! As if 
individual speculators were to be allowed to export the clouds out of the sky, or the 
stars out of the firmament, one by one. We shall be reduced to gnaw the very crust of 
the earth for nutriment. (Thoreau 401)
Thoreau's vision foreshadows McCarthy's stark warning of a world with depleted resources, 
where food no longer can be produced. Early ecological concepts like these planted seeds 
from which later visions would sprout.
An ecological ethics appears later, most famously in the work of Aldo Leopold.  In his 
book, A Sand County Almanac and Sketches Here and There (1949), Leopold introduces the 
concept of the land ethic. Leopold believed that if ethics are designed to regulate the 
relationship between the individual and the community, then “[t]he land ethic simply enlarges 
the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: 
the land” (Leopold 204). With this concept, Leopold moves away from the anthropocentrism 
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of previous ecological models to place humans on an equal basis with other parts of the 
ecosystem: “In short, a land ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the 
land-community to plain member and citizen of it. It implies respect for his fellow-members, 
and also respect for the community as such” (204). Such a role reversal leads to Leopold's 
famous definition of ecological right and wrong: “A thing is right when it tends to preserve 
the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends 
otherwise”( 224). Here, we have the appearance of an ethics that centers around an ecosystem 
rather than humans or an individual, placing the land, soil, and water on an equal footing with 
living creatures. The land ethic thus moves us away from biocentrism.
Deep Ecology, developed by Arne Naess, represents an advance in ecological ethics 
that will provide us with most of the concepts we will need to examine contemporary 
American fiction. Naess identifies conservation efforts as a “shallow” ecology: “The Shallow 
Ecology movement: Fight against pollution and resource depletion. Central objective: the 
health and affluence of people in the developed countries” (“Shallow” 95, italics in the 
original). Naess not only focuses on the anthropocentric component of conservation, but also 
on class considerations – it is the affluent who can afford to practice conservation. In contrast 
to this shallow ecology, Naess proposes a deep ecology that rests on a number of basic 
principles. Rather than enumerate them all, I'll focus on those that will contribute to the close 
readings that follow. The first principle is: “Rejection of the man-in-environment image in 
favour of the relational, total-field image. Organisms as knots in the biospherical net or field 
of intrinsic relations” (95, italics in the original). Much like Heidegger's dasein, this vision 
moves away from seeing humans as separate from their context: “The total-field model 
dissolves not only the man-in-environment concept, but every compact thing-in-milieu 
concept” (95).
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Next, the concept of biological egalitarianism means that humans are no longer above 
other species, as in the land ethic: “[T]he equal right to live and blossom is an intuitively 
clear and obvious value axiom. Its restriction to humans is an anthropocentrism with 
detrimental effects upon the quality of life of humans themselves” (96, italics in the original). 
Notice the important axiomatic extension of the idea of “rights” to the non-human. This right 
contains a caveat: “The 'in principle' clause is inserted because any realistic praxis 
necessitates some killing, exploitation, and suppression” (95). However, biological diversity 
should be preserved, because diversity “enhances the potentialities of survival, the chances of 
new modes of life, the richness of forms” (96). Survival of a species should no longer be seen 
as a zero-sum game, but rather viewed as symbiotic: “[T]he so-called struggle of life, and 
survival of the fittest, should be interpreted in the sense of ability to coexist and cooperate in 
complex relationships, rather than ability to kill, exploit, and suppress. 'Live and let live' is a 
more powerful ecological principle than 'Either you or me'” (96). Another important principle 
is that of local autonomy: “The vulnerability of a form of life is roughly proportional to the 
weight of influences from afar, from outside the local region in which that form has obtained 
an ecological equilibrium” (98). Here, Deep Ecology stands against globalization and 
international trade, equating distance with danger. Putting responsibility into local hands will 
have an effect on resource depletion, since “increased local autonomy, if we are able to keep 
other factors constant, reduces energy consumption” (98). 
In a later work with George Sessions, Naess issued further principles that have served 
as guidelines for a wide range of groups. First of those is the proposition that “[t]he well-
being and flourishing of human and nonhuman Life on Earth have value in themselves. These 
values are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for human purposes” 
(Sessions 14). This proposition removes the concept of values from the human sphere, 
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extending them once again to animals. Deep Ecology's principles now not only extend rights 
and values to the non-human, but also serve to limit the rights of humans: “Humans have no 
right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs” (14). Further 
principles insist on radical changes in human life: “The flourishing of human life and cultures 
is compatible with a substantial decrease of the human population. The flourishing of 
nonhuman life requires such a decrease” (14). Now, Naess' principles are not only putting the 
non-human on equal footing with humans, but are requiring that humans reduce their 
population to accommodate other life forms. Rather than nature being a threat and a danger to 
humanity, so that it must be “tamed,” it is humans who threaten the rest of the world: 
“Present human interference with the nonhuman world is excessive, and the situation is 
rapidly worsening” (14). Rapid population growth and industrialization are the problems, and 
this must be reversed: “Policies must therefore be changed.  These policies affect basic 
economic, technological, and ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will be 
deeply different from the present” (14). The economy must be reconfigured around 
sustainability to prevent resource depletion and preserve the inherent value of other life 
forms. Finally, the last principle is a call to arms: “Those who subscribe to the foregoing 
points have an obligation directly or indirectly to try to implement the necessary changes” 
(14).
Although ecological ethics stem from an impulse similar to postmodernism's – a 
critique of modernity and a questioning of the “progress” of science – ecological ethics are in 
many ways incompatible with postmodern ethics. Ecological ethics embrace universal truths 
that remain valid for all subjects regardless of social identity constructions. Although it would 
certainly be possible to attempt it, there seems to be little appetite for a linguistic 
deconstruction of global warming and climate change. These ethics are a metanarrative 
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driving other discourses, from food production to architecture to transportation, and one 
toward which skepticism comes primarily from those financially impacted by restrictive 
ecological measures. Unlike postmodernism, which eschews structure and systems in favor of 
play, ecological ethics insist that structure is primary; is, in fact, inseparable from a subject, 
for an ecosystem is itself a structure, and all life exists within this structure. Although Deep 
Ecology addresses class and economic differences among humans, it does not put the human 
other at the center of its ethics. In fact, ecological thinking is probably best classified as post-
humanist. As we can see, ecological ethics resolve some of the dilemmas of postmodernism, 
like the loss of metanarratives or the loss of the “real,” by giving us a new metanarrative, 
attached to an urgent threat that cannot be ignored, that is, in fact, real enough to have an 
impact on our lives. It also dissolves the self-other concept completely, replacing it with an 
interconnected network of living and nonliving factors. There is no “other” anymore – we are 
all in the same boat.
These principles have led to countless splinter groups, each with its own individual 
focus, and in the way of dogmatic metanarratives such as religion or economics, each splinter 
group has its disagreements with the others. I won't go into them here, but we'll encounter 
many of them in the readings that follow. Their disputes are not the issue here, but rather 
what unites them, which is a conception of reality in which everything is interconnected, 
where the part impacts the whole.
6.2 Freedom by Jonathan Franzen
Jonathan Franzen's 2010 novel, Freedom, vividly explores the ecological metanarrative and 
contrasts it to the postmodern era, finding the postmodern approach wanting and positing 
ecological thinking as “good.” He accomplishes this by setting up a love triangle in which 
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two men, Richard Katz and Walter Berglund, vie for the love of Patty Berglund. Patty, a 
housewife, is depicted as unhappy, constantly unsure of her choices and insecure about her 
weaknesses. She is the typical underachiever of contemporary novels, paralyzed by a lack of 
ethical structure. Richard Katz is the narcissistic representative of postmodernity, a musician 
who has no fixed beliefs and is primarily motivated by hedonism. Walter Berglund is an 
ardent environmentalist who is repeatedly described as good. Walter's ecological thinking 
begins with Thoreau and encompasses ideas linked to Deep Ecology. His ethics also manifest 
a strong post-humanism that places humans in opposition to the environment. While Patty 
and Richard express disdain for the contemporary generation, Walter embraces them and their 
willingness to believe. Through a series of rather comic blunders motivated by his ethics, he 
becomes a hero to the younger generation, who are inspired by his dedication. The novel ends 
with Patty, who has had an affair with Richard Katz, choosing to return to Walter because of 
his goodness, and Richard Katz redeeming himself by following in Walter's footsteps. 
Freedom opens with a portrait of Patty and Walter Berglund, a married couple with 
two children, as told from the viewpoint of their neighbors in St. Paul, Minnesota. This 
opening narration sets up the novel and describes the disintegration of their marriage from the 
outside. Although Patty seems like a typical housewife, there is something unusual about her: 
“One strange thing about Patty, given her strong family orientation, was that she had no 
discernible connection to her roots. Whole seasons passed without her setting foot outside St. 
Paul, and it wasn’t clear that anybody from the East, not even her parents, had ever come out 
to visit” (6). This is due to Patty's decision to abandon her family in New York and relocate to 
the Midwest in an attempt to create a new identity for herself. Both of Patty's parents seem to 
be adherents of the postmodern ethics of being for the other. About her mother, we are told: 
“She is even now, at the time of this writing, a state assemblywoman, the Honorable Joyce 
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Emerson, known for her advocacy of open space, poor children, and the Arts. Paradise for 
Joyce is an open space where poor children can go and do Arts at state expense” (39). Her 
father, a lawyer, is even more dedicated to the other: “Most nights her dad left the house 
again after dinner to meet with poor people he was defending in court for little or no money. 
He had an office across the street from the courthouse in White Plains. His free clients 
included Puerto Ricans, Haitians, Transvestites, and the mentally or physically Disabled” (40-
1). His client list reads like a checklist of the marginalized. Patty's antipathy toward her 
parents stems from their failure to take her seriously, with her mother showing no interest in 
Patty's sports achievements, and her father's continuous irony and sarcasm. When Patty is 
raped by the son of a wealthy political donor, her parents are more concerned about the 
political repercussions than about her well-being. Patty's decision to marry Walter and have a 
family at a young age seems motivated by a desire to reinvent her life. To Patty, Walter 
represents the goodness she wishes she could embody, but can't due to her ethical weakness: 
“'There’s something wrong with me. I love all my other friends, but I feel like there’s always 
a wall between us. Like they’re all one kind of person and I’m another kind of person. More 
competitive and selfish. Less good, basically'” (92-3). Patty develops a drinking problem as a 
result of trying to avoid the responsibility of being a parent: “[O]nce the one or two glasses 
turned into six or eight glasses, everything changed. Walter needed her sober at night so she 
could listen to all the things he thought were morally defective in their son, and she needed 
not to be sober so as not to have to listen” (186).
The novel's interrogation of the benefits of freedom is frequently illustrated by Patty's 
unhappiness: “Where did the self-pity come from? The inordinate volume of it? By almost 
any standard, she led a luxurious life. She had all day every day to figure out some decent and 
satisfying way to live, and yet all she ever seemed to get for all her choices and all her 
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freedom was more miserable” (226-7). This interrogation of freedom is hammered home 
when Patty visits her daughter at college: “Her daughter was gazing with desolate self-control 
at the main college building, on an outside wall of which Patty had noticed a stone graven 
with words of wisdom from the Class of 1920: USE WELL THY FREEDOM” (230). This 
motto seems to be an admonition to Patty. Towards the end of the novel, Patty spends some 
time with her dying father only to find that she hasn't been able to reinvent herself: “Spending 
so much time listening to her father make fun of everything, albeit a little more feebly each 
day, she was disturbed to see how much like him she was, and why her own children weren’t 
more amused by her capacity for amusement” (645). This leads her to the conclusion that 
“[h]er dream of creating a fresh life, entirely from scratch, entirely independent, had been just 
that: a dream. She was her father’s daughter. Neither he nor she had ever really wanted to 
grow up” (645-6). So we see that Patty has used her decision to be a housewife as a way to 
hide from the responsibilities inherent in being an adult, to remain in a state of eternal 
childhood, rather than to form a truly independent self. As if to emphasize that Patty doesn't 
view herself as a subject, large sections of the novel are written by Patty depicting herself in 
the third person, calling herself “the autobiographer”: “The autobiographer is almost forced 
to the conclusion that she pitied herself for being so free” (227), she laments.
If Patty represents the typical contemporary subject paralyzed by freedom and the lack 
of an ethical system, Richard Katz, to some extent, embodies the narcissism and hedonism 
frequently identified by critics as a weakness inherent in postmodernism. For example, he is 
described early on as “a self-absorbed, addiction-prone, unreliable, street-smart guitar player 
from Yonkers, New York” (82-3). These early comments serve to emphasize his unstable and 
narcissistic personality before he even begins appearing in the narrative. Richard is clearly 
presented as an artist figure: “Richard, irritable and unreliable though he was in most 
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respects, was helplessly serious about his music” (83). The art he produces, with his punk 
band, the Traumatics, is portrayed early on as destructive and hostile: “The noise was just 
unbearable. Richard and two other Traumatics were screaming into their microphones, I hate 
sunshine! I hate sunshine!” (90-1, italics in the original). Like many such characters in 
contemporary novels, he is the product of a broken home: “'[H]is mom ran away when he 
was little, and became a religious nut. His dad was a postal worker and a drinker who got 
lung cancer when Richard was in high school'” (92). Richard's lack of scruples place him in 
direct contrast to Walter, who, as we shall see, is continually depicted as a good person. For 
example, Walter tells Patty, “'I feel like the stupidest person on earth sometimes. I wish I 
could cheat. I wish I could be totally self-focused like Richard'” (123, italics in the original). 
In fact, Richard's connection to Patty and Walter is described as the only factor that prevents 
him from being completely self-absorbed: “He was very good at knowing what was good for 
him, and this was normally enough for every purpose in his life. It was only around the 
Berglunds that he felt that it was not enough” (474, italics in the original). However, Patty 
assures the reader that “Richard had a strong (if highly intermittent) wish to be a good 
person” (167). He is just not able to envision how to go about doing it, and his music career, 
despite eventually achieving financial success, does not lead to happiness: “Though 
Nameless Lake and the newly kindled consumer interest in old Traumatics recordings had 
brought him more money than his previous twenty years of work combined, he’d managed to 
blow every dime of it in his quest to relocate the self he’d misplaced” (240). Here, like Patty, 
he seems to have lost the sense of himself as a “self,” that is, as a subject. Richard's newfound 
financial freedom instead merely leads to hedonistic excess: “He flopped around on the 
ground, heavily carplike, his psychic gills straining futilely to extract dark sustenance from an 
atmosphere of approval and plenitude. He was at once freer than he’d been since puberty and 
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closer than he’d ever been to suicide” (241). As with Patty, freedom does not lead Richard to 
happiness. Instead, it leads to him becoming intensely depressed: “He strongly disliked the 
person he’d just demonstrated afresh that he unfortunately was. And this, of course, was the 
simplest definition of depression that he knew of: strongly disliking yourself” (255). Like 
Patty, Richard is unable to use his freedom well, because he has no ethical beliefs to guide 
him. At one point, Walter even goes so far as to protest that Richard “didn’t believe in a 
fucking thing!” (591). These qualities, the narcissism, the addiction, the instability, the loss of 
self, the depression, and the lack of beliefs, all strongly echo other contemporary portraits 
that are more explicitly critical of the postmodern era. Yet, an explicit connection to 
postmodernism is rather hard to locate in the actual text of Freedom, with the exception of a 
key scene that stands out. In fact, it occurs in the very first sentence in which Richard appears 
as a character in the narrative. After spending the night with Patty's roommate, whom Richard 
is dating, Patty meets Richard for the first time. She describes him thus: “Richard was 
wearing a black T-shirt and reading a paperback novel with a big V on the cover” (84). The 
immediate reference to Thomas Pynchon's debut novel, V (1963), not only timestamps the 
scene as occurring sometime in the postmodern era, but also brands Richard Katz with the 
postmodern label from the first moment we encounter him. Attaching this label to Katz links 
his flaws to postmodernism, echoing Franzen's very public criticism of it.
While Patty and Richard represent the negative effects of the postmodern condition, 
Walter is depicted as a relentless force for good. Just as an example, shortly after Walter 
appears in the novel for the first time as Richard Katz's friend and roommate, we are told that 
“Patty began to learn how miraculously worthy Walter was” (96). In fact, in one scene, Patty 
tells him this directly: “'God,' Patty marveled. 'You really are quite amazingly worthy'” (123). 
This worthiness is important to the story line, because Patty chooses to marry Walter despite 
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that fact that she is far more attracted to Richard, precisely because she values his goodness. 
We learn about Walter's dedication to caring for his parents, his self-sacrifices for others, and 
his firm embrace of an ethical system centered around the environment:
Walter burned with all sorts of earnest and peculiar views – he hated the pope and the 
Catholic Church but approved of the Islamic revolution in Iran, which he hoped 
would lead to better energy conservation in the United States; he liked China’s new 
population-control policies and thought the U.S. should adopt something similar; he 
cared less about the Three Mile Island nuclear mishap than about the low price of 
gasoline and the need for high-speed rail systems that would render the passenger car 
obsolete. (116-7)
Even those who are antagonistic to Walter recognize his goodness. Patty's sister chastises her 
for distancing herself from their family by saying: “'I’m not the one who turned her nose up, 
and could never take a joke, and married Mr. Superhuman Good Guy Minnesotan Righteous 
Weirdo Naturelover, and didn’t even pretend not to hate us'” (655). Here, Walter is given a 
number of epithets, among them “Superhuman,” “Good Guy,” and “Righteous,” that 
emphasize how impressively good he is. At one point, when Walter and Richard are arguing, 
Richard sarcastically mentions his goodness: “'Face it, man, you’re just too excellent,' Katz 
said, not kindly” (264). At another point, Walter points out to Richard that the difference 
between them is Richard's lack of an ethical belief system: “'Well, we're different you and 
me. Do you get that? Do you understand that it's possible to have values higher than getting 
laid?'” (462). Patty and Richard have an affair, and Walter finds out, leading to a separation. 
At this time, Walter begins a relationship with his much younger assistant, Lalitha. Lalitha, 
too, falls for Walter's goodness: “'Oh, my sweetheart,' she said, embracing him, resting her 
head against his heart. 'Nobody else understands what good things you’re doing. I’m the only 
Allen 200
one'” (596). Even after they split up, Patty continues believing that Walter is good. In her 
third-person biography, she writes of this time: “She wished she could go to him now, while 
he was still alive, and say it to him plainly: I adore you for your goodness” (647).
If Walter is relentlessly portrayed as good, the content of his goodness is clearly 
drawn from ecological thinking. At the very beginning, we are told that his neighbors see him 
as “greener than Greenpeace” (3). Walter's interest in the environment begins when his 
family inherits a house on a lake. In attempt to extract himself from working for the family 
business, “he announced that he was going to spend the summer fixing up the lake house and 
making an experimental nature film” (571). He arrives at the the house with “a duffel bag of 
clothes, ten gallons of house paint, his old one-speed bike, a secondhand paperback copy of 
Walden, the Super-8 movie camera that he’d borrowed from the high-school AV Department, 
and eight yellow boxes of Super-8 film. It was by far the most rebellious thing he’d ever 
done” (572). Thus, Walter's teenage act of rebellion is firmly connected to Thoreau, and his 
sojourn at the lake house, renovating and simultaneously enjoying the exposure to nature, is 
inspired by Thoreau's residence on Walden Pond. Here, Walter, like Thoreau, begins 
observing nature, choosing to make a film about bitterns: “Bitterns were perfect – so retiring 
that he could stalk them all summer without using up twenty-one minutes of film. He 
imagined making an experimental short called 'Bitternness'” (572). Later, in college, Walter's 
ecological interests expand into local activism. Patty tells us about “the symposia he’d 
organized – on overpopulation, on electoral-college reform – that hardly any students had 
attended” (136-7), and “his petition drive for better-insulated windows in Macalester’s 
dorms” (137). He even wrote editorials for the university newspaper, in which he, for 
example, “grappled philosophically with his fellow students’ habit of putting three times too 
much milk on their cold cereal and then leaving brimming bowls of soiled milk on their trays: 
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did they somehow think milk was a free and infinite commodity like water, with no 
environmental strings attached?” (137). These ecological beliefs shape how he views 
everything in his world. For example, when Walter visits Richard in New York, he praises the 
city: “'God, I love the New York subway!' Walter said as he followed Katz down to the uric 
uptown platform. 'This is the way human beings are supposed to live. High density! High 
efficiency!'” (282). For Walter, New York's attractions are ecological, rather than cultural or 
architectural, for instance. Ordering a meal in restaurant is a torture to his conscience:
He signaled to their waitress for another and then suffered through perusal of the 
menu. Between the horrors of bovine methane, the lakes of watershed-devastating 
excrement generated by pig and chicken farms, the catastrophic overfishing of the 
oceans, the ecological nightmare of farmed shrimp and salmon, the antibiotic orgy of 
dairy-cow factories, and the fuel squandered by the globalization of produce, there 
was little he could ever order in good conscience besides potatoes, beans, and 
freshwater-farmed tilapia. (384)
Listening to the radio disturbs him, because, “to Walter the message of every single radio 
station was that nobody else in America was thinking about the planet’s ruination” (395). 
This discomfort is magnified when he thinks about television, as well: “And TV: TV was like 
radio, only ten times worse. The country that minutely followed every phony turn of 
American Idol while the world went up in flames seemed to Walter fully deserving of 
whatever nightmare future awaited it” (395). Even the problems that arise in Walter's 
marriage remind him of his ecological beliefs: “Walter was frightened by the long-term 
toxicity they were creating with their fights. He could feel it pooling in their marriage like the 
coal-sludge ponds in Appalachian valleys” (418). Hurtful words from his wife remind him of 
ecological damage: “You could try dumping the poison back down into abandoned 
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underground mines, but it had a way of seeping into the water table and ending up in drinking 
water. It really was a lot like the deep shit that got stirred up when a married couple fought: 
once certain things had been said, how could they ever be forgotten again?” (418-9). Nearly 
every thought Walter has is shaped by his ethical belief system.
The roots of Walter's environmental beliefs stem from his romantic/transcendentalist 
experience at the family's lake house:  “Seventeen years in cramped quarters with his family 
had given him a thirst for solitude...To hear nothing but wind, birdsong, insects, fish jumping, 
branches squeaking, birch leaves scraping as they tumbled against each other: he kept 
stopping to savor this unsilent silence as he scraped paint from the house’s outer walls” (572). 
His experience, however, is disrupted by the appearance of his older brother, who takes 
possession of the house and throws a loud, raging party at the lake. Hiding away in the lake 
house, Walter is infuriated at his brother's violation of nature: “Why couldn’t they be quiet? 
Why this need to sonically assault a world in which some people appreciated silence? The din 
went on and on and on” (575, italics in the original). This experience “produced a fever to 
which everyone else was apparently immune. A fever of self-pitying alienation. Which, as it 
raged in Walter that night, scarred him permanently with hatred of the bellowing vox populi” 
(575). Later, when Walter begins working to conserve nature, we are told: “[H]is primary 
interest in working for the Conservancy, and later for the Trust, was to safeguard pockets of 
nature from loutish country people like his brother. The love he felt for the creatures whose 
habitat he was protecting was founded on projection: on identification with their own wish to 
be left alone by noisy human beings” (575). Walter's ecological ethics stem from an anti-
human mindset; they posit that goodness lies not in affirming but rather in opposing 
humanity. Thus, Walter's primary ecological focus becomes the dangers of overpopulation, 
and although he works to secure habitat for the cerulean warbler, his antipathy for people 
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underlies even this effort: “'Well, nest-predation by crows and feral cats is an efficient cause 
of the warbler’s decline. And fragmentation of the habitat is a formal cause of that. But 
what’s the final cause? The final cause is the root of pretty much every problem we have. The 
final cause is too many damn people on the planet'” (274). Walter goes so far as to argue that 
“'there’s hardly a problem in the world that wouldn’t be solved or at least tremendously 
alleviated by having fewer people'” (275). This is almost a direct quote from the principles of 
Deep Ecology. Walter lays much of the blame for overpopulation on religion, in particular, 
the Catholic church, with its mandate to multiply: “In Walter’s view, there was no greater 
force for evil in the world, no more compelling cause for despair about humanity and the 
amazing planet it had been given, than the Catholic Church” (394). Walter believes that a 
fundamental change has to be made, that the purpose of life has to be re-imagined: “'Kids 
have always been the meaning of life. You fall in love, you reproduce, and then your kids 
grow up and fall in love and reproduce. That’s what life was always for. For pregnancy. For 
more life. But the problem now is that more life is still beautiful and meaningful on the 
individual level, but for the world as a whole it only means more death'” (278). Walter sees 
the individualism at the heart of America's concept of freedom as being a threat to the planet: 
“It’s all circling around the same problem of personal liberties...People came to this 
country for either money or freedom. If you don’t have money, you cling to your 
freedoms all the more angrily. Even if smoking kills you, even if you can’t afford to 
feed your kids, even if your kids are getting shot down by maniacs with assault rifles. 
You may be poor, but the one thing nobody can take away from you is the freedom to 
fuck your life up whatever way you want to.” (453)
The focus needs to shift from the individual to a macro-level: “'What’s still 'normal' at the 
individual level is heinous and unprecedented at the global level'” (278), Walter argues. He 
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echoes many of the principles of Deep Ecology, for example: “'Every species has an 
inalienable right to keep existing,'” (274). Notice the use of the word “inalienable,” which 
links this statement to the Declaration of Independence and the Enlightenment philosophy 
that influenced it, only now the right is extended to animals as well.
The novel goes out of its way to demonstrate to the reader that both Patty and Richard 
feel out of sync with the younger generation, whereas Walter forms an attachment with them. 
These passages depict a transition from the cynicism, irony, and opposition of the postmodern 
generation to a more sincere attachment to a fixed ethical belief system. Katz ponders these 
generational differences when he meets a young fan named Sarah, who has baked him some 
banana bread. Katz muses, “She was like a walking advertisement of the late-model parenting 
she’d received: You have permission to ask for things! Just because you aren’t pretty doesn’t 
mean you don’t! Your offerings, if you’re bold enough to make them, will be welcomed by 
the world!” (437). He compares Sarah's generation to his own and finds it lacking: “Katz 
wondered if he’d been this tiring himself at eighteen, or whether, as it now seemed to him, his 
anger at the world – his perception of the world as a hostile adversary, worthy of his anger – 
had made him more interesting than these young paragons of self-esteem” (437). This feeling 
is exacerbated when Walter takes him to the concert of an indie band named Bright Eyes led 
by singer Conor Oberst. Katz sneers at the band's optimism, thinking “[W]hat a fucking 
irritating youth-congratulating name for a band” (463). In fact, what disturbs Katz is the sense 
that the younger generation has “none of the rage and disaffection of the crowds he'd been a 
part of as a youngster” (464). Franzen is making obvious reference to the New Sincerity in 
these comments, describing Oberst (who really exists) as “performing sincerity, and when the 
performance threatened to give sincerity the lie, he performed his sincere anguish over the 
difficulty of sincerity” (464). Richard, whom Franzen has tied to postmodernism from the 
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beginning, finds it “insufferable” (464). For him the event is a celebration of the new 
generation “being left to themselves to ritually repudiate, for an hour or two on a Saturday 
night, the cynicism and anger of their elders” (463-4) This new generation signals in some 
way Richard's, and thus postmodernism's, obsolescence: “They gathered not in anger but in 
celebration of their having found, as a generation, a gentler and more respectful way of being. 
A way, not incidentally, more in harmony with consuming. And so said to him: die” (464). In 
direct contrast to Richard, Walter is enthusiastic about the band, proclaiming, “'They're all 
about belief...The new record's this incredible kind of pantheistic effort to keep believing in 
something in a world full of death...It's like religion without the bullshit of religious dogma'” 
(464-5). Richard can only offer a sardonic comment, “'I admire your capacity for admiring'” 
(465). After the concert, he seeks out Patty, because “he was now craving the company of 
someone with a sense of irony” (465). In fact, Patty shares Richard's disdain of the new 
generation: “'Patty’s decided she doesn’t like anybody under thirty,' Walter said. 'She’s 
formed a prejudice against an entire generation. And, being Patty, she’s very funny on the 
subject. But it’s gotten pretty vicious and out of control'” (288). Richard remarks on the 
contrast with Walter by replying, “'Whereas you seem quite taken with the younger 
generation'” (288). By positioning Richard and Patty as out of sync with the new generation, 
Franzen signals to the reader that the postmodern era has come to a close, and by describing 
Walter as appreciative and admiring, he demonstrates that Walter's ecological ethics are more 
attuned to the contemporary era.
This is emphasized during the course of the novel when Walter has a rather comic 
meltdown in public and becomes a hero to the younger generation after a video of his rant 
goes viral online. Walter is hired by a billionaire who has concocted a scheme to open pristine 
wilderness to coal mining with the provision that after the coal is extracted the land will be 
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made into a permanent habitat for the cerulean warbler. Walter defends the compromise, 
telling a journalist that “[t]he Pan-American Warbler Park...represented a new paradigm of 
science-based, privately funded wildlife conservation; the undeniable ugliness of 
mountaintop-removal mining was more than offset by the prospect of sustainable 'green 
employment' (ecotourism, reforestation, certified forestry)” (589). Once the plan has 
succeeded, and he is set to make the public announcement, Walter begins to question “the 
course he’d charted for two and a half years with the Trust, convinced of the soundness of his 
arguments and the rightness of his mission, only to feel, this morning, in Charleston, that he’d 
made nothing but horrible mistakes” (400). Embittered by the breakdown of his marriage, the 
news that his wife has betrayed him with Richard Katz, and the corruption of his business 
partners, Walter's public announcement disintegrates into an angry rant. He mocks the 
displaced residents:
“You, too, can help denude every last scrap of native habitat in Asia, Africa, and South 
America! You, too, can buy six-foot-wide plasma TV screens that consume 
unbelievable amounts of energy, even when they’re not turned on! But that’s OK, 
because that’s why we threw you out of your homes in the first place, so we could 
strip-mine your ancestral hills and feed the coal-fired generators that are the number-
one cause of global warming and other excellent things like acid rain!” (608)
He continues in this vein getting more and more worked up, until he explodes into this 
diatribe:
“And MEANWHILE,” he shouted, “WE ARE ADDING THIRTEEN MILLION 
HUMAN BEINGS TO THE POPULATION EVERY MONTH! THIRTEEN 
MILLION MORE PEOPLE TO KILL EACH OTHER IN COMPETITION OVER 
FINITE RESOURCES! AND WIPE OUT EVERY OTHER LIVING THING 
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ALONG THE WAY! IT IS A PERFECT FUCKING WORLD AS LONG AS YOU 
DON’T COUNT EVERY OTHER SPECIES IN IT! WE ARE A CANCER ON THE 
PLANET! A CANCER ON THE PLANET!” (609, caps in the original).
At this point he is attacked by the angry audience and beaten to the ground. Naturally, he is 
fired by the Trust, but the event is not a total loss, as “the local TV footage of Walter’s rant 
and the ensuing riot had gone viral. It had lately become possible to stream video over the 
internet, and the Whitmanville clip (CancerOnThePlanet.wmv) had flashed across the radical 
fringes of the blogosphere, the sites of 9/11-conspiracy-mongers and the tree-sitters and the 
Fight Club devotees and the PETA-ites” (613). The unexpected media attention triggers a 
surging awareness of Walter's neglected side project, a summer internship whose goal is to 
interest the younger generation in population control.
Walter had developed the project with Richard Katz and his daughter Jessica, along 
with Lalitha, his assistant. He had brought in Jessica to gain access into the mindset of the 
younger generation, and Jessica points out that the new generation is not interested in 
opposition, but rather in making a positive choice: “'Kids my age are way more libertarian 
than you guys were,' she explained. 'Anything that smells like elitism, or not respecting 
somebody else’s point of view, they’re allergic to. Your campaign can’t be about telling other 
people what not to do. It’s got to be about this cool positive choice that we’re all making'” 
(457, italics in the original). Here, we see Franzen portraying a younger generation who 
prefers to embrace a positive structure of belief rather than oppose the system. Walter 
chooses the name for his movement specifically to undermine neoliberalism: “' I say we go 
with Free Space,' he said finally. 'I like how it steals the word 'free' from the other side, and 
appropriates the rhetoric of the wide-open West. If this thing takes off, it can also be the name 
of a whole movement, not just our group. The Free Space movement'” (458). Thus, the 
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opponent, the “other side” of Walter's ecological ethics is neoliberalism, whose ethics is 
primarily focused on individual freedom, a concept that is relentlessly critiqued in the novel. 
When Walter's rant goes viral, the Free Space movement begins to take off: “[O]vernight, 
despite having lost its funding...Free Space acquired a bona-fide fan base and, in the person 
of Walter, a hero” (613). Walter's Free Space project attracts a wave of young volunteers:
Lalitha checked her BlackBerry and found eighty new messages from young people 
all over the country, inquiring whether it was too late to volunteer for Free Space. 
Their e-mail addresses had more piquant flavors than the 
liberalkid@expensivecollege.edus of the earlier applicants. They were freakinfreegan 
and iedtarget, they were pornfoetal and jainboy3 and jwlindhjr, @gmail and @cruzio. 
(612)
Walter has clearly tapped into the zeitgeist, drawing out the younger generation. He starts a 
blog to communicate with his growing fan base, who latch onto his beliefs with intense 
fervor:
For a while, in his blog, he’d tried to downplay and qualify his cancer-on-the-planet 
'heroism' and emphasize that the villain was the System, not the people of Forster 
Hollow. But his fans had so roundly and voluminously chided him for this (“grow 
some balls man, your speech totally rocked,” etc.) that he came to feel he owed them 
an honest airing of every venomous thought he’d entertained while driving around 
West Virginia, every hard-core antigrowth opinion he’d ever swallowed in the name 
of professionalism. (618)
These sections of the novel become highly didactic, as Franzen gives us pages of Walter's 
ecological beliefs in such volume that they seem disconnected from the plot. For example, 
while Walter is simply waiting for something to happen, Franzen portrays his thoughts:
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To pass the time, Walter did mental tallies of what had gone wrong in the world in the 
hours since he’d awakened in the Days Inn. Net population gain: 60,000. New acres 
of American sprawl: 1,000. Birds killed by domestic and feral cats in the United 
States: 500,000. Barrels of oil burned worldwide: 12,000,000. Metric tons of carbon 
dioxide dumped into the atmosphere: 11,000,000. Sharks murdered for their fins and 
left floating finless in the water: 150,000. (430)
These long passages detailing ecological disaster are interspersed with dialogue whose 
primary purpose seems to be the exposition of ecological ethics. Walter's conversations are 
sprinkled with such moments:
“The problem is that nobody dares make overpopulation part of the national 
conversation. And why not? Because the subject is a downer. Because it seems like 
old news. Because, like with global warming, we haven’t quite reached the point 
where the consequences become undeniable. And because we sound like elitists if we 
try to tell poor people and uneducated people not to have so many babies.” (451-2)
The heavy-handedness of Franzen's recitation of ecological ideology during the sections 
focusing on Walter can at times be distracting.
Walter attempts to get Richard Katz to use his fame to promote ecological ethics, and 
Katz reluctantly agrees, but the revelation of his affair with Patty sours the relationship 
between them. Patty leaves Walter and attempts to build a relationship with Richard, but he is 
unable to adhere to any commitment: “Richard, in his stalwart if unconvincing way, was 
doing his best to be a Good Man now that she’d lost Walter. She didn’t love Richard a lot, but 
she did somewhat love him for this effort (although even here, let the record show, she was 
actually loving Walter, because it was Walter who’d put the idea of being a Good Man into 
Richard’s head)” (640). The relationship ends, and Patty finds herself alone. Meanwhile, 
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Lalitha dies in a car accident, causing Walter to give up his public persona and retreat to his 
lake house. Although it seems like he has given up his campaign against population growth, 
he is unable to stop living according to ecological beliefs. He launches a campaign against 
the pet cats in the new housing development that has been built on his lake: “The cats of the 
new neighborhood understandably preferred to stalk the woods and thickets of the adjoining 
Berglund property, where the birds were. And Walter, even before the last Canterbridge house 
was occupied, had gone door to door to introduce himself and ask his new neighbors to 
please keep their cats inside” (680). His neighbors naturally have objections to this. “'So 
Bobby kills birds,'” one of them says “'So what?'” (680). Walter patiently explains: “'[S]mall 
cats aren’t native to North America, and so our songbirds never evolved any defenses against 
them. It’s not really a fair fight'” (681). The neighbor doesn't care about Walter's concerns: 
“'[A]ll I care about is letting my children learn to take care of a pet and have responsibility 
for it. Are you trying to tell me they can’t do that?'” (681). Walter persists: “'We’re living in 
an important breeding area for a number of bird species that are declining in North America. 
And those birds have children, too. When Bobby kills a bird in June or July, he’s also leaving 
behind a nest full of babies that aren’t going to live'” (681). The neighbor counters, “'Well, 
I’m sorry,'” she says, “'but my children matter more to me than the children of some bird. I 
don’t think that’s an extreme position, compared to yours. God gave this world to human 
beings, and that’s the end of the story as far as I’m concerned” (680-1).The obstinance of his 
neighbors reawakens Walter's fury and he once again launches into an ecological campaign, 
bringing his neighbors “brightly colored neoprene cat bibs. He claimed that a cat wearing one 
of these bibs could do any frolicsome outdoor thing it pleased, from climbing trees to batting 
at moths, except pounce effectively on birds” (684). Walter's neighbors are less than pleased: 
“Walter seemed not to understand what a bother it would be to tie a bib around a cat every 
Allen 211
time it went outdoors, and how silly a cat would look in bright blue or red neoprene” (684). 
However, as the neighbors are tired of Walter's efforts, “the older cat owners on the street did 
politely accept the bibs and promise to try them, so that Walter would leave them alone and 
they could throw the bibs away” (684).
Walter's campaign against local cats is so drawn out and comical, and without any real 
narrative importance, that the question arises: Why is it there? The rather obvious clue is the 
name Richard Katz. Walter's campaign against cats stands as a symbol condemning the 
viewpoint of Katz: “Walter had never liked cats. They’d seemed to him the sociopaths of the 
pet world, a species domesticated as an evil” (688). Katz has broken up Walter's marriage 
because of his narcissism, and his lack of ethics. Richard believes that he has a right to hurt 
others: “His job in life was to speak the dirty truth. To be the dick” (475). Walter believes that 
Richard refuses to stand up for what he knows to be good because he wants to retain his 
independence: “'The world doesn’t reward ideas or emotions, it rewards integrity and 
coolness. And that’s why I don’t trust him. He’s got the game set up so he’s always going to 
win. In private, he may think he admires what we’re doing, but he’s never going to admit it in 
public, because he has to maintain his attitude'” (386). He is also unable to commit to a 
serious relationship, even with Patty. Walter's end game in his battle with Bobby is to obtain a 
trap, catch him, and deliver him to a shelter far away, thus ridding himself of his enemy. 
However, this action does not make him happy: “He didn’t regret having removed a menace 
from the ecosystem, and thereby saved many bird lives, but the small-animal vulnerability in 
Bobby’s face made him aware of a fatal defect in his own makeup, the defect of pitying even 
the beings he most hated” (692).
This pity foreshadows the novel's ending. Patty decides to attempt a reconciliation 
with Walter, and goes to the house on the lake, where Walter finds her sitting on the front 
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step. When he refuses to speak to her, she remains outside in the cold. Eventually, he feels 
pity for her, and brings her inside to warm her up. They reconcile. And Richard Katz also 
makes a conciliatory gesture. He sends Walter a CD: “It appeared to be a Richard Katz solo 
effort, with a boreal landscape on the front, superimposed with the title Songs for Walter” 
(699). It contains songs that manifest Walter's ecological ethics: “The first song was called 
'Two Kids Good, No Kids Better,'” (699). Although Walter responds by exclaiming “'God 
what an asshole you are'” (699), his tears indicate that Richard's final embrace of Walter's 
ecological ethics has redeemed him in Walter's eyes. At the novel's end, Walter and Patty 
move away from the lake, leaving their house “to be managed by a local trust as a bird 
sanctuary” (705), and “access to the preserve is granted only to birds and to residents” (706).
6.3 A Friend of the Earth by T. Coraghessan Boyle
T. Coraghessan Boyle's novel, A Friend of the Earth, published in 2000, provides a vivid 
example of the deployment of the ecological metanarrative in contemporary American 
fiction. The novel not only gives us an overview of the development and history of the 
environmental movement in The United States, but also presents to us a dystopian future in 
which the environment has been destroyed – a typical strategy of these novels. The 
implication of these dystopian visions is that environmental ethics are “good” in a profound, 
concrete way, and the results of not implementing them will be extremely harmful to us all. 
Boyle's novel focuses on the life of Ty Tierwater, an environmental activist, and his daughter, 
Sierra. The structure of the novel flashes back in forth through time, giving us a picture of the 
future, in the years 2025-2026, as well as going all the way back to what I consider to be the 
beginning of the contemporary era, 1989. Boyle uses a combination of first and third-person 
narrators, including adding first-person commentary to the the third-person sections. These 
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structural and stylistic manipulations create clear links between the actions of the past and the 
conditions in the future dystopian world. The novel describes Ty's conversion from middle-
class suburban father into an environmental activist that engages in “ecotage” (ecological 
sabotage) and who is eventually arrested and imprisoned for his crimes. In the distant future, 
after his release from prison, he works for Maclovio Pulchris, an eccentric pop star loosely 
based on Michael Jackson, as the caretaker of his private menagerie of endangered animals, 
in the hope that some of the species can be preserved despite the destruction of the 
environment.
If we restructured the novel into a temporally linear narrative, we would start with a 
portrayal of Ty Tierwater as a single father, living on the income generated by a shopping 
mall inherited from his father. This life is described as “his life of quiet desperation, aimless, 
asleep at the wheel, watching his father's empire fall away into dust like all the geriatric 
empires before it” (61). If the shopping mall and his father's success as a real estate developer 
embody the materialistic, Earth-destroying modern world, Ty's discontent would seem to 
belong to the postmodern era. Ty's future voice narrates this section, saying, “[F]or the better 
part of my life I was a criminal. Just like you. I lived in the suburbs in a three-thousand-
square-foot house with redwood siding and oak floors and an oil burner the size of Texas, 
drove a classic 1966 Mustang for sport and a Jeep Laredo...to take me up to the Adirondacks” 
(42). Ty is indeed imprisoned for his ecotage, but that is not the kind of crime he is referring 
to. Instead, he considers the damage to the environment caused by his lifestyle to be the real 
crime: “I guess I was dimly aware – way out there on the periphery of my consciousness – of 
what I was doing to the poor abused corpus of old mother earth, and I did recycle (when I got 
around to it, which was maybe once or twice a year)” (42). He extends this description of 
crime to include everyone in the Western world: “And just like you – if you live in the 
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Western world...I caused approximately two hundred fifty times the damage to the 
environment of this tattered, bleeding planet as a Bangladeshi or a Balinese, and they do their 
share, believe me” (43). Although Ty had previously had a dim awareness of the 
environment, and had actually named his daughter Sierra, in addition to joining the Sierra 
Club, he hadn't yet adopted any kind of environmental ethics. Instead, after his wife dies from 
an allergic reaction to a bee sting, he concentrates on raising his daughter by himself: “He'd 
been father and mother to Sierra since she was three years old and he had to rescue her from 
her grandmother and tell her mommy wasn't coming back anymore” (83). The suburban life 
of single fatherhood is described as stressful and unfulfilling: “Try climbing out of the cavern 
of sleep to the screams and night alarums of an inconsolable thirty-seven-pound ball of 
confusion and rage, try dropping her off at nursery school, a single father on his way to mind-
numbing, soul-crushing work, and she won't let go of the door handle” (83). His life at this 
point is empty, mind-numbing, and without meaning. He desperately needs a sense of 
purpose.
It arrives in the mail, when he receives a postcard inviting him to an Earth Forever! 
event: “Dear Mr. or Ms. Tierwater, it read, Are you concerned about the environment? Do 
you care about the rape of our forests, the pollution of our streams and rivers, the acid rain 
killing off the pristine lakes of the Adirondacks? Fed up? Ready for Direct Action? Then 
come to our, etc.” (62, italics in the original). This event would change his life, giving him his 
purpose, a belief system, and a set of ethics; and also determine his fate. Ty decides to attend 
the event, he tells us, because “he believed. He did. He genuinely did. He needed an 
awakening, a cause, a call to arms – and here it was” (63). There, he meets Andrea Knowles, 
a member of Earth Forever!, who eventually becomes his second wife in addition to 
introducing him to the life of an activist. The activist organization depicted in the novel is 
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rather obviously based on the real life Earth First! group, which is heavily influenced by 
Deep Ecology, and some of its splinter groups such as the Animal Liberation Front and the 
Earth Liberation Front that have been known to engage in more radical illegal action. Andrea 
comes from a long line of environmentalists: “She was the great-granddaughter of Joseph 
Knowles, one of the archetypal eco-nuts” (171), and is described as “the woman who 
routinely chained herself to cranes and bulldozers and seven-hundred-thousand-dollar Feller 
Buncher machines back in the time when we thought it mattered” (1). Earth Forever! also 
brings Ty into contact with another major character in the novel, Teo van Sparks, who carries 
a business card that identifies him as an “Eco-Agitator” (22). It is Andrea and Teo who 
indoctrinate Ty and his daughter, Sierra, into environmental ideology and an ecological 
ethics. Ty divests himself of his property, including the shopping mall he inherited from his 
father, and donates the funds to saving the environment: “[E]verything I ever had to 
invest...went to Andrea and Teo and my wild-eyed cohorts at Earth Forever! (Never heard of 
it? Think radical enviro group, eighties and nineties. Tree-spiking? Ecotage? Earth Forever! 
Ring a bell?)” (8). To Ty, this divestment represents a movement away from a life of “crime” 
to a more ethical life, one centered around the planet: “I sold the house, the cars, the decrepit 
shopping center my father left me, my wind surfer and Adirondack chair and my complete set 
of bootleg Dylan tapes, all the detritus left behind by the slow-rolling glacier of my old life, 
my criminal life, the life I led before I became a friend of the earth” (43).
The depiction of Ty's belief system is scattered throughout the novel in side comments 
and in his descriptions of the world and his life, and this provides Boyle an opportunity to 
give us a tour through the history of the environmental movement. At the core of Ty's beliefs 
is the idea, as the novel's title indicates, of being a “friend of the earth.” This concept's full 
expression requires a necessary opposition between humans and the eco-system of the planet: 
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“Friendship for the earth. For the trees and shrubs and native grasses and the antelope on the 
plain and the kangaroo rats in the desert and everything else that lives and breathes under the 
sun. Except people, that is. Because to be a friend of the earth, you have to be an enemy of 
the people” (44). Although Ty believes in human connection and loves his family, he still 
views people as the enemy: “Sure, there were individuals out there, human beings worthy of 
compassion, sacrifice, love, but that didn't absolve them of collective guilt. There were too 
many people in the world, six billion already and more coming, endless people, people like 
locusts, and nothing would survive their onslaught” (241). Thus, an ecological ethics 
renounces anthropocentrism and instead places the earth and its eco-system at its center. 
Boyle directly expresses the underlying motive for many of the dystopian eco-fantasies that 
populate contemporary culture as a romantic resentment of humanity and a longing to be 
freed from its inherited materialist value-system:
Sometimes, hiking the trails, dreaming, the breeze in his face and the chaparral 
burnished with the sun, he wished some avenger would come down and wipe them all 
out, all those seething masses out there with their Hondas and their kitchen sets and 
throw rugs and doilies and VCRs. A comet would hit. The plague, mutated beyond all 
recognition, would come back to scour the land. Fire and ice. The final solution. And 
in all these scenarios, Ty Tierwater would miraculously survive – and his wife and 
daughter and a few others who respected the earth – and they would build the new 
uncivilized civilization on the ashes of the old. No more products. Just life. (243)
This romanticism should not be surprising considering the transcendentalist roots of the 
American environmental movement, but the outright hostility toward humans indicates that 
we are no longer dealing with an anthropocentric ethics.
In addition to these expressions of post-humanism, the novel is filled with other 
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references to specific figures and ideas. For example, at the beginning, Ty introduces himself 
as an environmentalist and spells out some of his beliefs: “I'm an environmentalist, after all – 
or used to be; not much sense in using the term now – and I believe in Live and Let Live, 
Adat, Deep Ecology, No Compromise in Defense of Mother Earth” (6). Each of these phrases 
represents a complex ideology with its own history in the environmental world. Henry David 
Thoreau plays an important role in Ty's ideology as well. During the novel's first scene 
depicting direct action, we read that perhaps Ty “was thinking of Thoreau, his hero of the 
moment (along with Messrs. Muir, Leopold and Abbey): The authority of government can 
have no pure right over my person and property but what I concede to it” (49, italics in the 
original). Ty expresses his opposition to hunting by referring to Thoreau: “I've never hunted a 
thing in my life, not to kill it – I'm with Thoreau: No humane being, past the thoughtless age 
of boyhood, will wantonly murder any creature which holds its life by the same tenure that he  
does” (146, italics in the original). Ty's downsizing of his lifestyle is modeled, in part, on 
Thoreau: “I didn't want more. I wanted less, much less. I wanted to live like Thoreau” (263). 
Thoreau remains his hero even during the scenes set in the future, as he still keeps a “portrait 
of Thoreau” (76) on his wall. Another such figure is John Muir, who Ty identifies as “the holy 
fool who was the proximate cause of all this” (156). When Sierra occupies a giant redwood to 
prevent it from being cut down, Ty thinks of Muir:
I remembered Muir riding out a storm one night in the Sierras, thrashing to and fro in 
the highest branches of a tossing pine, just to see what it was like. He wasn't trying to 
save anything or anybody – he just wanted to seize the moment to experience what no 
one had experienced, to shout his hosannas to the god of the wind and the rain and the 
mad whirling rush of the spinning earth. He had joy, he had connection, he had vision 
and mystical reach. (156)
Allen 218
Thus, Boyle brings his awareness of the romantic underpinnings of the environmental 
movement to the surface of the novel again and again. Ty's reading selections also reflect this 
intellectual history, and bring us comments that seem to exist only to name names: “I retreat 
to the lavatory with a mold-splotched copy of Muir's The Mountains of California” (157-8), 
for example, or “He's been trying to read – Bill McKibben's The End of Nature” (33), and 
even a reference to “The Dharma Bums” (105), Jack Kerouac's fictionalized depiction of beat 
poet Gary Snyder, a major figure in the development of the contemporary environmental 
movement. 
References to Arne Naess and Deep Ecology also appear, including a rather 
pedagogical exchange between Ty and Sierra that seems designed to educate the reader: “She 
was fresh from Teo's Action Camp, in love with the idea of heroic sacrifice and so imbued 
with the principles of Deep Ecology she insisted on the ethical treatment not only of plants 
and animals, but even rocks and dirt. 'Rocks?' I said. 'Dirt?' She just nodded” (152, italics in 
the original). Ty here plays the role of uninitiated innocent, performing the presumed 
skepticism of a projected reader. Sierra takes the role of educator: “'Everything in the 
ecosystem has its integrity,' she assured me” (152). In answer to Ty's (and the projected 
reader's) skepticism, she continues to explain: “'[I]t's not just about wolves and caribou and 
whooping cranes – it's about the whole earth. I mean, you have to think about what right do 
we have to dig up the ancient soil and disturb the fungus and microbes, the springtails and 
pill bugs and all the rest, because without them there'd be no soil'” (153). This exchange is 
followed by a rather pedantic definition of Deep Ecology offered by Ty: “Deep Ecology – 
Adat – says that all elements of a given environment are equal and that morally speaking no 
one of them has the right to dominate. We don't preserve the environment for the benefit of 
man, for progress, but for its own sake, because the whole world is a living organism and we 
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are but a humble part of it” (153). Ty's sudden shift from skeptic to devotee in this passage 
emphasizes the force of Sierra's, and thus Deep Ecology's, moral argument. The reader's 
identification with Ty and his initial skepticism is exploited to suggest following his shift 
from skepticism to belief. Notice the emphasis laid on the ethics of Deep Ecology, invoking 
concepts such as rights and equality that are normally associated with humanism and 
extending them to the entire planet and the components of its eco-system.
Ty's beliefs intrude into every corner of his life so that he evaluates everyday events 
through the filter of an ecological ethics. When Maclovio Pulchris puts up Christmas 
decorations, Ty describes the holiday as “[t]he empty ceremony of a forgotten tribe. 
Christmas means nothing to me, except maybe as a negative, the festival of things, of 
gluttony, light the candles and rape the planet all over again” (144). His conversion to a new 
belief system is emphasized by the contrast with the past he describes: “We had Christmas 
when I was a boy, because of my mother, and there was magic in the world then – there was 
redemption. Hope. And more than that: there was a reason, for us and the beasts and the 
plants and everything else. That's all gone now. Long gone” (144). The recognition of 
environmental destruction has not only spoiled Christmas for him, but also eliminated the 
possibility of hope, redemption, and magic. These comments, coming as they do from a 
future viewpoint, toll the warning bell to us about the dangers of continuing on our current 
path. When Ty drinks a glass of wine, he can't really savor it because of his ethical doubts: 
“[H]e took no pleasure in it because the smell was artificial and the grapes that gave up their 
juice for it had been dusted with sulfur and Christ knew what other sorts of chemicals. Oak 
trees had fallen to make that wine. Habitat had been gobbled up. Nothing lived in a vineyard, 
not even nematodes” (238). Notice the references to nematodes and the ecological havoc 
wreaked by the creation of a vineyard, once again drawing from Deep Ecology. On the way 
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to commit an act of nighttime ecotage, Ty is stuck in a traffic jam, and he looks out on the 
city and sees only environmental damage:
The smog was like mustard gas, burning in his lungs. There was trash everywhere, 
scattered up and down the off-ramp like the leavings of a bombed-out civilization, 
cans, bottles, fast-food wrappers, yellowing diapers and rusting shopping carts, oil 
filters, Styrofoam cups, cigarette butts. A lone eucalyptus, twelve thousand miles 
removed from the continent where it had evolved, presided over the scene like an 
advertisement for blight. (240)
In fact, his thoughts are so imbued with ecological thinking that he can't even pass gas 
without worrying about the environmental consequences: “That's methane gas, a natural 
pollutant, same as you get from landfills, feedlots and termite mounds, and it persists in the 
atmosphere for ten years, one more fart's worth of global warming. I'm a mess and I know it. 
Jewish guilt, Catholic guilt, enviro-eco-capitalistico guilt: I can't even expel gas in peace” 
(106-7). Here, Ty puts his environmental beliefs on the same plane as religious beliefs, 
indicating that he has embraced their ethics as equivalent to a religion. The cumulative effect 
of these repeated passages is to lead the reader into viewing the world of the novel and the 
actions of its characters through an ecological lens.
Ty's beliefs lead him to fervently embrace direct action as the only possible way to 
save the planet. In this pursuit, he is schooled by Teo and his newly wedded wife, Andrea, 
who take him on an early excursion to block a logging road by digging a trench across the 
road, filling it with cement, and then letting the cement harden around their feet. In the early 
stages, Andrea is portrayed as the instigator of these actions: “She was enjoying this, a little 
field trip, she the professor and Tierwater the student. Call it Ecodefense 101, or 
Monkeywrenching for the beginner” (134). However, the irresponsible decision to allow his 
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fourteen-year-old daughter to join them in the cement leads to an attempt by local authorities 
to remove her from Ty's custody. Ty rescues/kidnaps her from temporary foster care and 
becomes a fugitive: “He was a criminal, a desperado, a fugitive from justice facing actual 
prison time, years maybe, years behind bars, and what had he done? He'd stuck his feet in 
some wet cement. Pissed off a few people. Tried to save the planet. Christ, they should be 
giving him awards” (125). Hiding with his family in a cabin in the woods under an assumed 
name, Ty sees himself not as a criminal, but rather a hero who should be rewarded for his 
sacrifices. Ty's reaction to the perceived injustice is to become more determined to fight for 
the environment:
Nobody knew them now, and nobody cared. But they were going to become a cause 
célèbre, that's how Tierwater saw it, heroes of the environmental movement. Like the 
Arizona Phantom. Or the Fox. People who'd struck back, done something, mattered. 
People who didn't just take up space and draw breath and consume so many pounds of 
food and pints of liquid a day and produce nothing in their whole oblivious, cramped 
and contaminated lives but waste and more waste. (125)
Here, we see how Ty's newly adopted sense of ecological ethics has transformed him from a 
suburban mall owner leading a life of quiet desperation into a hero, at least in his own eyes, 
and has given him a sense that his life matters and the courage to take extreme risks
While in hiding, Ty continues his covert acts of ecotage, sneaking out at night to 
sabotage logging machinery and other construction equipment, in sections of the novel that 
are clear echoes of Edward Abbey's novel The Monkey Wrench Gang (1975), one of the 
earliest attempts to fictionalize ecological thinking and an actual influence on the founders of 
Earth First! Here, we see how Ty uses defense of the eco-system to justify to himself the 
destruction of property:
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The least of those machines was worth fifty-thousand dollars, and I was prepared to 
destroy every working part I could locate – but subtly, subtly, so they'd see nothing 
amiss and run their stinking diesel engines till they choked and seized. I only wished I 
could be there to see it happen, see the looks on their faces, see the trees I'd saved 
standing tall while the big yellow machines spat and belched and ground to an 
ignominious and oh-so-expensive halt. (138-9, italics in the original)
Boyle maintains a distance from Ty's actions by showing him ignoring the cautions of Andrea 
and Teo, who, though supporting his goals, are worried about the potential consequences of 
his criminal activity. Although Andrea has warned Ty about drawing too much attention to 
the forest where they are hiding, Ty cannot stop himself from burning down a huge plantation 
of trees planted by a lumber company. When Andrea learns of his action, she chastises him: 
“[T]hirty-five thousand acres of habitat, gone just like that. What about the deer, the 
squirrels, the trees and ferns and all the rest?” (165, italics in the original). Ty replies by 
lecturing her about the environment: “Fire's natural up here, you know that – the sequoia 
cones can't even germinate without it. If you did a little research or even picked up a nature 
book once in a while instead of plotting demonstrations all the time, you'd know it's the most 
natural thing in the world” (165, italics in the original). Here, we see how Ty's embrace of 
ideology has led him to ignore the danger to his own family, and Boyle allows a glimpse of 
the hubris behind Ty's extremism: “And how had he felt about the fire? Good, he'd felt good. 
And more: he'd felt like an avenger, like a god, sweeping away the refuse of the corrupted 
world to watch a new and purer one arise from the ashes” (165, italics in the original). 
Boyle's depiction of Ty's willingness to break the law for his cause creates a contrast between 
him and an environmental movement that appears to be rather impotent: “E.F.!ers might have 
marched in the street and shouted slogans like 'Back to the Pleistocene!' but they strictly 
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eschewed any illegal activity; it was only the disaffected fringe that sometimes, out of 
frustration and an overriding love of the earth, spiked a grove of ancient redwoods or blocked 
a culvert” (160). It's clear that Ty does not belong to this more passive contingent: “[W]here 
did that leave Tierwater? Right where he wanted to be, on the unraveling edge of the 
disaffected fringe” (160, italics in the original). Boyle draws a clear distinction between those 
who truly live the ecological ethics and those whose environmental concerns are merely 
fashionable. In doing so, he also distinguishes between the postmodern era and the 
contemporary era, as Ty thinks about the '60s, a time “when he and Jane wore flowered shirts 
and pants so wide they were like flapping sails, a time when they subscribed to everything 
and never thought twice about it. Drugs were part of life then. And protests. Political protests. 
Flag-burning. Jeering. Painting your face for the sheer hell of it. There was none of that in 
what he was doing now” (209, italics in the original). A clear distinction is drawn between the 
anti-establishment attitude of the '60s and the more serious commitment of the contemporary 
era.
After Earth Forever! negotiates Ty's surrender to the authorities and a guilty plea in 
exchange for a reduction of charges and custody of Sierra, he and Andrea decide to spend the 
time before he goes to prison duplicating her great-grandfather's most famous publicity stunt. 
In 1913, Joseph Knowles had stood before a gathering of reporters and had stripped off all his 
clothing: “He then reiterated the credo that had drawn the journalists in the first place – that 
nature was to be preserved for its own sake as the nurturer of mankind” (172). After this 
statement, he entered the woods to live in the wilderness naked and alone: “Two months later, 
hard and brown and considerably thinner, not to mention chewed, sucked and drained by 
every biting insect in the county, he emerged at the same spot to an even larger crowd and 
proclaimed that his God was the wilderness and his church the church of the forest” (172). 
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This reference back to the great era of conservation once again underlines the philosophical 
history of the environmental movement, and again, there is a comparison to religion. Andrea 
and Ty agree to repeat Knowles' action, only this time they bring a journalist along to take 
pictures and ensure that they do not cheat the conditions. Ty sees their suffering as 
confirmation of his commitment to the environment:
To go out into the wilderness with nothing, to hunt and gather and survive like the 
first hominids scouring the African plains, that was something, a fantasy that burned 
in the atavistic heart of every environmentalist worthy of the name. And he was one of  
them, as far now from the shopping center and the life of the living dead he'd been 
enduring all these years as it was possible to be. (175, italics in the original)
Although they struggle to survive, finding little to eat and enduring exposure to the elements, 
Ty realizes the publicity value of the sacrifice: “Think of it as an adventure, Andrea said, and 
it was an adventure, Tierwater saw that immediately, the sort of thing that would make the 
two of them more notorious than all the Foxes and Phantoms combined” (175, italics in the 
original). They emerge from the forest after one month, but there is no sense of spiritual 
connection, just a collapse into pure physical existence. When Ty is arrested and taken to 
prison to serve his sentence, he feels a sense of relief, enjoying the pleasure of three full 
meals a day and a roof over his head. His and Andrea's publicity stunt had nevertheless been 
effective:
It had made the cover of Outside magazine, and it put them on the map, that was for 
sure. After that, practically every publication in the country, from People to the New 
York Times to the Enquirer, wanted to know what he and Andrea thought about the 
rain forest, the holes in the ozone layer, the decline of frogs worldwide, what it felt 
like to live naked and make love in a hut. The article had run to twelve pages, with 
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photos, and each line added another layer to the myth till the canonization was 
complete: they were the saints of the Movement, forget Abbey and Leopold and 
Brower and all the rest. (210)
Ty has accomplished his mission of becoming a hero, even to the point of comparing himself 
to a saint.
Upon his release from prison, Ty settles into a suburban routine, living on funds from 
Earth Forever! as Andrea continues her life as organizer and fund-raiser. Although he gains 
some measure of fulfillment from re-configuring his backyard in accordance with ecological 
principles, he finds himself feeling a strange restlessness: “[I]t wasn't just boredom – prison 
was boring – it was more a restlessness, a feeling of emptiness and impotence, a growing 
certainty that this was all a charade. The animals were dying, the forests falling. There were 
scores to be settled” (208). Ty yearns to return to the field: “Tierwater found himself craving 
more, craving action. It was an addiction, exactly that: once you'd identified the enemy, once 
you'd struck in the night and felt the magnetic effect of it, you were hooked. The passive 
business was fine, restoring an ecosystem, digging up a lawn, handing out flyers and 
attending rallies, but there was nothing like action, covert, direct, devastating” (237, italics in 
the original). Andrea strongly argues that he is a public figure and cannot afford to risk 
breaking the law, in light of his criminal record and the terms of his probation. In fact, she 
seems to have fully embraced a more legal path, telling Ty:
“No more guerrilla tactics. We can't afford it. Every time some eco-nut blows 
something up or spikes a grove of trees, we lose points with the public, not to mention 
the legislature. Seventy-three percent of California voters say they're for the 
environment. All we need to do is get them to vote – and we are. We're succeeding. We 
don't need violence anymore – I don't know if we ever did.” (238)
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By now, we know what will happen: Ty ignores Andrea's advice and goes out at night, face 
painted black, with sabotage tools, despite the risk: “He was risking everything, he knew 
that. But then, what was one marriage, one daughter, one suburban life compared with the 
fate of the earth?” (243, italics in the original). Ty is caught by police, and sent to prison once 
more, and Andrea decides to divorce him. He has lost everything, driven by a sense of ethics 
that puts the planet above himself and everything else. When Ty finally does get out of 
prison, he becomes even more fanatical. Lured by his former cellmate, who is operating 
undercover at the behest of the FBI, Ty attempts to poison the water supply of Los Angeles: 
“I was fighting a war, you understand, and maybe I lost my judgment, if I ever had any. In the  
company of an FBI agent posing as a disaffected scientist from BioGen and a shit by the 
name of Sandman...I found myself out on those windswept waters with eight big plastic 
buckets of tetrodotoxin at my feet” (218). What he doesn't know is that there is no real poison 
in the buckets; nevertheless, Ty is unable to go through with the plan:
[W]hen it was time to tip the buckets and begin evening the score in favor of the 
animals, I couldn't do it. Though I'd steeled myself, though I seethed and hated and 
reminded myself that to be a friend of the earth you have to be an enemy of the 
people...though this was the final solution and I the man chosen to administer it, when  
it came right down to it, I faltered” (218).
Ty is arrested and publicly branded “the human hyena” (218) by the press. Boyle portrays Ty 
Tierwater as man driven to such extremes by ethical concerns that he nearly commits what he 
believes will be mass murder, and although he doesn't go through with it, he describes this 
decision with the word “faltered,” meaning that he sees his lack of action as weakness, as a 
failure. Boyle consistently portrays Ty as a flawed man, driven by hubris and ego; yet, 
nevertheless, committed to what he believes is right; driven by a set of ethical principles.
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Sierra Tierwater is portrayed as similarly committed, but is viewed by the 
environmentalists in the novel as an almost religious figure. An early scene that takes place 
before Ty adopts his environmental beliefs demonstrates Sierra's character and foreshadows 
her fate. Having prepared steaks for dinner, Ty is surprised by Sierra's conversion to 
vegetarianism, telling us that her aunt “had taken her to the Earth Day rally in Washington 
Square, where she'd been converted by a dreadlocked ascetic and a slide show depicting doe-
eyed veal calves succumbing to the hammer and headless chickens having their guts 
mechanically extracted on a disassembly line” (114-5). Surprised by her decision, he is 
equally surprised by her strength of will: “Sierra stood there in the kitchen, five feet nothing 
and eighty-eight pounds, lecturing me about the evils of meat” (115). Ty finds her arguments 
compelling:
The steaks were in the pan, inch-thick slabs of flesh, and I looked at them there and 
for the first time in my life thought about where they'd come from and what the 
process was that had made them available to me and my daughter and anybody else 
who had the $6.99 a pound to lay down at the A&P Meat Department. Cattle suffered, 
cattle died. And I ate burgers and steaks and roasts and never had to contemplate the 
creature who gave it all up for me. That was the way of the world, that was progress. 
(116)
Although he can see her point of view, he fears that letting her refuse to eat the meat will 
compromise his authority as a single parent, and he worries that she will only choose to eat 
unhealthy food: “Let her get away with this and she'll rule me, that's the way I felt, and then 
it'll be junk food and candy, then it'll be stunted growth and rotten teeth and ruined skin, 
delinquency, early pregnancy, bad debts, drugs, booze, the whole downward spiral” (117). He 
insists that she eat the meat, but she refuses, remaining at the table until she falls asleep (a 
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scene that unfortunately reverberates with film and television clichés). For days, she 
continues to reject Ty's attempts to serve her meat, until, “[o]n the fourth day of her hunger 
strike, I got a call from the school nurse: she'd fainted during gym class, halfway through the 
rope climb, and had fallen twelve feet to the gym floor” (117). Ty races to the hospital, where 
he receives a cold welcome: “Sierra's eyes leapt up when she saw me come through the door, 
but then they went cold with the recollection that meat was murder and that I, her father, was 
chief among the murderers” (118). The end result of the standoff: “[S]he never touched 
another scrap of meat in her life” (118). This scene establishes Sierra as committed to her 
ethical beliefs and willing to stand up to authority at the risk of her own health. 
When she visits her father in prison, he apologizes to her for the actions that have 
separated them, for not being a bigger part of her life. Her response demonstrates her 
commitment to the environment: “'You don't have to apologize to me, Dad. I think what 
you're doing – and Andrea and Teo too – is the greatest thing anybody could do. The only 
thing'” (207). She pronounces her verdict of his actions: “'I think you're a hero'” (207). 
Drawing on the real-life example of Julia Butterfly Hill, who was still living in a tree at the 
time the novel was published, Boyle has Sierra occupy a redwood slated for destruction by a 
lumber company. The company tries to wait her out, hoping that the inclement weather will 
discourage her: 
A tree hugger by the name of Sierra Tierwater, twenty-one years old and a complete 
unknown – nobody's daughter, certainly – was trespassing in one of their grand old 
cathedral redwoods and the press was waiting for them to send a couple of their goons 
up to haul her down, as brutally as possible. But they weren't about to do that. Why 
bother? Why give her anything? (188)
But, as we have already seen, Sierra is not the kind who gives up easily: “She wasn't your 
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ordinary body-piercing neo-hippie college kid chanting slogans and chaining herself to the 
bumpers of corporate town-cars on her summer vacation, she was a shining symbol high up 
in the tower of her tree, she was immovable, unshakable, Joan of Arc leading her troops into 
battle” (223). She becomes a symbol, “the cynosure of the movement, the sacrificial virgin” 
(152), and remains in the tree for years, despite numerous attempts to shake her will: “Sierra 
set the record. Set it anew each day, like Kafka's hunger artist, but, unlike the deluded artist, 
she had an audience. A real and ever-growing artist, an audience that made pilgrimages to the 
shrine of her tree, sent her as many as a thousand letters a week, erected statues to her, 
composed poems and song lyrics, locked arms and marched in her name” (261). Sierra's 
resistance is described in glowing terms, and she is compared to a religious figure: “Sierra 
had begun to take on the trappings of the mad saint, the anchorite in her cell, the martyr who 
suffers not so much for a cause but for the sake of the suffering itself. She'd been studying the 
teachings of Lao Tzu and the Buddha, she told me” (262). Unlike Ty, who is driven by hubris 
and seething anger, Sierra takes to living in the tree as a way of life, communicating by cell 
phone with journalists and admirers, but giving no sign of faltering: “There was no need to 
come down to the earth, not then, not ever. She didn't care – or didn't notice – that she was the 
idol of thousands” (262). The novel's tragic climax comes when Sierra, who has been 
threatened by climbers and helicopters hired by the lumber company, simply falls out of the 
tree by accident, falling 180 feet to the earth below. Ty views her death as an act of heroism: 
“Sierra gave up everything for an ideal, and if that isn't the very definition of heroism I don't 
know what is. Once she was up in her tree, that was it, her life was over” (222). The religious 
connotations are again invoked during the future sections of the book, when a journalist 
wants to write her life story. It is called: “Martyr of the Trees: The Sierra Tierwater Story” 
(261). Ty has not only sacrificed his life to the cause, but also the life of his only child. The 
Allen 230
loss helps drive him to the extremes that lead him back to prison.
If the scenes of the novel set in the past portray Ty and Sierra as ethical warriors 
fighting the good fight against the destroyers of the environment, the future scenes provide us 
with a terrifying glimpse of the consequences of losing the fight. In the years 2025-2026, 
global warming has devastated the environment. Ty's narration is littered with commentary 
which reveals the changes that have occurred, emphasizing the damage to the environment: 
“The sky is black – not gray, black – and it can't be past three in the afternoon. Everything is 
still, and I smell it like a gathering cloud, death, the death of everything, hopeless and 
stinking and wasted” (2). The world is racked by massive storms alternating with devastating 
heat waves: “[P]eople thought the collapse of the biosphere would be the end of everything, 
but that's not it at all. It's just the opposite – more of everything, more sun, water, wind, dust, 
mud” (8). The wind is so fierce that buildings are destroyed and lives are endangered by 
flying objects: “People have been decapitated by roofing material, crushed, pole-axed, 
impaled – you hear about it every day on the news” (13). Dust fills the air, making it hard to 
breathe:  “And then there are the eye and lung problems associated with all the particulate 
matter in the air, not to mention allergies nobody had heard of twenty years ago. A lot of 
people – myself included – wear goggles and a gauze mask during the dry season, when the 
air is just another kind of dirt” (13). Ty chastises the reader for these conditions: “But what 
can I say? I told you so? This is the world we've made. Live in it” (13). The changes in the 
temperature have eliminated the possibility of creating certain foodstuffs: “Have I mentioned 
that grapes are a thing of the past? Napa-Sonoma is all rice paddies now, the Loire and Rhine 
Valleys so wet they'd be better off trying to grow pineapples” (15). Ty talks of eating “my last 
can of Alaskan snow crab (now extinct like everything else that walks or crawls in the sea, 
except maybe zebra mussels)” (4). There is no wine or beer, only sake, and meat has been 
Allen 231
replaced by an invasive species of catfish transplanted from Asia. Animal life has been 
devastated, with mass extinction the norm: “[T]he whole world is Africa now, and India, 
Bloomington, Calcutta and the Bronx, all wrapped in one. The mega-fauna are gone, the 
habitat is shrunk to zero, practically no animals left anywhere but the R-species and the 
exotics” (232). This includes the local landscape: “This used to be open country twenty-five 
years ago – a place where you'd see bobcat, mule deer, rabbit, quail, fox, before everything 
was poached and encroached out of existence” (7). It also encompasses the entire earth: 
“Now the elephants are gone, and the forest too – Ceylon, last I heard was 100 percent 
deforested, a desert of unemployable mahouts and third-generation twig gatherers” (79). Heat 
waves lift the temperature to over 130 degrees: “The whole world's a pizza oven, a pizza 
oven that's just exploded, the blast zone radiating outward forever, particles of grit forced 
right up my nose and down my throat” (258). The narrative emphasizes the connection to 
today, chastising our inaction:
Global warming. I remember the time when people debated not only the fact of it, but 
the consequence. It didn't sound so bad, on the face of it, to someone from Winnipeg, 
Grand Forks or Sakhalin Island. The greenhouse effect, they called it. And what are 
greenhouses but pleasant, warm, nurturing places where you can grow sago palms and 
hydroponic tomatoes during the deep-freeze of the winter? But that's not how it is at 
all. No, it's like leaving your car in the parking lot all day with the windows rolled up 
and then climbing in and discovering they've been sealed shut – and the doors, too. 
(185-6)
As if to emphasize to us the futility of global warming denial, Ty blatantly asserts, “Global 
warming. It's a fact” (186). This message, like most of these commentaries, is aimed 
backwards in time, to us, as the residents of Ty's era undoubtedly know the truth of climate 
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change. Ty's final verdict is damning: “Nature doesn't matter anymore – it's not even nature, 
just something we created out of a witches' brew of fossil-fuel emissions and deforestation” 
(81).
In this blasted dystopian world, Ty lives a spartan existence as the caretaker of pop 
star Maclovio Pulchris' private menagerie of wild animals. As he explains to a journalist: 
“'That's what we were trying to do here, Mac and me...save the animals. It's too late for the 
earth. Or for us. But the animals, if only we can keep them from extinction until we're gone – 
they'll adapt, they will, and something new will come up in their place. That's our hope. Our 
only hope'” (221). Unfortunately, the journalist is only interested in celebrity gossip: “I'm 
trying to marshal my thoughts to tell him about extinction, about how we're at the very end of 
the sixth great extinction to hit this planet, caused by us, by man, by progress, and how 
speciation will occur after we're gone, an explosion of new forms springing up to fill all the 
vacated niches...but he's not listening” (221). The message is clear – that our celebrity-
obsessed media are not doing their job, not informing the public of the dangers that await 
them, and that the public is simply not interested. After Pulchris is killed by one of his lions, 
Ty and Andrea, who has returned to him, head out to the cabin where they had once hidden 
from the law. There they are greeted by a devastating scene:
[W]hat has changed, and no amount of footage on the nightly news could have 
prepared us for it, is the forest. It's gone. Or not gone, exactly, but fallen – all of it, 
trees atop trees, trees bent at the elbows, snapped at the base, uprooted and flung a 
hundred yards by the violence of the winds. All the pines – the sugar, the yellow, the 
Jeffery, the ponderosa – and all the cedars and the redwoods and aspens and 
everything else lie jumbled like Pick-up-Sticks. Mount Saint Helens, that's what it 
looks like. Mount Saint Helens after the blast. (266)
Allen 233
Here, Ty and Andrea will try to establish a new existence in harmony with nature, in the hope 
that, eventually, the eco-system will recover. The novel ends on a note of hope: “The woods – 
these woods, our woods – are coming back, the shoots of the new trees rising up out of the 
graveyard of the old, aspens shaking out their leaves with a sound like applause, willows 
thick along the streambeds. At night you can hear the owls and the tailing high shriek of 
coyotes” (274).
It might seem that Ty, having lost his daughter and spent much of his life in prison, 
and having failed to stop the coming environmental collapse, would have some regrets about 
his life. Yet, in one of the novel's final scenes, Ty confronts an insurance investigator who had 
investigated the fire he had set in 1989. The investigator asks him if he was the one who had 
set the fire, and Ty replies: “'I set the fire and demolished it all, and you know what? I'd do it 
again. Gladly'” (270). Here, we see that Ty still believes that he was right and the changes in 
the climate described in the novel support this belief. The investigator remains skeptical, 
asking, “'And what did you accomplish? Look around you – just look around you and answer 
me that'” (270). Ty replies, “''Absolutely nothing'” (270). Ty's ecological battle was justified 
on its ethical merits alone, even if the outcome was failure.
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7 Conclusion
At this point, I'd like to look back over the dissertation and summarize the main points in 
order to consolidate my argument. In my first chapter, I analyzed seven different theories 
proposing an end to postmodernity and the beginning of a new period. This chapter 
established several important factors for my argument. First of all, it demonstrated a 
widespread sense that postmodernity has come to an end. Next, it established that although 
there are some overlapping areas of agreement, for the most part, there is no clear consensus 
about what happens after postmodernism. I identified two approaches that theorists have 
taken, one taking postmodern theory and extending it into something new, and the other 
proposing a break with postmodernism altogether. The most important conclusion I draw 
from my analysis for the purpose of this dissertation is the fact that most if not all of the 
theories posit a renewed interest in ethics. This conclusion leads me to my central thesis: that 
the period after postmodernity is characterized by an interest in finding ethical systems or 
structures that counteract the weaknesses in postmodern ethics.
In my next chapter, I examined postmodern ethics and its critics. I presented two 
critical views of postmodern ethics, the first being that postmodernism has no ethics, is 
essentially non-ethical; and the second an ethics of being for the other, derived from Lévinas. 
The criticism of postmodernism being non-ethical tended to fall into two categories. One 
insisted that a textual and linguistic focus was a distraction from real world suffering, and 
went so far as to suggest that the failure to engage ethically was an attempt to cover up 
something iniquitous at the heart of postmodern theory. One critic, for example, suggested 
that postmodernism was just a new form of conservatism that was attempting to resist the 
changes ushered in by modernity. The other criticism was that postmodern theory was pure 
nonsense, was, in fact, in some way “phony.” These criticisms led to the so-called “ethical 
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turn,” which put forth a concept of ethics based on being for the other. This ethics was 
criticized for different reasons than the first version I discussed. One criticism is that it is 
extremely difficult to live by these ethics, as there is no clear guidance for how to be for the 
other. Another criticism is the the lack of reciprocity that forms the basis of a functioning 
society. Others criticize the ethics of being for the other as merely another name for 
imperialism, colonialism, or even racism. All of these difficulties mean that postmodern 
ethics are inadequate for contemporary subjects.
After this analysis, I explored but ultimately rejected the possibility of an ethical 
dominant. Drawing from Brian McHale's theory that the modern era had been characterized 
by an epistemological focus, and that the postmodern era had been characterized by an 
ontological focus, I proposed that perhaps the era after postmodernity could be considered to 
have an ethical dominant. My argument was that if the modern questioning of epistemology 
had indeed led us to start questioning the very nature of reality itself, and had thus brought us 
to postmodernism, as McHale describes, then the postmodern questioning of ontology had led 
us to an ethical dilemma. If we can't trust our perceptions of reality, and thus, don't know 
what reality is, how can we make decisions about how to act? The postmodern solution was 
play, but play can only bring us so far. What if we want to do the right thing, the “good” 
thing? What if there are real world consequences? In the state of ontological uncertainty 
McHale leaves us in, we would desperately need some kind of system or structure 
independent of our perceptions of reality, in order to guide us in making decisions. In other 
words, we would need ethics. Ultimately I decided to reject an ethical dominant because I 
think it is impossible to sum up an entire epoch, even if, like McHale, we limit it to works of 
fiction, with one idea. However, as McHale's theory does have a lot of utility as a quick 
litmus test, I wanted to show that my theory could be used to extend his – and is, at the very 
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least, logically consistent with it.
Having established that the era after postmodernism is characterized by a renewed 
interest in ethics, and having explored the weaknesses of postmodern ethics, in my third 
chapter I laid out a periodization concept from which I draw out three ethical paradigms that 
in some way engage with or eliminate the weaknesses of postmodern ethics. In my model, I 
explained why so many of the theories examined in my first chapter proposed a new 
modernity. I integrated the end of the Cold War, the spread of neoliberalism, and the rise of 
the Internet into an explanation for a change in mood and focus, calling out the need for 
ethical guidance in a rapidly changing globalized society. I identified three ethical paradigms 
that arose from these changes. The first, an egoism embedded in neoliberalism that insists 
that each individual has the right to pursue individual happiness by participating in a free 
market that provides a nearly infinite array of products and services. The second paradigm I 
identified was a pragmatist approach to religion that involves relating to what one considers a 
higher power. The final paradigm was a metanarrative centered around ecological thinking 
that views humans as only one part of a larger system. Although these ethical paradigms may 
have arisen independently from the existence of postmodernism, I suggest that their growing 
presence in contemporary American fiction is indicative of their usefulness in resolving the 
ethical issues left over from the postmodern era.
In order to demonstrate and explore this growing presence, I performed six close 
readings of contemporary American novels, all of which were written in the period that I 
propose follows postmodernity. I opted to exclude from consideration novels and writers who 
are or could be considered postmodern. After briefly describing some key concepts from each 
paradigm, I read two novels per ethical paradigm. The first novel in each case contrasted the 
ethical paradigm with postmodernism in some way, either through a direct discussion of 
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theory, or through a character who represented the postmodern viewpoint. The second novel 
illustrated the ethical paradigm without reference to postmodernism, showing that the ethical 
paradigm is representative of the contemporary era and not just a critique of postmodernism. 
The readings clearly demonstrate that not only are these three ethical paradigms present in 
contemporary American fiction, they are placed in response to the ethical weaknesses of 
postmodernism.
If postmodernity has indeed come to an end and been replaced by something else, 
tentatively referred to by the clumsy appellation “post-postmodernity,” there is no clear 
model to describe this new period. By seeking out a common theme among the various 
theories and offering a proposal for why it is so central, I hope I have made an important 
contribution to the ongoing efforts to define the contemporary era. This definition is not only 
important for us as literary theorists, helping us to better differentiate and analyze works of 
literature; it is also necessary for anyone who hopes to understand the world in which we live 
today. The paradigms I've identified and explored are helping to shape our culture, our 
economic and political reality, and our daily lives. They form the environment in which our 
ideas are formed, and it is essential to see how and why this happens. If our society is longing 
for ethical guidelines to help navigate the rough seas of a rapidly changing future, at the same 
time, it is also valuing humanities research less and less. Ethical research such as this 
dissertation can demonstrate the centrality of the humanities to living full, happy, and 
productive lives. Science can produce knowledge, technology, and change, but it doesn't help 
us cope with these disruptions. Only the humanities do this.
At this point I would like to acknowledge and address some potential weaknesses of 
my approach. Although I draw my examples solely from fiction, my models are larger than 
that and could encompass other cultural fields. I could have used film quite easily, and there 
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were films such as James Cameron's Avatar (2009) that exhibit all three of my paradigms. 
One of my biggest problems while writing this dissertation was sorting through the 
extraordinary amount of works that fit my paradigms. I had to draw the line somewhere, and I 
chose fiction because it is the form of narrative that gives the deepest insight into the internal 
decision-making process and belief systems of its characters. No doubt the same paradigms 
could be used to analyze art, architecture, poetry, or photography. There is certainly more 
work to be done, which makes this field of inquiry so exciting to explore. The contemporary 
era is like a new continent, and the maps we are forming are preliminary forays into new 
territory. Again, I could have opted to do a comparative study and chosen works from 
different cultures and languages, but this would have expanded my already enormous text 
corpus to unworkable size. I opted to stay within the culture where I first noticed the 
phenomenon. 
Another weakness was the lack of marginalized voices. This occurred somewhat 
inadvertently as I excluded works that manifested an ethics of being for the other from 
consideration. This eliminated a hefty portion of contemporary fiction from consideration and 
caused me to exclude a number of important authors. In no way does my project intend to 
suggest that these writers are not part of the contemporary paradigm. In fact, the ethics of 
being for the other is probably the most common ethical paradigm in contemporary American 
fiction. Finally, if I had written three separate dissertations, I could have gone much more 
deeply into each of the ethical paradigms – there are plentiful examples for each of them, and 
I was only able to briefly explore them here. There are already multiple books detailing these 
ethical paradigms, but none of them, as far as I know, position them as characteristic of an era 
following postmodernity. Again, there is much more work to do.
With that in mind, I would like to propose some areas for future research. One of my 
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regrets was my inability to formulate a coherent thesis for another ethical paradigm I noticed, 
which appears quite frequently in non-fiction as well as fiction. In this paradigm, family 
illness or tragedy serves as a catalyst for depressed and unsuccessful postmodern subjects to 
form an ethical structure around caring for a family member. Works such as The Corrections 
(2001) by Jonathan Franzen, Purple America (1996) by Rick Moody, and Dave Eggers' A 
Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius (2000) serve as excellent examples. I hope to 
develop a deeper theoretical concept on this theme sometime in the future. Another obvious 
direction for future work would be to try to apply these paradigms to works in other cultures 
or other cultural fields to see if they hold true. Due to the fact that all of my paradigms draw 
from established American philosophical tendencies, it could be interesting to see if these 
ideas exist in other cultures or not. In addition, searching for these paradigms in non-narrative 
forms such as visual art or music could reveal interesting aesthetic trends. Finally, I believe 
that if these paradigms are combined and balanced with each other, it could create some very 
interesting readings of major works such as the novel I began with, Infinite Jest. This 
dissertation could very well be a preliminary work in a new area of research.
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